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CHAJ?TER I 
The scope and aim of our investigation is the presentation 
of an organized or systematic view of Brownson's political 
philosophy. This includes particularly the argumentation 
whereby Brownson supports his conclusions. This task requires 
one to sift the pertinent material from the multitude of 
articles on _;_)oli tical to·pic s penned ·oy this :;Jrolific writer 
1 
from 1838 to 1875. 
Orestes Brownson was a professional reviewer. As such he 
touched upon every im?ortant issue of his day. In his 
commentaries he strove to analyze his subjects carefully, to 
delve into the basic princiyles involved. So it is that in 
his observations on contemporary political problems, he fre-
quently transcended immediate issues to enter the realm of 
:yhilosophy. 
Since Brownson's discussions were 9rom:pted by current 
issues, it is difficult to comprehend and. to evalurte his 
political philosophy without noting specifically the :Jroblems 
1 His ·,vritings fill twenty large volumes which have been 
collected and arranged by his son. Henry :h1 • Bro-vvnson, The 
;forks of Orestes A. Bxovmson, Detroit, 1882-1887. Citations 
hereafter are to the volun1e and page of these works. 
i 
p:u 
that prompted it. However, detailed biographical information is 
not pertinent to the topic treated, and is furthermore unnecess-
ary because of comparatively recent biographies which are 
2 
readily accessible. Therefore it seems advisable to indicate 
briefly the salient features of his life and times, selecting 
only information that is helpful, and even necessary, for an 
understanding of Brovnson's position. 
2 Doran i1halen(Sister Rose Gertrude /Jhalen, C.S.C.}, Granite for 
God's House, Hew York, 1941; .Arthur I~I. Schlesinger, Jr., 
Orestes A. Bro·wnson: A .Pilgrim_'s Progress, Boston, 1939; 
Theodore llaynard, Orestes Brownson- Yankee, Radical, Catholic 
Hew York, 1943. It is helpful to know that these-biographies 
are based largely urJon a three volume life of Brownson by his 
son, Henry F. Brownson, who reprints most of the imgortant 
letters sent and re'Jeived by his father. Orestes A. Brownson' I 
Early Life, Middle Life, Later Life, Detroit, 1898-1900. · 
It omits letters which are _purely oersonal, such as Brownson's 
quarrels with his family and his indulgence in intoxicating 
beverages in his old age. Schlesinger's work is gerhaps the 
most helpful, although his treatment of the period immediately 
prior to Brownson's death appears slightly misleading. The 
work of '1lhalen is confessedly pro-Brownson, to such a degree 
that it is inaccurate, as is indic:.:;ted clearly by ~Vilfred 
Parsons, S.J., "Brownson, Hecker, and Hewit," Catholic World, 
(1941), CLIII, 396-408. Maynard adds information concerning 
Brownson es a Catholic omitted by Schlesinger, and with 
considerable flourish indicates defects in #halen's study. 
• iii , 
Orestes A. Brownson was born in Stockbridge, Vermont, on 
3 
september 16, 1803. His parents were Sylvester and Relief Met-
calf Brownson. Sylvester died shortly after the birth of Oreste 
and his twin, Daphne Augusta. The boy was one of six children. 
wnen he was six years old his mother, unable to continue the 
support of bmr family, placed Orestes with an aged couple in the 
town of Royalton where he was reared. 
The people with whom he lived were New England Congrega-
4 
tionalists. Brownson says that they treated him with great 
kindness and affection. However, he led a rather isolated 
existence: 
Properly speaking I had no childhood • • • • 
Brought up with old people, and debarred 
from ~11 the sports, plays, and amusements 
of children, I had the manners, the tone, 
and tastes of an old man before I was a 
boy. A sad misfortune. 5 
Because of his environment Brownson was free to devote a 
great part of his time to reading, an accomplishment he 
achieved at an ec"rly age. He read whatever was available, 
3 The brief account of Brownson's life given in this chapter is 
based, for the most part, on Brownson's autobiography, The 
Convert, V, 1-200. ---
4 They did not attend the services of this congregation because 
its meeting :place was too far from their residence. V, 7. 
5 V, 4. 
'~ 
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0 
although this was comparatively little. He was interested parti-
cularly in the Scriptures and eSpecially in tbe Passion. Thus he 
says that his reading Yvas confined " ••• principally to the 
Scriptures, all of v~ich I had read before I was eight, and a 
great part of which I knew by heert before I was fourteen years 
7 
old.n 
He recounts an incident at the age of nine which gives us 
an insight into the temperament which cha.racterized both his 
youth and maturity. He tells us that he was permitted to 
accompany a much older boy to the square at Toyalton -
••• to witness a muster, or general training 
of a brigade or militia. On returning home, I 
was asked what I had seen to interest me. I 
answered that I had seen two old men talking 
on religion. In fact, I was so much interested 
in their discussion that I quite forgot the 
soldiers, Shough I came of a military family, 
and almost forgot to eat my card of gingerbread. 
The discussion, I remember, w~~s on free-will · 
and election, and I actually took part in it, 
stoutly maintaining free-will against Edwards, 
who confounds volition with judgement.... 8 
This incident indicates that Brownson possessed a rather 
6 "Our family librt::~ry consisted of a .:.:'rotesta.nt version of the 
Scriptures, a London edition; /latt's Psr,lms and Divine Songs, 
and The Franklin .Primer, to v.h ich viere subsequently [~.dded 
Edward 1s History of Redemption; Davies's Sermons; a History of 
the Indian ~aars by Dr. S"anders ••• , a muliila ted copy oi· 
Pnilip Q,uarle, ••• and during the wer of 1812 with Great 
Britain, a weekly newspaper, published in ;'lindsor by Alden 
Spooner." V, 4-5. 
7 v' 5. 
8 v' 5. 
ptt v 
unusual aptitude for becoming involved in t:;,rguments. He 
mentions also that he possessed this inclination in common with 
a fiery temper: "I had an irritable temper, and was subject to 
violent outbreaks of passion, but I tried hard to control myself 
and, till I was man grown, I do not believe I ever suffered . . . 
9 
the sun to go down upon my ·wrath." The incident indicates 
further the primacy which matters pertaining to religion and 
controversy occu~ied in the life of Brownson. In fact anything 
as mundane as a card of gingerbread remained of secondary 
10 
importance tr~oughout his life. 
As has been noted, Brownson refers to his lack of childhood 
companionship as a sad misfortune. tlliile it undoubtedly was 
such in the sense that it deprived him of something, it also 
encouraged his tendency to medit9te upon scriptural passages, 
' and especially upon the accounts of the Passion • And while his 
solitude w&s due in part to circumstances over which he had no 
control, it w~:ts also partially voluntEry. Thus he says: 
9 V, 6. It seems that Brownson g2,ve way to his temper rather 
frequently, but es)ecially in the heat of an argument. Of., 
for e7oB.mple, the following in which Schlesinger, 153, 
describes Brownson's visits to Brook Farm: "The star·ry 
optimism of the dwellers frequently stirred him to debate 
where, argument failing, he sought to overawe by sheer 
physical massiveness, raising his voice, pounding on the 
table, and givmng ·Nay to anger when his op:9onents failed to 
grasp his point." 
10 Maynard, 282-283, notes th:s,t Brownson was distressed finan-
cially at rather frequent interV[\lS. He attributes this not 
to Bro1mson's lack of sh~ewdness in managing finances, but to 
· the fact that they were not su c'fici ently imp or tan t to 
receive a great deal of his time and attention. 
p;; 
Sometimes I seemed to hold lon~ familiL.r 
conversations with him rchrist] and was deeply 
pained when anything occurred to interrupt 
them. Sometimes, also, I seemed to hold a 
spiritual intercourse with the Blessed Mary, 
and with the holy angel Gabriel, who had , 
announced to her that she was to be the mother 
of the Redeemer. I was rarely less alone than 
when alone •••• I :!)referred to be alone, for 
then I could taste the sweets of silent medita-
tion, and feel that I was in the presence of 
Jesus and Mary, and the holy angels; yet I had 
not been baptized, and had very little instruction 
except such as I had obtained from reading the 
Holy Scriptures. 11 
Vi 
·~vhile Brownson had no particular instruction in religion he 
frequently attended the meetings of the various sects which were 
held in the vicinity. These inal ud.ed the Methodists, Baptists, 
Universalists and Christians. He could discover no difference 
in their respe 'Jti ve doctrines, but he prefer red the Methodist 
preachers bec~use they 
••• apiJe~c·red to have the stronger lungs; they 
preached in a louder tone, and when they 
pre:c ched the pe01)le shouted more. I thought 
them the best, bec~use they made tile most 
noise, and gave the most vivid pictu:res of 
hell-fil'e, and the tortu.res of the damned. 
All I lea1·ned, ho i7ever, ±·rom v.i ther was, that 
I must be born again or go to hell, get religion 
or be damned. The more I listened to them, the 
more I feared hell, and. the less I loved God. 12 
At the age of fourteen he left his gue.rd.ians. His mother 
took him, along 'iiith the re:::r'c of the family, to B&.llston Spa, 
in Hev.r York. He earned his livelihood by \,'or king iE. a ·::?rinter' 
11 v, 6. 
12 v' 7. 
---····--------··---·----------
a V:Ll 
office. :C:e also attenued c:.n acad.emy in the vi::dnity, but only 
13 
for a very brief period. His stay at the academy marked the 
beginning and end of his formal e<iucation. During this :period 
he retained his inte1:est in religion, but he was ex)osed to many 
conflicting theol"ies. He encounte:ced atheists, Univers&.lists, 
deists. lie mind became confused. The nore he trusted his 
reason, the further it led him :from religion. Yet _he felt the 
need of religion. He vms in a ;>osition which necessitated a 
14 
choice betvleen 1·eason and religion. At the age of nineteen he 
decided in favor of religion. He says that he vtas p&ssing a 
Presbyterian meeting house on a llleasant September day, entered 
it, and ·1tas deeply o~ffe-cted by the services. The following 
Sunday he ~·1as baytized and received as a member of the congre-
15 
gat ion. 
His life as a Presbyterian was not very agreeable. After 
attending his first meeting on the dry after his ba:::>tism, he 
realized he had made a mistc.ke. The account of his "Presbyter-
13 The ex::o.ct extent of Browns on's forrnal education is urJ.kno\m. 
Schlesinger, 7, mentions that "••· he briefly attended a 
a neighboring academy, probably until his earnings ran out ••. 1 
Brownson says he was attending school at the age of nineteen, 
but does not indicate his age at enrollment. V, 10. l!aynard, 
12, n. 13, gives a reo.,r3onabie explanation: "••• After Orestes 
had exhausted his savings, he worked as a 1n·inter, and then, 
having ear ned enough, resumed his studies." The only thing 
certain in regard to Brownson's formal education is that it 
was brief. 
14 v' 9. 
15 v, 10. 
a 
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ian Ex:1erienae" in The Convert desc:cibes 
16-· 
the )articular congre-
gation he joined. It also describes his 
17 
Presbyterianism in its doctrines. His position was a painful 
one. He endured his torments for two years. During this time 
he anBlyzed his position. He had abandoned reason for an 
autho1·itative teacher. In Presbyterianism he found no authority 
It directed him to the Bible, asking him to read it with a 
prayerful mind. Thus it disclaimed all responsibility as an 
authoritative teacher. Brownson immedi~;tely detected an ,unfair-
ness in this attitude: 
But while the Church refused to t~e the 
res,)onsibili ty of telling me -what dootrine I 
must believe, while she s ;nt me to the bible 
and grivate judgment, she yet claimed authority 
16 Schlesinger, 10-11, notes that his descri?tion on this point 
is exaggerated. He object~=, for example, wben Brovvnson says 
that the member-' of the Oongregetion v:ere bound to watch over 
one another ·Ni th fraternal affection. Brownson says that "I 
was not long in discovering that this meant that we were eac 
to be a spy upon the others, and to rebuke, admonish, or re-
port them to the .Session. My whole life became constrained. 
I dared not trust myself in the presence of a chDxch member, 
to a single s2ont&-neous .emotion. I dared not S?3 ak in my 
natural tone of voice, and if I smiled, I expected to be 
reported." V, 12. 
17 The descri•)tion of his own state of mind may be, and undoubt 
edly is, accurEcte, even though it is exaggerated in regard t 
the ~oarticulEr congregation he joined. It has been noted 
that Brownson joined the congregation on the s:9ur of the mom 
ent. Consequently he ..,-n:;s unsY:are of his incompatibility with 
Presbyter ian ism. Further more, he was in t:~n extremely disturb d 
!lt~;te of mind drawn between rationality or reason and 
religion. T!'king all these factors into consideration one 
may easily believe that Brovmson v:as rrther nervous about 
the entire situ2.tion E.nd conseq_:eetly s~1eaks the truth when 
he s<>.ys that his v:hole life ·:·as constr::dned. 
• 
to condemn and excommunicate me as a heretic 
if I departed from the standard of doctrine 
contained in her confession. 18 
ix 
Having become more keenly aware of his position, Brovmson 
realized very vividly that he had made a mistake in abandoning 
his rec::son. .l!'or if he denied it, or looked upon it as unworthy 
of his confidence, he would be as though he v1ere vvi thout it. 
conseq~ently he would be no better than an ox or an ass. There-
fore he v1ould be qualified no beti7er than an ox or an ass to 
determine whether God exists or has made a revelation. Further-
more, an ass could not receive a revelation even on the supposi-
tion that God exists and has made one. So he decided that to 
revoke reason as he had done was a ncowardly act, the act of an 
19 
intellectual des1)eredo." Hereafter he vvould trust his reason. 
He would never s.gain abendon it. He would not believe anything 
wluch contradicted it. Brownson made this decision at the age 
18 V, 13. Brown son cent inue s the same trend of thought. "This I 
reg~ rded as unfEir treatment. It subjected me to all the dis 
advantages of authority ~vithout'any of its advantages. The 
church demanded that I should tre~::t her as a true mother, 
vvhile she v.cas free to treat me only as a ste gs on, or even as 
a stranger. Be one thing or another, said I; either assume 
the authority and responsibility of teaching and directing 
me, or leave me with the responsibility and my freedom. If 
you have authority from ~od, avow it, and exercise it. I am 
all subwission. I will hold what you say, and do what you 
bid. If you have not, then say so, and fSorbear to c.<.:Lll me to 
an account for differing ~rom you, or disregarding your teach 
ings. Bither bind me or loose me. Do not mock me with a 
freedom which is no freedom, or vii th an authority which is 
ill·usory. n V, 13-14. 
19 v, 18. 
p :X: 
of twenty one. He says of it that ,it marks the beginning of his 
20 
intellectual life. 
After severing connections with Presbyterianism Brownson 
also left New York in order to teach at Detroit. Some;,time 
after arriving there he became a victim of malaria. He w~s so 
seriously ill that,he was not exyected to recover. He was con-
fined to his room during the latter part of 1824 and the early 
21 
part of the following year. During his illness he turned his 
22 
attention toward Universalism. After his recovery he returned t 
Vermont. He applied for and received a letter of fellowship as 
a oreacher, and was formally ordained an Evangelist during the 
- 23 
summer of 1826. 
] 1 ollowing his ordination Brownson returned to Uew York. He 
lived and preached su(Jcessi vely in Fort Anne, Whitehall, Licht-
24 
field, Ithaca, Geneva and Auburn. This period of his career is 
20 v, 19. 
21 Brownson does not mention these facts in The Convert;_ he re-
fers to them briefly in XV, 284-285. 
2:2 Bro~vnson bec.~:,me interested in Universalisrn thra»ugh his 
mother's sister who gave him some literature on the subject 
v;hen he was ,',bout fifteen. He had read some of it before he 
was a Presbyteriz~n. iJhile it <''roused his interest it did nat 
convince him. But, after rejecting Presbyterianism, Brownson 
says " ••• I -vvEs necess~uily forced O[HJk on tbe point whence 
it had taken me up, vt ... . en I believeQ., so far as I believed any-
thing, the doctrine of Universalism. 11 V, 26. Thus it was 
quite nt: tural for him to study Universalism more intensely 
afte1· rejecting Presbyterianism. V, 20-28. 
23 v, 30. 
24 v, 31. 
• xi 
importcnt for tvro reasons: In 1827 he mar1·i ed Sally Healy. It 
also marks the beginning of his career as ~writer. He wrote 
articles for The Gos)el Advocate and Iml)artia.!_Inyestigator, and 
became its editor in 1828. Brownson describes his connection 
with the magazine: 
I had written a good deal for the :periodical 
vwrhile at Ithaca, had chu..rge of it during the 
absence of its editor, and had acquired through 
its pae:e s considerable reputb. tion as a \lri t er 
••• I conducted it for a year, but with more 
credit to my free, bold and crude thinking, 
than to my piety or orthodoxy even as a Univer-
salist. · 25 
Brownson saon became dissatisfied with Universalism. It 
was unrea:3onable. Somewhat untactfully for a minister he ex-
nressed his doubts openly, not only in regard to Universalism 
but in regE,rd to Ohristie..:.1ity. He c..:nd Universalism were incom-
patible. His own brief deS31'i.!tion is ag£1-in cited as indict:ctive 
of the temp~.eament character·istic of Brovmson. 
25 v' ~32. 
But with these doubts hf,nging over me, it -,·;e.s 
clear th2·t I could not, as an honest man, present 
myself before the 1:.ublic t:.s a Ohri stian minister. 
It is true I did not ~-.-ri"ce or L)reach differently 
from wh: t I tho"L~ght and felt •••• 
But, al thou:)i I 1vas beginning to acquire a 
)rominent •!osition in the denomination, I felt that 
I out to 1:;a ve it. I could not consent to )l'O fess 
vvhat I did not honestly believe •••• 
I v,'::cnted the t1·u th, Hould. 1 ;b or for it, har d.e::· 
than most men perhb.llS, but never to sto~1 ';:ith its 
mere a:;)rehension or bar1·en contem)lE~tion. r.:y 
dis)or;ition 7:as practict..l rE.the::.· than S::_-Jecul<:tive. 26 
{26 v. 38-39. 
• Xii 
Clhis somevrh.at; det; iled ox o;:li "vi on of his ea1·ly life indi-
cates Bro',mson as a man ·aho YlEcf:> im::;;uL3i ve, as evidenced by his 
su6.d.en entre.nce into l'resbyteri;:mism. Once in a position he 
e:::mminecl it Very care fully • 1l'hus he cLevelO)ed a power of 
ancclysis- of stripping en issue of &nything extrei:nsic. In 
.2res·uyter i enism he 1:~n teO. an c:.ut hor it~ti ve teacher; he did not 
f' ind it. Anything else . as merely embellishment. Br ov1nson was 
interested in one issue at one time: i.e., in concentr::."ting 
v)on one sicte of it to the e:z:clusion o :f evel·ything not explicit-
ly f,d ~· 
..-..s a v:ri ter and a lecturer he v-1as, as incii ca ted, bold and . 
free; he •:as also cr ud.e in the sense that he lacked s1:;.btlety or 
·9olieh. He had a fiery temper. He \'iCS im~1rudent in his 
utter:nces, h<ving little regd'cl ::or the consoqur.;nces ensuing 
fror::1 v:hrt he ::;aid. He loved trv.th. He vmnted to convey it to 
others, to defen6. it against any and all comers. As a man 
writing bolclly and '.'tr i ting to defend his stands he w·as pre sen ted 
vri th innumer 9-lbe occasions for develo ling his talents as a 
controversialist. 
This brusque, inde:::mndent inciiviclual continued his searah 
for truth after abc: .. ndonine,: Uni ver ':ali sm. He becc~me ~ tt.:1.ched to 
many movements for reform, such as thr:t of Robert Dale O'~nen. He 
J?l'e8ched and vv'rote as an inde:::1endent mini::;ter, became a Unitar-
i~n minister, and was associeted with the transcendentalists. 
His account of these experiences is given in his Convert, and is 
also st::ted in some detail in the biograghies already cited. 
Xll1 
In his search for truth he read vvba t ms.y be referred to 
conveniently <:?.s the ordinary works on religious and philosophi-:-
cal questions in which he vias interested. Being reared among 
.Protestants, and not having encountered the ,.~orks of the 
scholastics, he read, among others, the 1vorks of Locke, Reid, 
~erkely, Hume and Godwin. ~uite naturally he was influenced by 
27 
the men he 1·ee.d. Some of the :rhilosophe rs famous in the day 
were Jl'rench. With the help of a dictionary Brovmso.11 vn s able 
to read_ the v1orks of Pierre Leroux and Victor Cousin, both of 
28 
whom confessedly influenced him a great deal. ~Vhile Brownson 
wE s by no means an ac.:}om-Jlished linguist, he vn s able to acquire 
a knowledge of sever&l other langu ges, including German, Span-
ish and Itt~lian. The most prominent of the Germans, Kant, and 
29 
later the Itr..lian, Gioberti, s.lso influenaed Bro>rmson. 
now it hes been noted that these .:..len infJimenaed Brownson. 
The way in v;hich they influenaed. him india cJ te s, as exaatly as 
that is :possible, the nat-l1:ce of the man whose poli tiat::.,l philoso 
27 V, 124. The ;:iork of John Riedl traces the influenae of these 
men on Bro 'i\nson in a am·sory manner. "The Life and :::'hiloso-
phy of Orestes Brownson,n doctoral dissertEtion, l,Iarquette 
University, 1930. 
28 V, 125-130; I, 215. 
29 Even )rior to his conversion Brownson ap:precis_ ted the fact 
that Kant and Catholicism are incomg::tible. Wnile he 
labored to refute him, Kant exerted considerable influence 
over Brownson. I, 130-313. Cf., Lavv-rence hoemer, "Bro;vnson 
2s a Critic of Kant,n I·.:Issters Thesis, Loyola University, 
1941. 
p 
phy is to be investigDted, 
thought is expressed. 
as v1ell as the terms in vlhiah his 
x:iv 
It seems that Brownson aaae:yted, for examl;le, the view of 
30 
Leroux and Gioberti, in much the same way that he accepted 
.Presbyterianism. He vvc1s always desperate for truth. He accepte 
very eagerly whatever these men said that seemed to him to be 
ree.sonable. Having accepted it, he v;ould anaJ..yze his position 
carefully. Usually he found that something they said was true, 
at least in some 2ense, and something was false. The truth must 
be tetained and the error rejected. 
Having investig,~.ted these men, absorbed what they said, 
Brov;nson adopted their terminology. He says, for exam:Qle, that 
the formula of Gioberti, ~ns Cr_ea.t ~xistentias, is true aon-
31 
fessedly not as Gioberti holds it, but as Brownson holds it. 
He said the same thing in regr:.rd to Leroux's doctrine of aommun-
ion - that man lives by communing vli th his fellow man. l/hat 
both of these men se~id is false, according to Brovvnson, but it 
is not false if properly under stood. lJothing is more true than 
the fact that God created all things, and nothing is more true 
than the :fact that God created. man so thr::.t he needs the society 
of his fellow man in ordor to develop his capacities. 
30 The extent to v;hich he acce~)ted these r:.en is still a dis·puted 
que~3tion. Sidney :L:aemers, Americe.'s jj'oremost Philosopher, 
ITashington, 1931, 17-30. 
31 Brovmson bec~lme fa::ailiar \vith Gioberti s-~lbseqGontly to his 
concersion to Catholicism. Brov:nson sc.:,ys that he hesitates 
to refer his readers to Gioberti who is erroneous in many 
res·pects. Yet he admits Gioberti assisted him in clarifying 
40. 
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Having acce9ted such views ec.se:rly, &nd having been 
accustomed to analyzing them rathe:r zealously he acce:pted their 
terminology and retained. it. Thus the Brownson who is writing. 
lecturing and attempting social reforms o-f one kind and another, 
is a man who has accepted truth from a great many sources, 
ex:Qressing it in somewhat unusual te1·ms. 
In the course of his career ]3rovmson founded. a magazine of 
his ovm in order to be unhampered in his expression by editorial 
restrictions. This magazine he called the Boston ~uarterly 
Review. He used it as an organ for ex[;r essing -~-ihatever he. though 
ought to be said and also for suyporting the Democratic party, 
which he thought would secure necessfry reforms. He expressed 
his thoughts boldly, vigorously, clearly. His views attracted 
consider<-ble ,-ttention. The Democrats rewarded his efforts by 
giving him 1J.. poli ticel position. He ceme to be regarded as a 
leader in the Democratic 2~rty. 
In 1938 Bro-,·;nson was a Democrat in the sense thet he was a 
32 
member of t.ha t party, which he supper ted in his '..,uarterly He view 
He was also a democrat in the sense that he o.cce_pted as true the 
popular conception of democracy, which in his estime;tion meant 
to" ••• assert eg_uslity as a natural right, and to asst1me ••• 
that the introduction and maintenance of equality between man 
and man is ~esirable, and essential to the moral, intellectual, 
32 v, 111. 
.. 
33 
and physical well-being of mankind on earth. 1' 
Hr;.ving accepted the democratic principle of equality as a 
good theory, Brownson also had the cour~ge to try to secure its 
-oractical realization. Thus he says that "I had had the incred-
. 
ible folly. of tre.':ting the equality <;;,Sserted as if it meant 
something, as if it could be made a reality, instead of a 
34 
miserc' ble sham." For that ret: son he ·published in his review an 
35 
essay on the laboring classes. It ap 1Jeared in 1840, during the 
presictential campaign of that ye~:.·r. In it he argued that it is 
nothing short o:f an absurdity to prate ::~iously of equal rights 
36 
unless the mights e:ts vvell as the rights of men are equal. So . 
he advocated, among otheT things, the destruction of great 
business cor_porations, the modern credit system, and urged also 
the modificution of the factory system and suggested that the 
denial of the right to inherit ]roperty would tend to eqg&lize 
37 
men's rights. 
33 v, 114. 
34 v, 117. 
35 Boston Quarterly Heview, July, 1940. This esscy is not re-
printed in his collected ~orks. 
36 11 If, then, you will have democr::-icy, if you insist on the dem-
ocratic form, have the cou.rcge to go fu.rther, and the good 
sense to adopt the measures ne ces Sc~ry to prevent your uni vel'·~ 
sal suffrage and eligib; li ty from being a mere sham ••• you : .. 
must est:":blish and. maint?S,in the substantial equality of con-
ditions, so that not merely the rights but the mights of men 
shall be equal. 11 V, 103. 
37 On the basis of thet essay, Schlesinger, 100, compf.~res him 
vii th LI:::~rx and sa:;s th:: t "B:co"'::nson -~·;as his ne2.r" st forerunner 
in ..:':..mer icn:. n 
... 
Brownson gained much notoriety by his publication and sub-
sequent defense of his "Ess:::.y on the Laboring Olasses.tr ifhen he 
published it he was connected with the Democrttic y:rty, and it 
38 
was as a le&.der of that _:)~rty that his views were received. The 
opposing PE'rty tJ:1er e fore 1·e o1·int ed the essay und circulated it 
as c;iidely as llOSSi-ole to indicate that these were the VieWS of 
39 
his pc·r ty. 
The appefn·ance of Brownson's ''Sssay on the Laboring Classe~ 
c:,nd. the election of 1840, mark the end of his career as a poli-
tici n, and the beginning of his cEl'eer as a golitical philoso-
faith in him ; because the n ••• :people sold tl1e i:c birthright for 
a osrrel of cider, '1 Bro·.·rnson lost faith in ;opular democracy: 
The famous election of that :ro~r .crought a 
much gre<:tor revolution in us than in the 
gove1·nment •••• vie for- one confess - anc1 
we ca:;:e not who kaows it - that ,:hat ·:'e savv 
during the presidential election of 1840 shook, 
nay, gave to the winds all our. reme.ining con-
fidence in the JOJUlar democratic doctrines. 40 
Since B:ro·.:nson received a }ractic 1 de:11onstration of the 
feet that he must revise his vie·;,s, he began to re-examine his 
38 ·v, 103. 11His essay 
leading ~emocr2t. 
Brownson disrobing 
r::ake cleer that he 
Schlesinger, 101. 
••• ',7e,s Te '3ei vDd. us a ;renouncement from a 
Tne t::,dmini3tration forces, dismayed. to fine 
in iJUblic, had to re~mdiate him, and to 
',;: s in no v1ay s:) eaking for the )arty." 
39 ".. • the lfhir-s Te ~,r int ed his article and di f~tri buted it by 
the hundreds,:o of t~ousonis to show ~,::hat it ·:as the J?resident 
and his JB.l·ty really helcL. T! r.:aynard., 92. He remarks in the 
same _CJla-;e thc:.t 3chlo singer has \'IJ:'i tton the best critic ism of 
this as .;e ct of B1· ovmson. Schlesinf':o r, 99-111. 
40 XV, 259. 
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hiS -position. He contended both ;:~t this time and later that his 
reasoning r:as sound. However radical his conclusions seemed, 
they -,;ere not only consiDtent . ith, but the only ones derivable 
41 
from, the Jremises given to him by his countrymen. 
Having found no fault vii th his ret_:;.soning, 3rovmson began to 
re-examine his prmi se s. He became keenly n:1,vare of the fact that 
.he must have a )hilosol.)hicrl foundation in order to tcke an 
intelligible stf::.nd in his comments on c 1.1rrent events. Oonse-
quently he investig. ted. more :Jarefully questions concerning the 
origin ani ground of government. lt is at this time that the 
influence of Plato is discernible. 
Rather remarkable is the fact that Brownson discovered that 
he lacked an element without which he co1lid not s:£ak intelli-
gibly of authority and liberty - this was an infallible auth-
ori ty to determine v1hether or not freedom is real freedom and 
not license, and authority is not de spot ism. Thus Brownson 
defended, prior to his conve1·sion and vJithout a knowledge of the 
writings of Catholic :philoso:;;)hers and. theologians, the view that 
42 
government c~:nnot be sustained without infallible authority. 
41 Of., for exe.mple, the following: npeo:ple, though adopting the 
democratic _:)rinc igle, told me I went too far, but I knew I 
'Has logic~tl." XVIII, 224. "But I can hardly re2d the essay 
over without being myself shocked, and wondering at my 
temerity in :_:mblishting it • • • • plr .. ce me v;he re I stood then 
••• :~md I would today repeat and endol'Se eve1·y pe.rae;ra:ph and 
ev,.:;ry ·;10rd I then ·vvrote ;n V, 104. 
42 This point is treEted explicitly in Ohagter II, 15-19. 
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Since his :poli ticL"l views were b!.'l sed upon what may be 
/ 
referred to as a unique synthesis of ideas gathered from the 
various ources mentioned, Brownson's political 90sition is 
merely a concrete illustr~tion of the inconsistency of his gen-
eral position - that he &cce;ted and defended infallible auth-
ority without investig(_;,_ting the claims of the only institution 
which claimed to be infallible. Brownson vras the first to 
reco,s-nize this inconsistency. Yet, he tells us in his autobi-
ogrc.phy that if he investigLted this institution end if it re-
quired him to reject the doctrines which brought him thus far, 
c_;nd v-.rhich he knew to be true, he ·uou~d have no reason for seek-
ing sdmission to the ehurch. ili th some hesitation, therefore, 
he sought ~~n interview with the Bisho:p of Boston. Describing 
his ~eeision to seek such an interview, he says: 
It was, no doubt, un_:;;leq.sant to take such a 
step, but to be etern.slly d~mned would, after 
all, be a grest deal un)leasanter. Accordingly, 
vvith ±'ear and trembling, and yet with firmness of 
purpose, in the last v:eek of I.Iay, 1844, I sought 
an interview iNi th the late .1.Ught heveren!l Benedict 
Joseph Fenwick • • • and in the follovling week, 
visited him again, avo·.ved my ··.vish to be'3ome a 
Catholic, and begged him to be so kind as to intro-
duce me to some one who would take the trouble to 
instruct me, and prepare me for reception, if 
found worthy, into the coo~union of the church. 
He immedi;tely introduced me to his coadjutor, 
vvho hc..s su:]ceeded him, the J.\ight h.everend John 
Bernard Fitzpatrick. 43 
Brownson's deseription of his inte:cvie·.-iS -~dth Bishop 
43 v, 164. 
Fitzpatrick rep.:t·e sent his most tac!tful :.vri ting. There v.ras no 
meeting of r:ainds. The doctrines Brownson held must be waived; 
" ••• but, if I rejected or ','mived it, what reason hc-,d I for re-
gar cling the chv..1· ch :. s auth ori ts ti ve • • • or for recognizing any 
44 
authority in the Bishop himself to teach me?" 
Thus BrO'I'mson writes that it w~s two or three months before 
there was any indication that they r:ould ever come to an under-
standing. He could not indicate his difficulty, 
••• lest the Catholic Bishop himself should 
degrive me of all ret:son for becomlng a Catholic, 
and ser:d me b~' ck into the wo1·ld utterly na1red 
and destitute. I had made up my mind that the 
church was my l,;.st )lank of safety, that it was 
communion with the church or death. I must be 
a Catholi~, and yet could not and would not ie 
one blindly. I had gone it blind once, and had 
lost all, and would not do so again. My trouble 
was great and the Bishop could not relieve me, 
for I d~red not disclose to him its source. 45 
However, Bro~nson notes that he and the Bishop soon came to a 
good understanding, without discussing at all the merits of his 
ovm vie'.-.·s. He .,-,as baptized and confirmed on Sunday, October 20, 
1844 • 
.As a Catholic Bl'0'.7nson continued his career as a reviewer. 
He founded Br?wnson' s ~ue.rterly HevieYl. ifi th the appr obL--vion of 
nis bishop, he continued to v:ri te on 1·eligious and philosophical 
matters, usually on the occasion of reviewing a book that dealt 
with such matters. 
-------- ---------------· ------------- -----
44 v' 165. ' 
45 v' 166. 
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Politically, his views did not change a great deal. Browa-
son did not try to prove that a good Catholic could also be a 
good Americ~ citizen. He stated boldly '""nd simply ths..t no one 
oan be a good American oitizen unless he is a. Gatholic. He 
maint2ined from the start that Catholicity is necessary for the 
republic, and that it cannot exist ~~:i thout it. Thus an article 
in his review for October, 1845, is entitled, "Catholicity 
46 
iJecessary to Sustain .Po9ular Liberty. 11 
This brief survey of what B1·ownson did immedi.c;tely after 
his conversion is given to indicate that there was no complete 
and rar.Ucr::l bre2k in the trend of his thought subsequent to his 
conversion. Yet, c: s hr.cs been indic~ted, Brownson was compelled 
to adopt e.n entirely new a:ppro:.:,ch to these subjects. Thus one 
might say that it ;res by request th>,t Brovmson )rocwed another 
dictionary and began, e.t the age of about forty one, to study 
the ~orks of St. Thomas and St. Augustine. Consequently he 
shifted also the ground and the terms in V.'hich his new ar·guments 
were formulated. Therefore those subscribers who had been 
following the trend of his thought could see no connection what-
soever bet·,veen the :SroYmson who ·,-rrote before ~md the Brownson 
. 
7lho v.rrote immedir·tely after his conve:r:sion. It vms not until 
some yec::,rs lD-ter thc::.t he retm·ned to his own doctrine of 
46 X, 1-16. 
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communion. 17 
.At the time Br ovm.son Yvas converted, he vvas ::: t the ) eak of 
his :popul<:ir i ty. .His essay on the le,bor·ing cl~-'-S se s had been cir-
culated by the hundreds of thousands. He apgealed to the kind o 
audience that the CEtholic jov~·nals s.t tha.t time did not reach. 
The continuation of his Heview vn,s tnerefore desirable. "The 
bishop told. him th&t ho should not hide his light under a bushel, 
U}JOn r.:hich Van ;{yck Brook's comment is, 'e.s well urge a bull not 
48 
to pretend to be a lamb 1 • " 
attitude immecli Lt ely &:fter' his conver·s ion: 
Ne have no occasion to stop to defend ourselves 
or our church •••• The false chc:,.rges agB.inst 
Catholics can do us no hsrm, unless v;e suffer them 
to frighten us e,nd induce us to stop and re:-9el 
them • . • • 
We must fJ.ttc 3k the enemy 1 s camp, and arrfdgn 
:r·rotestantism herself. She, not the church, is 
the question; she, not the chm·ch must be ~=-ut on 
the defensive • • • • ,Je muzt drag her from her covert, 
force her into ti.1e li.ght, and comcel her to stand 
and make her defence.· -
Our duty calls us to <:.:.ct on the offensive, to 
ex:,?ose tne so:ccoress, to shov•J v • .ha.t it is th:-~t ht:.s 
bewitched our brethern and holds them s~ellbound • 
.Protestantism is strong only ·d:en she is suffered 
to att[ck Lnd keep Cetholics on their defence • 
.._:,. tta·Jked herself, nhe is as tov; .e.t the touch of 
flre. 49 
Being some·whet belligerent t;;.bout his posit ion, Brownson 
suffered no one to insult the l!'aith. Anyone att:-·:;king the 
47 U.:ynard, l?0-162, di S<Jl;_s::;e s the influence Brov1nson might have 
had if he had beec allowed to continue to }resent his argu-
ments in his oYm tenns. 
48 EaynErd, 152. 
49 XIX, 141-142. 
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Chuxch in e, vulgar or d.er og<:~ tory ma.nner did so, in the 1;r esence 
oi.' B1·ovmson, at the 1·isk of incm:ring bodily h~rm. His son 
cites an instance, <:~lso 1·eferrod. to by l~aym-J..rd, in v1hich ~. man 
l)t;dled. :S.oovel' insul tea the Ch-ccr ch: "Brownson s im::;ly took hold 
of him by the coat collar and the so~t of his trousers and 
50 
tossed him over the stove. 11 
Bro..-vnson, as is evident, took lliS relieion se2.'iously. He 
and his review made an im)ression. The review itself 
~: t:bracted considerf. ble attention. lJ ot only ciid it enjoy rather 
17icie cil·culetion in tho united 3tr tes but it was also reprinted 
51 
in .i:~ngland. .As a Catholio reviwer Bro\Jnson 'Na;J sslc,_om cri ti-
·.:.rhile criticizing tho ::c'•J<ll:.ct of his pen. Somewhat naively, 
Bro7mson VIaS unaole to under stand Ylhy S"L.Ch an attitude s-hould 
52 
make him the target of antipathy. 
Devoting his effort:::: to deteeting errors in the works of 
othe2:s, and subseqt:ently defending his judgments, 3rovmson con-
tinued to develop his talents as a controversialist. He ab-
horred inconsistency. Finding it in the work of another he 
50 I;i8;ynard, 155. 
51 11 In 1853, indeed, inte1·est in .Brownson ,, . 'aS grest enough to 
compel an Bnglish edition." Sehlesin~,er, 198. 
52 Jfor eJ-":am}Jle, Brovmson felt obliged to point out the errors 
in a work of a very dear friend, ~eorge Bcncroft. The 
hi sto:cien Yvas unco,ble to understand the"t a harsh review of 
his 7<'0rk did not mN n thc::t Browns on ·wan ted to sever _:)er sonal 
relationship. Brownson, in atonement, Ci.edic~ted his 
Amerie<:~n .;.·.eoublic to his 11 old friend, George Bancroft." 
-=---:~VIII, 1. 
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e:xpressed his re~mgnance graphically - almost ,Jruelly. 
This means, of course, that vl.hile 13:r:ovmson inv:--rir::.bly 
silenced an o~)ponent, he did not thereby gain acceptance for his 
ovm viewpoint. It means thct few )eOlJle would be willing to 
argue a qoint '.7i th him. li.'_ the.r than cite testimonials to that 
effect, of v1hich t11ere 8.re many, it is :r)erhap s more effective to 
ai te r=,n instanee of Bro·wnson 1 s glee in encoun to ring one whose 
c.vo•.coed _pur:_s1ose ·;;as to carry on 8. series of arguments with him. 
After comr:lGnting that Protestsntisrn is an unintelle·Jtual reli-
gion, and that Erotestants have made a sorry figure of reasoning 
on religious questions, Brownson writes: 
It is, therefore, refreshing to meet even one 
Protestant who shows some signs of intellectual 
life, who has the courf:,ge to make some show of 
argument, and who, :Jerha:ys, has understanding 
enough of the matters on v7hich he writes to be 
capable of being refuted. Ne had well-nigh 
desgai:tod of ever meeting such a one, and now 
that he rresent;s himself 11e greet him cordially 
and choi" ish him as a friend. de ho_pe his COUl'Ecge 
will not fail him ~~t the first onset, and that 
he will not as soon f:J.S he reeeives the first blow, 
like our orlinary adversaries, disap)ear, to be 
seen or he~';rd of no more for ever. Seriously, 
it gives us pl,~a::~ure to meet a Protestant v1ho 
has a beard on his face, and w·ho h~:'S the str·ength 
to give 2>nd take stur·dy blovrs. .·Te are tired of 
comb~~ting me1·e boys or mere simulacra, or 
shadows as unsubst=~'ntial as the gliosts of su:per-
stition. 53 
-.1hile Brownson's -_•u:·i tings may be <Jhs,racte1·ized as direct, 
hard hitting, blunt, forceful, it is not true that he is entirell 
impersonal. It is not at all unusval to ii nd him disrobing in 
-------
53 X, 329. 
publia. In the midst of an argument it is rather ordinary for 
:Oim to introd.uce purely .:_1ersonal matters. .b'or example, in dis-
cussing the enfranc.i:lisement of ;:omen, 3rownson says that tt.illven 
her tongue is a weapon that is more effectual than a man's fist, 
as Lucretia I.:iott, the ~uakeress _:_)rec"cher, :}roved to us personal-
54 
ly some years <:,go at the tea-table of one of her nieces." 
The Brownson descri.bed thus far has been a man who is 
bold, rough, incle9endeut and somewhat ruthless as a contra-
versialist. His term:perament and ?rofession were not the kind 
conclusive to congenial personal relationships. As a layman 
Ylriting a Catholic review, Brownson's position necessitated per-
sonal contact :;.;ith members of the hiel'[:.rchy. "'uite obviously, 
difficulties developed; they may be desc1·ibed briefly e.s person-
al ra thcr thc"n doctrinal. 1!1 or exam·r)le, B:cownson Virote an essay 
55 
on "Archbishop Hughes on Slavery. 11 The archbishop had opposed 
Brown-Son 1 s atti tuU.e on the question. In defending himself 
Brownson adopted a )rocedv..r e typical in his reviews. He is 
mystified by the language of the arch:;ishop, for his words indi 
56 
cate th~::.:.t he has undoubtedly incurred excommunice.tion. Brownson, 
however, refuses to believe that the illustrious .9rel1:te has 
l 4 ss.lly meant to separate himself from the 6hurch. 11All the pre-
sumptions are thtJ.t, both as a Catholic and a man, he agrees ·,vi t 
the c.i::u.rch o o •• " Oonseq r!en tly he c oncl uclo s that n:ie can accept 
54 XVIII, 404. 
55 XVII, 179-210. 
56 XVII, 204. 
--- -·--- -··------------- -·~----····-·· 
no such interpretation of his language, and even if we were un-
able to explain it away, we would still insist that he did not 
and could not mean it, and should wait with our confidence in hiD 
unimpaired till he should see proper to favor us or the public 
67 
with his own explanation." 
This is cited as an instance of the logic-chopping which, 
while in this and many other instances was confessedly irrefut-
able, did not hel~ Brownson's position. Whether through the in-' 
fluenoe of Archbishop Hughes or some one else in an authoritative 
position whom he offended in a similar way, Brownson's Review 
was delated to Bome for examinationo Somewhat gleefully, Brown-
son announces, in an article entitled "The Ohurch no~ a Des-
potism," that Rome, while somewhat puzzed by certain things, 
58 
could find nothing contrary to faith in what he said. 
Some time later, however, Brownson apologized very humbly 
for his general attitude: 
I must myself confess, to my shame and deep 
sorrow that for four or five years, ending in 
1864, I listened with too much respect to 
those liberal or liberalizing Catholics ••• ·• 
My faith was firm, and my confidence in the 
church unshaken, but I yielded to what seemed 
at the moment a wise and desirable policy. 69 
During this period of his life Brownson*s political views 
altered radically. Almost to the outbreak of the civil war, he 
57 XVII, 204-206. 
68 XX, 216-248. 
59 VIII, 220-221. His son adds a note saying that this was the 
most humble passage his father ever wrote. 
had taken the position of Calhoun in commenting upon practical 
60 
problems. In the period immediately 9receeding the civil war, 
Brownson found himself defending the Union. In order to main-
tain his position oriasistently he was obliged to investigate 
more carefully the nature of the Union. The results of his in-
vestig'-tions are embodied in ilis vvork entitled The .American 
61 
I~epublic. 
Brownson's book was motivated )rime,rily by patriotism. He 
believed sincerely that American republicrmism -~)reserves certai 
inherent charaJteristics vihich represent the reason why America 
has sec1Hed for the individual the greatest liberty man has ever 
kno'lvn. Brownson endeavored to transcend. immedL"te issues and to 
expose its essential elements. In doing so he belioved he was 
contributing to the welfare of the reDublic. 
During this same :Jeriod, ill hcs~lth, along vii th other 
facto1·s such ~~s he.rsh and imprudent attacks upon individuals 
61.. 
and. institutions and his support of Fremont for president nee-
essitated the discontinuance of his review in 1864. From that 
time until 1872, when his wife died, he wrotet.3for Oatholic 
60 In his Heview of JtO~nu<:cry, 1844, Brovmson is lE;vi sh in his 
·oraise of Calhoun. Somewhat naively, he closes his dis-
cussion by avovving th:::~ t tt ••• we hccve introduced l.Ir. Calhoun 
into our os~R:es, v.ri thout 1·e:.::.·erence to the i'act thet he is now 
befo1~e the .Americ :·'n .;;:;eople :_,s a ~Jrominent candidate for the 
presidency. 11 
61 XVIII, 1-222. 
62 Brov;nson discl.<:dmed [~ny conr·entiel dlslike for the Irlsh or 
the Jesuits, though his remarks V'iere unduly h~.rsh. 
63 These articles ·were unsigned. They are included in the 
collection of his son. 
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pe :riodicals, particularly the Ca tho lie ·;;orld. 
Lirs. Brownson, realizing that her husband was too inde_pend-
ent to submit cheerfully to editorial revisions and restrictions 
( es··;eoially those of one vvho ...-vas formerly his devoted follovmr, 
Isaac Hecker of the Catholic ;;o;-ld) requested on her death bed 
tb.at her husband revive his ?.eview. In order to gratify her ·wish 
<::cs well as to prove to the :'ublic the"t he \laS, and had always 
been, devoted to the Ohurch, Brovrnson' s heview ap_pe ared again 
in January of 1873. In October of 1875 ill health again re-
64 
CJ.'l'"ired. him to cea2e its )Ublicc.tion. In his valedictory 
Brovmson says that it is only -r:i th consid.erable -~· ain that he 
can grasp a _pen. He makes his final 1:rofession of faith and 
e:x:_p1·esbeS p:rs.titud.e to tho3e vilo suJo;_Jor·ted. him during the 
thirty one years he had t-'-}~·et;,red 0et'ore them as a Catholic re-
viewer. he indi:J tes -J.lso that he Yiil~ :Jontinue to labor for 
the Ch"G.rch de:::;)ite t1::.e discontim;_ance oi' .his I.eview. 
Appro _:;rL tely, IJel·ha~JS, 3ro';·ms on argued to the last. In 
his fine 1 contro ve:rsy, 3r ovmson' s son -.las un:: ble to see the 
force of his t"a ther 1 s lor;ic. A£te1· retiring to his room, 
B::.·.y;mson re olied to E~ knock on Lis U.o0r: 11 If the"t 's you, :i:'rancis, 
65 
I'm too til·ed to make it any :,Jlainer tonight." He died on 
~)ril 17, 1876. He is buried in a cry}t, in the center aisle 
of the lfni ver :::;i tJ Ct.l.a.::,;el at iTotre Dame. 
-------------------·------------
64 :X.X, 436-438. 
65 L.a.:;rn rd, 420. 
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His son, Hanry 1. 3ro~mson, ioz~r~bss hi$ f~ther as 
very generous and vn',rm he rted, observing that he ·;les l\Ot a 
''self-seeking, cold hearted, c.lcul:;.ting man v,rho looks at 
every tiling vii th a v ieVI solely to his ovm sa tisfE.ction or 
emolument, natu:rally c~lltivc::tos the s.ttr::'.ctive, £Jlea,:;e,nt ex-
teTio:c or manners v.rhich ·,;.J:Ul coHstitute to the gaining of his 
})Urgose, end wins the re gute. tion of amiauili ty t::nd gocd 
66 
na tU!t' e • " This then, is 3ro-::mson the man. 
Irovv v1e will :.Jrocoed v:ith a study of his political 
Jhilosophy. The ex~o3ition begins with a discussion of the 
rLd1t~3 of the incU vidual. 3ronnson also Dakes right the basi 
oi' lJ,w, v:zb.ence it is neJessary to Jresent his concerltion of 
l~lR. Afi'irL1ing .ti:-:"hts o:Z beth the individual and society, 
1ossible to determine the ~es~0ctive limits of each. Thus he 
endee.vo:cs to solve the .i:,roblsm of individual libeTty in 
reL:tion to nuolic c,utl1ority, '.vhich is, after all, the funda-
mental ·Jro blem of ~poli t ioal '1hilosophy. ll1ollowing the 
exposition of his solution of the Jroblem, there is an 
:;ttem)t to evaluate Brownson. 
·---- --·-------------
66 Brownson, :,;orly Life, 481. 
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CHAPTER II 
!HE RIGHTS OJ' THE INDIVIDUAL 
l 
In one o~ his ~irst politioal essa7s Brownson tells us 
that the idea of individual libert7 is so ingrained in the 
minds of the Ameriean people, for whom he was writing, that it 
is unneoessar7 to prove philosophioallJ that the individual has 
2 
rights whioh the state ma7 not violate. fhese rights have been 
enumerated more or less oompletel7 b7 the people in the forma-
tion of the government. While being keenly aware of their 
rights, the Ameriean people are rather ignorant o~ the prinoi-
ples whioh legitimate them. OonsequentlJ his essa7 is a kind 
of exhortation. the people are told what they must hold 
theoretieally in regard to government and freedom in order to 
justify and preserve their rights. 
!he first requisite for the preservation o~ rights is the 
olear recognition of the fact that the state is not the ulti-
mate sovereign. lts sovereignt7 is derived and therefore 
limited. !hia again requires explanation rather than formal 
proof. Jor Brownson says that "lovereignty is that whioh is 
highest, ultimate; whieh has not onl7 the ph7sioal foree to 
make itsel~ obe7ed, but the moral right to eommand whatever it 
l XV, 1-34. (Written in 1838) 
2 xv, a. 
3 
pleases." Thus tt th• state ia held to be sovereign, then it mar 
eommand whatever it pleases and there is no appeSl from its laws. 
He Shows very well that it makes little differenee whether 
sovereignty in this sense is vested in a king, aristoeraoy, 
emperor, or the majority of the people. If the state is supreme 
there is despotiBB and no individual liberty. therefore the 
Amerioan people cannot hold an underived sovereignty of the 
state; they must maintain that its authoritJ is derived from, 
and limited by, something higher than the state. 
Sinae the state ia not the ultimate sovereign, its •omma~a 
do not make right and wrong. Every person feels that he has a 
right to do that whioh is just regardless of what the state 
eommands. !hat is, he feels'that the state itself has the right 
to do only that Which is just. lustioe, in other words, is not 
dependent upon the state; it is above the state, superior to it, 
4 
not derived from the state. Conse~uently Brownson says that the 
enaetmenta of the state "••• are not in and of themselves laws, 
and oannot be laws, unless they receive the signature of abso-
lute justice. If that signature be withheld they are null and 
5 
void from the beginning." 
Justioe, therefore, is the ultimate soTereign. It is 
" ••• 
the sovereign of sovereigns, the king of kings, lord of 
6 
lords, the supreme l&w of the people, and of the indi vidual!•" 
3 XV, 4. 
4 XV, 9. 
5 XV, 10. 
6 XV,- 9. 
As sueh it is one law imposing obligations upon both ihe indi-
vidual and the state. ~herefore the iAdivi4ual is free onl7 
beeause the law of justice forbids the state to enaot laws pre-
venting the individual from doing what is right and just. Under 
this law, however, the individual cannot do whatever he pleases. 
He has no right, for example, to do what is wrong or unjust. I.a 
other words, the law of justice gives to the individual freedom, 
but not lieense. 
lhus the freedom or right of the individual in regard to 
the state eonsists 1n his abil1t7 to do that whiSh is just and 
right. !his is the essenee of his freedom; it is all the free-
dom that the individual has or ean have: 
The highest eonoeption of libert7 is that 
whieh leaves ever7 maa free to do whatever 
is just to do •••• Freedom to do that whieh 
is unjust aecording to the laws of God, or, 
- Whieh is the same th.ing, - the law o1! 
nature, is lieense, not libert7, and is as 
mueh opposed to liberty as lust is to love. '1 
In virtue of the faot that justioe is one law, bindiag botk 
the individual and the state and defining the respeetive rights 
and duties of eaeh, it ia olear that there oan be no eonfliet 
between individual libert7 and publie authorit7 in a state 
founded upon justiee. That is, being one law, juatiee is ever 
equal. to itself. Consequently its eommand to the individual 
eannot eonfliet with its eommand to the state. 
'1 XV, 19. 
At this time, however, Brownson devotes very little eon-
'" 
sideration to the praetiaal problem arising from the interpre-
tation of this law. He is perhaps unaware of the problem 
arising from the faet that the individual oonoeption of what is 
just and necessary might be different from that of the state. 
Thus he disposes of it by saying that the law of justice is 
God's law, written and discoverable in the universe. The only 
authoritative expounder of its decrees is human reason. In 
most instances it is the reason of individuals; in very few 
8 
cases it is the reason of the people collectively or the state. 
Thus he would seem to hold at this time that the individual may 
arrest the action of the state when it aommands anything lneom-
patible with his own peculiar sense of justice. 
Brownson first attempts a more philoaophioal presentation 
9 
of his views five years later. His theory at this ttme is 
10 
based to some extent upon Plato. It is at this time that the 
contribution of Leroux is also evident, aw will be seen in the 
exposition of the theory. Brownson was aware of the fact that, 
since his articles were being published in a popular magazine, 
his readers would be a little eonfuaed by the eombination. lhus 
8 XV, 18. 
9 (1843); XV, 296 ff •• 
10 ~polities are, to no ineonsiderable extent, founded on the 
Platonio dootrine of ideas, and to all who are not aequainted 
with that doctrine, I must seem to be talking nonsense, When, 
in fact, I am talking very tolerable sense." XV, 364. 
he oommented: 
I pray my readers to be as indulgent as possible 
to this answer, and not too hastily pronounee it 
a fine speeimen of transcendental nonsense. How-
ever unmeaning it may be to them, it has meaning 
to me, and I know very well what I mean b7 it: 
but what phraseologr will suffice to eommunieate 
my meaning to their minds, I own, I am at some 
lose to determine. 11 
His diseussion here assumes that God's will in regard to 
man is discernible in the natural order He has created. Oon-
5 
sequently in order to discover what rights God has given to man 
it is necessary to investigate his nature with a view to determ-
ining what is necessary for its preservation. That is, the 
investigation is necessary to the extent that it furnishes a 
basis for the oonelusion that man has natural rights whioh the 
state must respe•t. 
Sinee he was under the influence of Plato at the time, 
Brownson tells us that man•e nature may be considered either as 
oonoretized in the individual or as existing ideally in the 
"Divine mind, ~' or logos." As it exists in the divine mind 
his nature signifies the human kind, raee or genus. It is re-
12 
ferred to by the term humanitr. 
In affirming that humanity has an ideal existenee in the 
divine mind, Brownson means that its existence is real in 'the 
highest sense of the term, that is, as a substanee. Sinee 
11 Demo•ratie Review, (July, 1843), XV, 364. 
12 XV, 36'1. 
6 
humanity has a substantial existenee, it ia an activity; an 
activity, however, is likewise a substanae. In other words ever7 
aotive foree is a substance and every substanee is an aetive 
foroe. thus Brownson says that humanity is an activity and 
13 
nothing but an activity. 
Sinee the nature of humanity is that of a distinctive, 
aotive, eauaal foroe, God must preserve it as suah in order to 
govern it; that is, sinee humanity's nature is oommensurate with 
its power to act,. its aetivity oannot be destroyed without 
destroying man's being. Thus if God were to suppress the eausal 
power of humanity, He would destroy His creature rather than 
govern it. 
Bow the preservation of this aetive foroe is the preserva-
tion of humanity's freedom, beeause freedom consists in the 
14 
power to aot, to do, to cause. thus Brownson says that "I 
am aetive only in that action which bas its eauae and origin in 
me. If I perform it only through neoessity, I perform it not at 
15 
all, but it is performed by that foree Whioh necessitates me." 
13 XV, 359. Brownson, of course, oonfessedly refers to the "vis 
aotiva of Leibnitz." XV, 358. ---
14 Ii this view of freedom Brownson believes that he avoids &n7 
dispute in regard to man's freedom: ~en have asked, is my 
will free? Am I free? lonsense. This is not the question, bu , 
am I, am I at all. Bor I am only so far forth as I am free." 
XV, 359. 
15 XV, 359. 
' This meana, in other words, that a thing ia onlJ inaamu.h 
as it is aetive. In the case o~ humanity, the activities result 
ing from its unique and distinotive being is what is meant by 
its freedom. ~hue freedom is eoextensive with the power to aet. 
And since an aotive foree is a substanee, and conversely a sub-
stance is an aetive foree, freedom is likewise eommensurate with 
being. Henee Brownson says that "••• a~solute slavery, slavery 
extending to the whole being, were absolute death, total 
extinction of being. So long and so far as I exist at all, so 
16 
long and so far I am free." It is therefore elear that tod 
must preserve the freedom of humanity in his government. 
Sinoe humanity is a ganerative prineiple or an active 
power, its activity results in the produstion of individual mea 
and women. It is embodied and manifested therein as the eause 
is manifested in its effects. In other words, just as the 
aotivity of an individual results in individual aetions, so 
also does the activity of humanity result in individual men and 
women. Humanity is therefore related to the individual as the 
individual is related to his aets. On tbe basis of this 1' analogy the nature of humanity is more •learly definable. 
We see that sinoe the individual is the cause of his aets, 
he is distinct from them as the cause is distinet from its 
effect. For the same reason, however, he is not entirely 
16 XV, 359. 
17 XV, 365, 
8 
separable from his aots; there is a sense in whieh the individu-
al lives in hie aets, but the sum total of his actions do not 
eonstitute the individual. Likewise, therefore, there is a 
sense in whieh humanity is inseparable from indiVidual men and 
women. Xevertheless humanity must be distinet from individuals 
also, just as the cause is distinct from the effeet. Thus 
humanity is not merely the sum total of human beings. 
In order to see the bearing of this analysis upon the 
rights of individuals, it is neeessary to review briefly the 
status of the question. His discussion is based on the proposi-
tion that the Divine will must prevail in human affairs. His 
will in regard to a particular thing is disooverable in the 
nature Be gave it. Now the nature of humaaity is to aet. to 
preserve its nature intaet, humanity must be free to aot. To 
the extent to which this freedom is restricted, humanity is not 
preserved intaet, but destroyed. Its aets are individual men 
and women. Since government must preserve intaet the nature of 
that whieh is governed, it is evident in the first plaee that 
18 
humanity must be free to actualize itself in individuals. 
Further, a single action of an individual does not exhaust 
his aetivity. Eaeh individual aot represents a eertain phase of 
the individual. In other words, the aetive foree of an indivi-
18 "But, as the aets of humanity, generieally eonsidered, are 
individual men and women, it follows that freedom for it to 
fulfill its destiny, is freedom to obey the command to 
'multiply and peplenish the earth'." XV, 367. 
9 
dual is not manifested onee and for all in a single aetion. 
Aoeording to Brownson, "The greater the number and variety of hil 
acts, the more fully will his being be represented, or aetualizec 
••• And 3ust in proportion as you hinder the individuals aetivitl~ 
do you •ut htm off from manifesting himself, and, therefore, 
19 
from fulfilling his destiny." Consequently humanity fulfills 
its destiny to the extent that it manifests itself in individu-
als. Ben•• he says that "lhe highest·good of humanity must be tc 
fulfill its destiny, that is to actualize itself in the greatest 
20 
number and variety possible of individual men and womaa.~ 
Therefore ~restriction of this a•tivity is •ontrary to the 
will of lod as Be expressed it in •onstituting human nature. 
further, the preservation of this freedom in the ra•e 
necessitates the freedom of the individual. For in being born 
an individual merely begins to represent the aet of humanity, 
just as the individual merely begins to aet by the faot that he 
is born. Therefore the work of humanity does not oonsist in the 
mere produation of individuals. For ea•h individual, as we have 
seen, represents a distinet aspect or phase of humanity, just as 
individual aots represent distinot aspects of the individual. 
As the individual grows and develops his potentialities he 
19 XV, 36,. 
20 XV, 36,. 
represents, therefore, distinot and peculiar aspects of 
21 
humanity. 
10 
Bow we have seen already that humanity must be free to 
actualize itself in individuals. Therefore the individual must 
be free to develop his eapaeities to the best of his abilitf; 
that is, he must be free to work out his. own destiny as an 
individual. 'o interfere with that freedom in any individual 
is to prevent humanity from actualizing the distinct phase of 
itself which was supposed to be actualized in the development 
of that individual. Oonlequently Brownson concludes that the 
22 
race is free only va the condition that the individual is free. 
And since he has shown that government must preserve the free-
dom of the raee, it must likewise preserve the freedom of the 
individual. 
To say that man is free is not· sufficient, however. To 
show what is involved in that statment it is necessary to dis-
cover what is necessary for him to develop and aetualize his 
oapaeities. lt is at this point that Brownson generates a 
21 ~But an individual is an individual, only so far as he 
represents humanity, under a distinet and peouliar aspeet, 
represented by no other. His destiny is to represent this 
distinct and peouliar phasis of human nature." XV, 369. 
22 "Renee, if by our social arrangements, we prevent this 
individual from preserving, and so to speak, acting out his 
individuality, we not only prevent him from fulfilling his 
ow.n individual destiny, but humanity herself from aotualizin 
that aspect of her being which it was the miSBion of the 
individual, in his life, to actualize." XV, 369. 
11 
rather unusual intelleotual child. As we have seen, one of ita 
parents is Plato. It now becomes evident that the other is 
Leroux. 
He has ooneluded that eaoh individual man must be free to 
develop his oapaoities to the utmost of his abilit7 in order to 
actualize distinet aepeets of the individual or the raee. But 
sinee man is dependent he can develop himself only to the 
extent that he has the cooperation of something other than him-
self. In Brownson's language, this development is aeaomplished 
23 
through oommunion with hie fellow man, with nature and with God. 
He cannot actualize his capacities exeept in this way. lhe7 
are the conditions upon whioh he is free to develop himself. 
Sinee government must preserve his freedom, it must preserve 
likewise that which is essential to it. 
Inaemueh as man develops his eapaeities through hie fellow 
man, it is evident that government must preserve his right to 
eommune as much as possible with his fellow man. Briefly, it 
should encourage education because thereby the individual •om-
munes with the great minds of the raoe. On the other hand, the 
division of society into eastes or classes should be abolished 
because it tends to restriot his freedom of communing with his 
24 
fellow man. 
His oommunion with nature is signified by the term propert 
23 XV, 371. 
24 XV, 371. 
Negatively, the state cannot determine what his profession will 
be, nor abrogate his right to own property. From a positive 
standpoint, conditions should be such that the fruits of his 
labor will be suffieient to provide for himself as the head of 
a household. In modern terms he has a right to a living wage: 
The right to labor, that is, to such an organ-
ization of industry, as shall enable every man 
to obtain his living and discharge his duties 
as a husband and a father, by means of his labor, 
is every man•s inalienable right, if any speoifie 
12 
right may be so termed. · 26 
Jinally, the state must guarantee man's freedom to worship 
lod aeeording to the dictates of his consoienee. Aeoording to 
Brownson this means that the church must be entirely independent 
of the state - it must be absolutely exempt from all eivil eon-
26 
trol. 
~he rights enumerated thus far are termed natural rights 
because they are consequent upon his nature. ~d sinoe men have 
the same human nature, the rights he has beeause of his nature 
are equal. The full and free exercise of his natural right is 2' 
what is meant by man•s freedom. 
Granted that man has rights which the state may not violate 
it is necessary for him to determine when a given enactment has 
violated his rights. that is, he must determine when he may 
resist lawfully, or rebel against, the authority of the state. 
Secondly, eoneeding man's freedom of worship, his right of eon-
science, .there is the question of what is to be done when his 
13 
oonseienoe is subwerwive to the authority of the state. ~hese 
problems are p.raetieal, and very real, and therefore must be 
solved. In the solution one must not secure individual rights 
at the expense of authority, nor seeure authority at the ex-
pense of these rights. ~he problem, whether arising in oon-
aeetion with the rights of revellion or of oonsoienoe, is the 
same problem. It is stated in general terms before partieular 
inst~oes are diseussed. 
It has been noted that the law of justiee is the ultimate 
sovereign. It is superior to the state and binds the people 
eolleetively as well as individually. It is agreed that &D7 
enactments whioh violate this law are null and void from the 
start. 
On this basis, Brownson preseats his problem in the form 
of a question: "Has this Higher than the people, this sovereign 
of sovereigns, any outward, visible embodiment? In other words, 
has he on earth a regular, formal, authorized interpreter of 
28 
his will?" Evidently one must answer either a definite affirma-
tive or negative, or else try to prove that the question itself 
is misleading and therefore unanswerable in sueh a simple 
fashion. In either ease serious difficulties are eneountered, 
as Brownson himself disoovered in his attempt to answer the 
question. 
28 XV, 350. 
On the supposition that there is no authorized interpreter 
of the divine will, it is up to the people, whether individually 
or eollectivel7, to determine what is and what is not the divine 
will. If eaeh individual has the right to deaide for himself 
whether a given enaetment violateacGod's will, Brownson argues, 
there is no eseape from anarchy. Be writes: 
In so doing, you then raise the individual above 
government, and authorize htm to sit, in his own 
right, in 3udgment on government, whieh is ineom-
patible with government, subordination, or sooial 
order. ~his would be extreme individualism, whieh 
cannot eoexist with government; beeause all govern-
ment demands soaial eooperation, subordination, and 
subjection. 29 
On the other hand it is evident that the people eolleetive-
ly or the state, oannot be the judge of lod's will in relation ta 
individual enactments. ~or if they represent the divine will ia 
human affairs, there is no appeal from their deeision. Praeti-
oally, this asserts the absolute sovereignty of the state, thus 
leaving no rooa.:~'for the rights of the individual. For it the7 
are authorized interpreters of the divine will it is of no 
importanee, as Brownson says, " ••• whether you sa7 the people 
are sovereign in their own right, or merely b7 divine appoint-
ment, if you make their sovereignty eomplete, and permit the 
30 
eubjeet no appeal from their deeision." 
Another alternative is to make the ~hureh the authorized 
29 XV, 350. 
30 XV, 352. 
15 
interpreter of the divine will. On this basis it would be the 
supreme court, from whose decision there eould be no appeal. The 
state would be subordinate to the Ohureh. Thus the rights of 
the individual would be secured against the state because he 
oould appeal to an authority higher than the state. 
Brownson points out, however, that people generally dis-
trust the Ohuroh. they object to a theory of a supreme ehureh 
on the ground that such a theory merely shifts power. And since 
the Ohureh can be as despotie as the state, there is no advant-
age to be derived merely by transferring power from the one to 
the other. Brownson maintains that such an objeetion is valid, 
with one possible exeeption: 
If we believed the Ohureh to be a divine insti-
tution, the real body of our Lord, the ground and 
pillar of the truth, the house of God, in whieh Qod's lpirit resides, and therefore, that it is 
by divine authority that it exists and acts, 
should we distrust it, believe it eapable of 
tyrannizing? 31 
Although not a Oatholie at the time, Brownson remarks that he 
does not share the ~availing hosil1~7 and distrust of the 
Ohureh. He says he believes it to be the kind of institution it 
elaims to be. 
Nevertheless, sinee his countrymen rejeot the Ohureh, some-
thing else must be substituted in its place. For the assertion 
of individual rights is rather feeble and futile unless there is 
a power above the state whieh oan proolaim infallible when these 
31 XV, 349. 
,I! 
--
rights have been violated. In other words, God is sovereign; 
Hie will must be obeyed. But Brownson argues that n ••• if there 
be no established medium through whieh his word speaks, no auth· 
orized interpreter of his will, having the right to speak to us 
in the name of the sovereign, and to enforce our obedienee, we 
are praotieally as if we had no sovereign, and actually living 
32 
in a state of anarchy." 
Sinee the Ohureh is re~eoted, the only reoourse is to sub-
stitute for it the rather foggy thing oalled publio aonseienee. 
this he desoribes as the sense of right expressed in what we 
recognize as the highest and most sacred among us. "And this. 
by whatever name it goes, is our Ohureh, our divine institution. 
This it is, whether it be ealled the pulpit, the press, the 
33 
lyeeum." He observes at the aame time that this substitute bas 
all of the disadvantages but none of the advantages of the 
reject: 
The only difference there is or oan be between 
the view we condemn, and the view we as a people 
aooept, is the difference between a formal, 
regularly eonstituted ohurch, able to trace its 
descent from the apostles, and to show that it 
speaks by divine authority, and an informal 
.ehuroh, intangible, and at best only partially 
able to demonstrate its legitimacy •••• We have 
then in the oase of enthroning publ1e sentiment, 
all that we find objectionable in the supremaey 
of the Churoh, without any of the advantages. 34 
32 XV, 351. 
33 XV, 350. 
34 XV, 350-361. 
l7 
Thus, in hie first attempt to formulate a theor,v o~ govern-
ment, Brownson eame to the eonolusion that an infallible organ-
iaation is neeessary to speak in the name of God. It is only on 
this basis that the will of God ean be aeeertained infallibly, 
and thus it is the only basis whieh seeures both the rights of 
the individual and the authority of the state. Further, this 
conclusion was arrived at before Brownson has eome into eontaot 
36 
with the works of Catholic theologians and philosophers. 
His thought on the subjeet is brought out again when he 
discusses "the .glorious right of rebellion and revolution." In 
general terms the right to rebel signifies the right o~ the 
people to overthrow a government whioh has beeome oppressiTe, 
35 Maynard argues that "Brownson, by going to the Founding 
Fathers and the Ameriaan Ooastitution, obtained, while still 
a irotestant, a good deal more datholie thought than he was 
eonseious of at the time •••• They[the founding fathers]de-
rived their ideas from Loeke, who derived from Booker, who 
had derived from st. Whomas Aquinas." 352, n. 102. He adds 
also that Jefferson read Filmer, who presented the dootrine 
of Bellarmine for the purpose of refuting it. Thus Brownson 
reputedly arrived at some knowledge of Oatholio politieal 
philosophy in this circuitous fashion. This may be true, of 
oourse, but it would be somewhat difficult to show that Brown 
son derived from Jefferson {who derived from Filmer, who wrot 
to refute Bellarmine) his view that an infallible authority 
is neeessary to guarantee individual liberty - or his view, 
stated in Chapter IV below, that the philosophy of these 
founding fAthers is defioient. The extent to ~ieh the 
founding fathers were influenced by the Seholasties is 
discussed rather well by Sylvester J. MeNamara, Amerieaa 
Demoeraor and Oatholie Doctrine, lew York, Bo date. 
18 
and to institute a new government whieh will secure to them a 
greater measure of freedom. 
Brownson argues that if the right to rebel is really a 
right at all it, like all human rights, must be derived from 
something. Quite obviously it eannot be derived from the state, 
for it is the right to overthrow the state. ~t oannot be a 
right inherent in the people eolleotively, for taken in this way 
they are the state. It it is a right inherent in the individual 
then eaoh individual has the right to arrest the aotion of the 
government Whenever he deems it advisable to do so. But this is 
inoompatible with the very notion of the state. If sueh a rule 
36 
were adopted praotically, the state eould not exist. 
Nevertheless, the right to rebel must be asserted against a 
government which violates man's natural rights. But the only 
way in whieh it may be asserted without denying the authority 
proper to the state is to go outside of the state to that Whieh 
is higher than it. Ibis is, as we have seen, the will of God. 
fhe will of God must be represented by an organization above and 
beyond the state. He argues that there is and oan be no organ-
ization, other than the Roman Oatholio Ohuroh, whioh represents 
3~ 
the will of God on earth. Therefore it is the only institution 
superior to the state. IDherefore the right to rebel against 
36 XV; 395-398. 
3~ xv. 399. 
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the state ean be derived from this organization alone. It is 
therefore evident that it alone ean determine when it is lawfUl 
to resist the state. In order to elarify his point, Brownson 
adds the following: 
But suppose, as in Protestant eountries, the 
ehureh has been perverted to a funetion o~ the 
state, or that it has itself beeome eorrupt and 
oppressive, as we aontend was and is the ease 
with the Oatholie Ohurah, and that there is no 
element of reform in the state on whioh you ean 
seize to· sanation your movement, what then will 
you do in order to get rid of bad government? 
Nothing; for in sueh a ease nothing oould be done. 38 
Brownson adopts the same line of argument after his eon-
version. Re hold that it is impossible, on Protestant prinei-
ples, to present a theory of government whi•h will guarantee 
the rights of the individual as well as the authority of the 
state. He says that 
The prineiple of private 3udgment adopted by 
Rrotestants in religious matters, it is well 
known, bas destroyed for them the ehureh as an 
authoritative body, and put an end to every-
thing like eeolesiastie:al authority; transferred 
to eivil matters it would equally put an_end 
to the state, and abolish all aivil authority, 
and establish the reign of anarehy or lieense. 39 
The reason for this is olear. Without the Oatholie ehureh 
as the infallible interpreter of the law of God, the right to 
deeide when a aivil enaetment is eontrary to the law of God 
must be lodged in either the individual or the state. If it is 
lodged in *llt4tadividual, he has the right to resist the aetion 
38 XV, 398. 
39 XVII, 8. 
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of government. Sueh a oourse of aotion, if praetioall7 adopted, 
would result in anarohy. On the other hand, if the state is 
authorized to interpret the law of God there is no appeal from 
its deeision. ~here is nothing higher than to state to whieh 
the individual ma7 appeal. Suoh a oourse· of aetion, adopted 
praotiaall7, would result in despotism. ihus Brownson says that 
"Here is a sad dilemma for our uneatholie oountrymen, whieh 
admirabl7 demonstrates the unsuitableness of Frotestant prinei-
40 
plea for praotie&l ~ife." In his estimation men oannot solve 
this problem; the7 must reaognize the solution which God has 
given. 
The same sort of a dise.ussion ooours in eonneetion with the 
freedom of worship, whioh is one of the natural, inalienable 
rights of man. This right is referred to also as the right of 
eonsoienoe. This right is the most fundamental, for it is the 
41 
souroe and foundation of all other rights. Sinoe it is in-
eluded in the natural rights it is equal in.all individuals. 
~erefore the state must respeet this right equally in all indi-
~iduals. +t has no right to prefer the eonseienee of one indivi-
dual to that of another. Jor the state to suppress or to trample 
upon the eonseienee of an individual is, as we have seen, abso-
lutism. If it may trample upon the eonvietions of any one group, 
whether that group by Catholie or Protestant, it ma7 trample 
40 XVII, 8. 
41 XIII, 139. 
also upon the oonvietions of any other group. To avoid state 
absolutism it is eonsequently neeessary to preserve intaet the 
right of eonsoienee. 
However, Brownson says that the " ••• notion of the un-
21 
bounded license of eonsoienee no man in his sober senses oan un-
42 
dert&ke to defend." He observes that some individuals and 
43 
groups hold rather queer eonvietions. Some of these are in-
eompatible obviously, with the very existenoe of the state. It 
is ineontestable that the praotioal adoption of the unbounded 
44 
lieense of oonseienoe is anarchy. On the other hand it is 
equally certain that the state cannot extinguish the eonseienee 
of the individual. To assert that it is authorized to do so is 
to deny that the right of consoienee is a natural right whieh the 
state must respect. ~his is despotism or state absolutism. 
Brownson states the problem and its solution rather forcefully 
rwhen he says: 
Here, then, we are exposed to two powerful and 
dangerous tendencies, rushing, on the one hand, 
42 VI, 552-553. 
43 Brownson mentions, for example, that "••• the eonseienee of 
the Anabaptists required them to run naked through the 
streets, and that of the early Quakers required them, 
especially the women, to go naked into the religious 
assemblies and prophesy •••• There was,too, Matthias, 
the famous New York prophet, whose queer eonscienee eommanded 
him to elaim his neighbor•s property and his neighbor's 
wife as his own. Was the liberty of consoienoe to be 
allowed?" VI, 553. 
44 In addition to factors suoh as those numerate~n n.43, Brown-
son mentions also that it would be oonvenient to develop a 
oonsoientiors ob j ctio~1 to the : c,.yment of taxes, and to simi-
lar obligations. VI, 553. 
into social despotism, and on the other, into 
anarchy. What, in this state of things, do we 
need in order to escape them? We need, it is 
evident, a power alike independent of the state 
and of the individual, to step, as it were, in 
between them and harmonise them, - a power strong 
enough to restrain the state when it would beeome 
deapotie, and the individual when he would •eeome 
disloyal or rebellious. Without sueh a power we 
cannot save our republie, and have that security 
for individual and social liberty it was insti-
tu&ed to proteot and vindicate. With only the 
state and the individual we have, and ean have, 
only antagonism. The two elements are, and will 
be pitted one against the other, eaeh struggling 
for ~he mastery. They eannot be made to move 
without eollision one with the other, unless 
there is between them a mediating term •••• 
ihat term, power, or aonstituent element, is 
religion, and I need not add, the Christian re-
ligion •••• There is no other power eoneeivable 
that ean mediate between the state and the indi-
vidual, and prevent either from invading the 
pro~inee of the other. All history, all experienee 
proves that the eontrivanoes of statesmen, the 
playing off of interest, the division of powers, 
and the nioely adjusted eheoks and balanoes so 
mueh relied on by aonstitution-mongers, are, 
and must be ineffioient without the presence 
and energetie support of religion. 45 
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these examples, advoeated during different periods of his 
life, are suffioient to show that there is a eertain similarity 
and consistency in Brownson*s views on the rights of the indivi-
dual. He decides once and for all that the only intelligible 
eoneeption of freedom is that it eonsists in the power to do 
that whieh is just. Renee freedom is not only based upon 
authority but eonsists in obedien•e to authority. The seareh 
for the basis of man*s freedom, therefore, is identioally the 
45 XII, 13. 
seareh for that whieh is ultimately sovereign. 
The ultimate sovereign is God. He is the souree of man's 
rights. Hie will is written in man*s nature and diseoverable 
therein by hie reason. He oan disoover, at least, that the 
state does not own man eompletely, and that man eonsequently 
has rights whieh he holds independently of the state. 
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Whatever may be said of man's ability to read aright the 
law of God written in nature, Brownson maintains that religion 
is essential to guarantee praotioally that these rights will be 
preserved intact. Man has no guarantee that the state will not 
violate his rights unless he oan appeal to something above the 
state. But in making the appeal he must be eertain that he 
really appeals to the Will of God. Henee there must be an in-
fallible representative of the Divine Will to whieh he oan make 
his appeal. This is Brownson's oontention before as well as 
after his eonversion to the Oatholie lhurch. 
!he most fUndamental of man's natural rights is, as we 
have seen, the right of conscience; that is, true liberty of 
oonseienoe as opposed to lieense, Then too, he has a natural 
right to propagate the raoe in the manner designed by God. He 
has the right to hold property also. These rights, and all tha 
is implied neoesearily therein, are not held from the state, 
Consequently they are not under the jurisdiction of the state, 
but of the ehuroh. 
Brownson applied this theory in eommenting upon numerous 
praotieal affairs as was his task as a professional reviewer. 
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In several plaees in his review he oondemns a Maine liquor law 
46 
beeause it is eontrary to the natural law. Brownson says that 
a man has a right to as mueh food and drink, "even of that thin 
47 
and washy thing ealled lager beer" as he oan proeure honestly. 
He admits that the state may punish one who is inebriated if he 
disturbs or endangers the rights of others. It may therefore 
punish the abuse of a right. But it eannot prevent the abuse of 
a right by declaring the right itself to be an abuse. In so 
doing the state deelares itself a teaaher or morals, and thereby 
·eneroaehes upon the domain of the Ohuroh. ~hus a law preventing 
the use of aleoholie beverages is null and void beeause it 
violates a natural right. 
In other instanses he shows that marriage pertains primar-
48 
ily to the spiritual order. He argues therefore that the rights 
and duties arising from that state are under the jurisdietion of 
the spiritual authority. Therefore when the state lays dow.n the 
eonditions under whioh the marriage oontraat may be made or dis-
solved, it does so in violation of God's law. 'or the ~hureh, 
not the state, has jurisdiotion over the spiritual order. In 
49 
assuming sueh jurisdietion, the state exeeeds its powers. 
46 XIII, 339 ff.; X, 542. 
47 XIII, 339. 
48 XIII, 340-343. 
49 He diseusses othe.r questions sueh as the respeetive rights of 
the state, the ehurah anl parents in regard to edueation of 
ehildren in various seaions of his Review. Of., i.e., XI, 401 
-403; XII, 498; XIII, 403; XV,23.He holds that it is the pro-
vinee of the statesman and the theologian to determine these 
matters praatioally; it is aonsequently unneeessary to pre-
sent a detailed exposition of his view of these matters. 
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It has been noted previously that there is a similarity 
and oonsisteney in Brownson's views on the rights of the indi-
vidual whioh he advooated during different periods of his life. 
While this is true in regard to his aonelusions and the way in 
whieh he applied them, it is not true of the arguments whioh 
support them. In the aourse of his philosophieal inquiries he 
dropped, for the most part, the Pl&taatam whieh eharaeterized 
his earlier essays. However, he retained Leroux's dootrine of 
eommunion and made it the basis of his later views. ~his is 
olear from the exposition of his doatrine whioh follows. 
In his more mature view, Brownson again established the 
thesis that man has rights against the state. His exposition, 
again, is based upon a consideration of man's nature. lhia 
time, however, man is eonsidered as a eonerete i.udividual. As 
suoh he is first of all a ereature. Consequently he is a de-
pendent being. He exists at all only inasmueh as he partiei-
pates in or imitates, the being of God. In Brownson's language, 
50 
man must eommune with God. He eommunes with Qod, or is related 
50 Brownson aonsiders this dootrine of oommunion to be extreme-
ly important. It is applied in nearly every phase of his 
philosophy. As is evident, he derived this doetrine from 
Leroux. Although he defended what he held to be true in the 
theory throughout hi~life, he says that "I did not and 
eould not follow him lLerouxJ in all his applieations of the 
great prineiple he had helped me to grasp and understand. He 
sought to apply it in an un-Christian sense; I saw, or 
thought I saw, in it a means of placing myself more in har-
mony with the eammon beliefs of Christendom, without 
violenee to my reason." V, 130. 
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to H~, in three wtrs: through religion, soeiety and nature. 
That is, man lives and aots and in doing so he imitates, in a 
+aeble way, God. He lives and develops hie eapaeities through 
nature, for he eould not sustain his existanee even momentarily 
without it. He develops through soeiety beeause he is born into 
and lives in a social group, and through religion beeause with-
out it he eould not return to God, his final eause. Eaeh one of 
these is, therefore, a medium whereby man partiaipates in the 
divine life. 
The most important medium of man's eommunion with God is 
religion. God has not only ereated man, but through the Inearna 
tion has given him the means whereby he ean return to Him and 
thus fulfill the purpose of his axistenee. And inasmueh as God 
Himself has given him these means, man does not derive his right 
to them from the state. Renee it aan neither oonfer nor abro-
gate man's right to practiae his religion. The right to prae-
tioe his religion, known also as the right of eonseienee, is 
therefore the first and most important right whieh the indivi-
52 
dual holds independently of the. state. 
Seoondly, man sustains himself in existenee and thereby 
partieipates in the divine life by using the natural forees 
52 "The right of eonseienee is exemption from all merely human 
authority - a right to be held by all eivil soeiety as saered 
and inviolable; and is the first and impassable barrier to 
the power of the state. The state eu.not pass it without 
violenee, without the most outrageous tyranny." XIII, 139, 22~; 
Cf. also VI, 122. 
2' 
ereated for that purpose. In this sense he oommunes with God 
through nature. Quite obviously the nature whieh sustains man's 
life, the air he breathes and the food he eats, are not made by 
soaiety •. They are made by God for man. Consequently man's 
right to them is held independently of soeiety. This right is 
53 
termed the right to property. 
thirdly, it is unquestionably true that sooiety eontri-
butes to the development of man's life, and therefore that man 
aommunes with God through it. first of all the family, whi•h 
ia aosaetety, is responsible for man•s existen•e• Be is born 
into it and lives with it. The family is oonseq,.ntly ne•es-
sary to his growth and development. But even the family is not 
eompletely responsible for the existenee of an individual, for 
the parents are generators, not ereators. Beither is the fam-
ily eompletely responsible for sustaining his existen•e• There 
fore the individual has rights whioh are held independently of 
the family. 
Man is also dependent upon soeiety as a mature individual. 
Outt.off from all eomm'Wlieation with his fellow man, he oould 
not attain to his full stature as a man. By living in soeiety 
he oan actualize and develop potentialities of his nature to aa 
63 "But the state does not ereate the right to property, and 
its ohief right as its ohief duty in regard to it, is to pro 
teet the proprietor in the free and full enjoyment of his 
property. The right to hold property is prior to eivil 
sooiety, and is one of those rights oalled the natural right 
of man, whieh eivil society is instituted to proteet." XII, 
361. 
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extent impossible without it. !eeause society is responsible 
for the exietenee of aertain phases of the individual's life, it 
is to that extent owner of them. Oonsequently it has rights 
over him. Therefore it oan impose duties over as muah of the 
54 
individual's life as it has brought into existenae. 
fhus man's threefold aommunion with God gives rise to three 
institutions: religion, soaiety and property, Man's right to 
praotiae religion and to own property are held independently of 
soaiety. 'hese rights and all that is implied in their preser-
vation are guaranteed by God who has given them to man, Soeiety 
is not responsible for their existenee; it does not own them. It 
has no right to abrogate them. So•iety must protest them equal-
ly and in every individual beoause human nature is present 
equally in every individual. 
While the nature of eaeh man is equal, aonorete individuals 
are unequal. They oeaupy different positions in soeiety. For 
example, some are lawyers, others doetors, politieians and 
laborers. Some men have a eomparatively large amount of proper-
ty: others have less. In other words, the aetual possessions 
aoquired by the aonerete individual as a member of society are 
54 "Man does not depend exelusively on so•iety, for it is not 
his only medium of aommunion with God, and therefore its 
rights to him is neither absolute nor unlimited; but still he 
depends on it, lives in it, and eannot enter into any eompaot 
league, or alliance that sooiety does not authorize, or at 
least permit. ~hese rights of soeiety override his rights 
to himself •••• " XVIII, 34. 
unequal. Rights whieh he aequires in this way are referred to 
as vested or eivil rights beeause the individual holds and ae-
65 
quires them as a member of eivil sooiety. 
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Now soeiety must proteet these vested rights, for if it 
does not do so the natural rights themselves will be endangered. 
This statement requires illustration rather than formal proof. 
If, for example, a man is eleoted to Congress, society must 
guarantee his right to be a eongressman. If a man legally ae-
quires a pleee of property, society must protect his right to 
hold it in order to proteet his natural right to property. If he 
marries, soeiety must protect his right to be married to that 
particular person. 
Quite obviously, the natural law does not give to the indi-
vidual the ri~ht to this partieular pieee of property or that, 
or to have this partioular individual for a wife rather than some 
other person. Likewise, man has no natural right to be a oongre&s 
-man. Thus these partieular rights vested in eoaerete individual& 
are not precisely natural rights, and they are unequal. Still i1 
is elear that if soeiety does not protect the rights vested in 
individuals who are members of society, the natural rights them-
56 
selves would be endangered. 
fhus far Brownson has based his argument for individual 
rights on two distinet grounds. The mature view just presented, 
56 XI, 168-171. 
56 XI, 169-171. 
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when eompared with his earlier analysis of human aature, indi-
cates the extent to whieh Brownson has divested himself of his 
Platonism. In the first argument presented Brownson has said 
that ~aa is an idea: his destiny is to aetualizl himself in in-
dividuals; the eonditions of this aetualization are expressed in 
one word, eommunion, - eommunion with his kind, with nature, and 
with God; and the conditions of this eommunion are expressed also 
57 
in one word, Freedom." 
Later he argues simply that man is a dependent being. The 
nature God has given him requires for its preservation oommunioa 
with God through religion, sooiety and property. The rigbts of 
the individual in regard to religion and to property exist inde-
pendently of the state. The state is not responsible for their 
existenee; it does not own them. Sinee these rights are held 
independently of the state, the individual may arrest the action 
of the state whieh deprives him of those rights. 
It has been noted also that the most serious difficulty en-
eountered in regard to natural rights is a judieial one. Brown-
son will not countenance the theory that asserts as a principle 
that the power to judge the validity of a state la~ is, or ean 
be lodged in the individual. His reason is that if this princi-
ple is adopted and acted upon it would tend inevitably to an-
arehy. On the other hand, the p~wer of judging the eonformity 
or non-eonformity of an enaotment to the law of God eannot be 
57 xv. 363. 
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lodged in the state. This asserts in pr1n•iple the supremaey of 
the state, thereby permitting the individual,no appeal from its 
decisions. 0onsequently he argues that there must be a 3udioial 
power above the individual and above the state and independent 
of both, whieh is aapable of determining infallibly whether or 
not an enaotment of the state is contrary to the law of God. In 
the absenee of such a power, or in the failure to recognize it. 
soeiety must fluetuate between anarchy and absolutism. ~hue the 
praetieal recognition and guarantee of individual rights is due 
to Ohristianity. 
In the enumeration of man's right as an individual and as 
a member of society, no mention has been made of man's right to 
participate in the administration of government. In other words 
Brownson's enumeration of rights has not ineluded the right to 
vote. The reason for this is the faot that the right to vote is 
in a sense the right to partieipate in the exercise of authority 
It implys the right to govern, and more partieularly, the right 
to legislate. Before discussing it in terms of suffrage, Brown-
son endeavors to determine the ultimate source of legislative 
powe!. It is therefore necessary to turn to Brownson1s exposi-
tion of law, whioh is presented in the following ehapter. 
CHAPTER III 
BROWNSON'S CONCEPTION OF LAW 
In the preceding chapter Brownson has maintained that 
society is not completely responsible for the existence of an in 
dividual. It does not own him completely. Consequently its 
rights over the individual are not complete and ultimate. Brown-
son adopts a similar approach to his discussion of law. He dis-
cusses law in terms of rights and ownership. In order to present 
his thought accurately it is necessary to adopt his own approach 
1 
to the subject. 
One of the most familiar and fundamental conceptions of an 
individual, according to Brownson, is that of having a right to 
whatever belongs to him. He goes on to say that whatever belongs 
to a person is his because he owns it. Furthermore, he owns 
1 Brownson undoubtedly assumes this point of departure at least 
partially because of his audience. While his re~ders included 
many professional philosophers, he does not, for the most 
part, write exclusively for these. Consequently in treating 
a philosophical subject in an essay intended for public con-
sumption, he trys to begin with those ideas which are most 
easily understandable and most readily acceptable to ordin-
arily educated persons. From these he proceeds to matters 
more difficult, both from the standpoint of comprehension and 
acceptability. 
In applying this view to the point at issue, it must be 
noted that Brownson believes that people are much more keenly 
aware of their rights than of their obligation to obey law. 
He says that ''We are deafened and wearied half to death with 
the ceaseless babble about the rights of man •••• " XIV, 343. 
Yet he approaches the discussion of law from the standpoint 
of right to render the discussion more familiar. 
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anything to the extent that he is responsible for its existenoe. 
Now an individual is responsible for the existenee of a taing to 
the extent that he is its maker. The most fundamental notion of 
2 
right is therefore the right of the maker to his produet. 
Continuing his argument, Brownson points out that ownership 
or the right to one's produat is the source of obligations as 
well as rights. This is evident beoause whatever a person owns 
is owed to him. He has it as his due. On any other supposition 
right itself is unintelliiib~e and entirely devoid of meaning. 
The preeise point Brownson attempts to establish by this 
analysis becomes clearly evident when his argument is reversed: 
He holds that because there is a maker there is ownership; be-
~ause of ownership there is right. Right is therefore conse-
quent upon ownership and coextensive with it. 
Now it :!s important to note that it is beaause of ownership 
that something is owed; for if there were no owners it would be 
impossible to owe or to be obligated to anyone. And because 
ownership is in this way the souroe and origin of duty or obli-
gation, the right identified with it likewise gives being to 
duties. 
From this viewpoint, therefore, Brownson says that right 
3 
defines duties and imposes obligations binding upon others. 
2 XII, 300. 
3 XIV, 330. 
.. " 
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To define duties and to impose obligations binding upon others 
is, however, the distinot and peouliar function of a legis~ator. 
And in view of the fact that right does define the duties and 
obligations of others in the manner already indieated, it is 
therefore legislative in oharaeter. Thus Brownson oonoludes 
that the question or right is a question of law. Oonsequently 
4 
the term right may be used legitimately in the sense of jus. 
Having eleared the ground, Brownson*s own proeedure is 
olear. It is necessary to determine the ultimate maker of all 
things, for He is their owner. Ownership, furthermore, is the 
source of right, whieh in turn is legislative in charaeter be-
cause it defines duties and imposes obligations. Oonsequently 
the source and origin of legislative power is determined in de-
termining the ultimate maker of all things. 
Aooording to Brownson Q.od alone is a maker in the striotest 
8ense of the term. The reason, of oourse, is that in making all 
things He used no previously existing material. He is therefore 
eompletely and solely responsible for the existence of creatures 
He owns them eompletely. Consequently His right in regard to 
creatures is complete and ultimate: It imposes and defines their 
duties. In terms of law this means that God is the ultimate 
eame up n an ar io e on 
,.-...,....,c-only in e sense of jus • in the sense 
in whieh right is leg slative, makes the law, and imposes and 
defines duty. The question or right we showed to be a ques-
tion of law, beoause man*s right is law for all but himailf, 
and imposes and defines their duty to him ••• " XIV, 330. 
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souree of authority over man•s free will. The authority is His 
in virtue of His creative aot whioh gives being to man a a 
5 
ereature distinct from God. 
A brief examination of the view presented thus far indi-
cates that Brownson has been interested in law only to the ex-
tent that it concerns man. He has endeavored to show olearly 
why God has dominion over man. The easiest way to do so, in 
his estimation, is to show that God owns man. 
Having thus aonfined his discussion of law to man, Brown-
son says that it is an aot of authority over free will. Having 
showed that God has iominion over man, he says that God is the 
5 "Our duty to obey God is the correlative of his right to 
eommand us, and his right to command us is in his right of 
property in us, and his right of property in us is in his 
having created us. All dominion rests on ownership, and all 
real ownership on creation. We found, then, God*s sovereign-
ty of the universe on his creative aet, by whioh he has pro-
duced it from nothing." XIV, 299-800. 
In regard to the reason why Brownson puts his argument in 
this particular form, he comments as follows: HNo doubt a 
correct answer may be found to the question, Why are we bound 
to obey God? in the current teachings of the schools; but 
we have not met one in so olear, precise, and definite a form 
that we oan easily use it in our controversies without our 
modern deniers of the obligation to worship God, and of moral 
accountability. We think, however, that a very simple answer 
may be given, not chargeable with novelty, or of being 
original with us, - though seldom stated in the precise shape 
in which we present it, - and whieh will meet our wants." 
XIV, 299. This, of course, substantiates the reason already 
given for his point of departure. Cf. n. 1. 
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souree of authority over man's free will. 
It is not a sufficient explanation for the basis of law, 
however, to state simply that it originates in God. For al-
though One and Simple in Himself, He is conceived by finite mindl 
under many aspects. auoh a mode of conception follows as a eon-
sequence of the limited intellectual power of the creature. 
The creature, for example, thinks of God as intelligent and 
possessed of a free will. Beoause of this mode of oonceiving 
God it is necessary to determine further the basis of law by 
assigning it to either one or both of these attributes. 
On this question Brownson unhesitatingly declares that the 
7 
ultimate ground of law is God's will. He does not, however, 
attempt to defend the view that law is the product of will to 
the entire exolusion of intellect. He maintains rather that 
6 XIV, 303. Brownson says also that he is aware of the fact that 
the term law"··· is j»equently used in a wider sense than 
that in which we here use it. It is frequently applied to 
inanimate and irrational nature. Thus men speak of the laws 
of matter, of motion, of plants, of animals; they speak also 
of intrinsic laws, and laws of instinct; but in all these 
instances the word is used in an analogical or metaphysical, 
not in ita toe and prober sense." XIV, 303. This treatment o I' 
law is, of course, vastly different from that of st. Thomas, 
I-II, q. 90, a. 1, x., wherein is found the familiar "le• 
!uaedam regula eat." However, in answer to the first "'"DJeotio~'-
n the same article, st. f.homas notes that law "lioitur dup-
lioiter esse in aliquo ••• " The seeond of these includes 
"••• quaelibet inolinatio proveniens ex aliqua lege potest 
diei lex non essentialiter, sed quasi participative! et hoe 
modo inolinatio ipsa membrorum ad oonoupisoendum lex 
membrorum voeatur." 
7 XIV. 304. 
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alth?ugh both baoulties are necessary, will plays the dominant 
role. In order to understand the respective functions of in-
telleot and will in the promulgation of a law, it is neaessary 
to note that tt is possible to view law from two distinot 
aspeots. 
In the first plaoe law may be oonsidered from the stand-
point of its oontents and purpose. That is, it may be viewed 
for the preeise purpose of ascertaining what it is that is 
oommanded and also the purpose to be achieved by the command. 
From this viewpoint, Brownson readily oonoedes that law is 
clearly an aot of the intelleot; for only an intelleot is 
oapable of grasping the relationship between means and ends, 
and therefore it alone is capable of formulating a plan or a 
8 
rule of action. 
Aeoording to Brownson, however, this oonoeption of law is 
deficient. He argues that a mere plan as suoh does not bind 
the will. In other words, however reasonable a plan may be, 
however good its purpose, it l88aoivth$•ebyt,n aot of auther-
ity over free will. Thus a plan requires the addition of 
9 . 
another faetor in order totransform it into law. 
8 XlV, 333. Cf. also XIV, 305, and the following, "If we eon-
aider law as to its eontents, or in answer to the question 
why the sovereign chooses to enaot it, it is no doubt aotus 
intelleotus, but in that sense it is only improperly oalled 
law." XIV, 347. 
9 XIV, 305. 
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In the seoond plaoe, therefore, law must be considered with 
a view to aseertaining the oharaeteristie whioh determines a 
law as such; that is, as binding upon the will. In other words 
it is necessary to determine what it is that gives law its 
formal oharaoter as law. 
From this Viewpoint law must have its origin in the will, 
for will is the moving power. Only the will oan oommand, and 
without it a legislator eommanding or imposing a rule, there is 
no law. Consequently law derives its eharaater as a binding 
foroe from will and not from the intellect. Sinee this is the 
formal element which determines a law as suoh, it is clear that 
the divine will is for Brownson the source of law. Brownson 
summarizes his view of the question as follows: 
Law is not actus rationis, but aotus imperii, 
therefore an aot of will, for will, not reason, 
is the imperative faoulty. Reason enlightens 
will, but will oommands reason. Reason is 
declarative, not legislative, does not found 
the law, but deolares what the law is. It 
tells us what is good, what is bad, what is 
desirable, what is undesirable, but does not 
bind us to seek the one or avoid the other. 
Law is the voice of authority, and derives 
its binding force as law from Him who eommands, 
not from what is commanded. To know whether 
it is law or not, we ask not, What is said? 
but, Who speaks? God speaks - is the ultimate 
reason for all obedienoe; for who may say unto 
him, What doest thou?, or, Why oommandest 
thou thus? law undoubtedly is reasonable, but 
it is law not beeause it is reasonable, but 
beeause it is the expressed will of the 
sovereign, of him who has the right to impose 
his own will as law. 10 
10 XIV, 303. 
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In dissussing law with a view to determining its ultimate 
souroe in either the will or intellect, Brownson is not at all 
interested in attempting to settle the question in terms of the 
respective funetions of these faculties considered in themselves 
He is much more interested in the question from the standpoint 
of the praetiaal difficulties encountered in adopting either of 
these views. Thus he pursues the same question still further in 
terms of the eonsequenoes involved in adopting either the 
primaey of the will or intelleot in regard to law. For he says 
that "It is only by means of plaeing obligation solely in the 
fact that God wills it, that we know how to oarry on the war 
11 
against the peculiar errors of our times." 
Brownson contends that if reason in the sense of intellect 
is legislative in oharaoter it is impossible to show that God 
legislates freely. The argument whereby he supports this con-
elusion is very brief: 
If, to get law in an obligatory sense in whieh 
it is law for the will, we go further, and 
assert reason not merely as deelarative, but 
as striotly legislative, we then lose all free 
legislation, for reason is neeessarily, not 
free. By plaoing the obligation as well as 
the rectitude of the law in reason, we plaoe 
it in the eternal and neoessary essence of 
Godt and then God is no longer a free legisla-
tor, for in his essence he is necessary being. 
The law, then, is of necessity, and God has no 
freedom in governing the world. 12 
ll XIV, 344. 
12 XIV, 342. 
40 
In this argument Brown~on says that God's reason is 
identified with His essence. Consequently it possesses all of 
the attributes of that essence. Therefore God's reason is 
eternal, immutable, neeessary being. Sinee reason is neeessary, 
13 
the laws originating therein are neeessary laws. 
Now in saying that God's essenee is necessary, Brownson 
means that He exists necessarily. He does not mean that God is 
under compulsion. But again, creatures cannot, because of thai 
limitations, express all they know about God in one eonoept. 
The conceptions of God as eternal and immutable essence, for 
example, is not the conception of God as free. The conception 
of something flowing from His eternal and immutable essenee is 
not the conception of something produeed by His free act. In 
order to grasp this aspect of God it is neeessary again to 
speak of H~ in terms of intellect and will. 
Brownson readily ooneedes that both intellect and will are 
necessary for a free act. Without intellect there eould be no 
will, for it is only because the intellect presents objeets to 
13 At this point one might objeet that God's will is likewise 
identified with His essence and is therefore necessary being 
Thus it would follow also that laws originating therein are 
likewise necessary. Bhile Brownson neither proposes the 
objeetion nor answers it explicitly, it oeours rather 
obviously. That it is not an objection for Brownson is 
brought out in the course of the discussion. 
14 
it that the will oan function. Nevertheless he holds that the 
intelleot is determined by its object. The evidence of truth 
15 
compels its assent. 
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He refers to the will, however, as the monarch of the 
mind. Its assent is not eompelled by an external object. It is 
not determined to adhere tD any one of the objects presented to 
it. Consequently will is the ultimate ground of freedom: "The 
reason presents the end and the motive for seeking it, and the 
14 Cf.,for example, IX, 240; III, 124; X, 156. 
15 Now it is clear that the truth or falsity of Brownson's view 
depends upon the truth or falsity of his view that intelleot 
is neoessary, not free. It is impossible, of oourse, in a 
work such as this to treat such a2subjeet exhaustively. 
This would require a thesis of oonsiderable length, sueh as 
the study of Sidney Raemers, America~ Foremost Philosopher, (already referred to), who wrote the work for the purpose of 
explaining what Brownson meant by his theory of knowledge. 
The soope and importanoe of the problem concerning the 
nature and respective functions of intellect and will in a 
~':free aet, as well as the factors entering into its solution, 
are indieated elearly by Anton-Hermann Chroust, ttHugo 
Grotius and the Seholastie Natural Law Tradition," New 
Soholastiaism, (April, 1943), XVII, No.2, 101-133.---
Brownson himself has no formal discussion of the problem. 
If he appreeiates it as a problem he attempts to avoid it 
by saying the important consideration is the fact that man 
knows and wills by means of faculties. He does not .ooniiter 
intelleot and will separately in order to discover what they 
are in themselves and how they are related. Cf. I, 105-115, 
230; XIV, 194; VI, 33; IX, 240-241; II, 33 ff. 
will ehooses or rejects it, determines to gain or not to gain 
16 
it. 
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Brownson's view of the respective functions of intellect 
and will in a free aot is consequently a very simple one. The 
intellect seeks knowledge at the command of the will. Having 
been thus oommanded, the intellect in turn enlightens the will. 
But since the will is superior to the intelleot, it is under no 
obligation to aoaept any particular object presented to it. Thus 
the final decision in regard to the object to be adhered to is 
made by the will. It is consequently the ultimate source of the 
free act. 
On the basis of this view of intellect and will, it is 
alear that God's intellect cannot be the source of law. For if 
it were, law would be conceived as existing prior to the oommand 
of God's will. And if it is prior to the command of His will, it 
eannot oome into existence as a result of His free act, because 
His will must be viewed as the ultimate source of His freedom. 
16 X, 156. Of. also the following! "Reason enlightens will, but 
will oommands reason." XIV, 303. Further, "But though the 
soul operates simultaneously in all of its operations as 
intellect and will, the will is the commanding faculty, the 
monarch of the mind, as it has sometimes been called, and it 
is in some sense as its servant, not as its master, that the 
intellect •••rates. The motive power of all intellectual life 
is the will, love, the love of the good •••• It is the spring 
and motive, or rather mobile, of all our actions, and must 
therefore hold the first plaoe in our philosophy, whether we 
speak of the subject or of the object." I, 352-353. 
Thus if the divine intelleat were the source of law, God would 
have no choice in the promulgation of the laws whereby He 
governs His creatures. In fact He would not be free to command 
or not to command the existence of creatures, for His will 
would be limited by laws existing prior to the command of His 
will. Thus Brownson concludes that if law were grounded in 
intellect "••• no sovereign will would be requisite to consti-
tute it law. Ita obligation would be in what it commands, not 
in him who oommands, whiah no Catholio theologian, and none but 
17 
an infidel or liberal Christian ean admit." 
17 XIV, 347. Brownson adds that St. Thomas treats law from an 
entirely different viewpoint. His concluding statement, 
however, involves a large question, on Which Brownson has 
spoken hastily. st. Thomas explicitly makes law a thing of 
reason in s.Th., I-II, q. 90, a. l, a, and eertainly seems 
to exclude will as suoh. He makes the relatiQ4 of will to 
law its regulation by the reason. Ibid., ad 3~: "••• 
voluntas de his quae imperantur, aa-Eee quod legis rationem 
habeat, oportet uod sit ali ua ratione re ata: et hoe 
modo intelligitur, quo vo un as princip s ras quoted in the 
objection1 habet vigorem legis ••• " Cf. als~ q. 93, a. l, c: 
"••• ratit divinae sapientiae moventis omnia ad debitum 
finem obtinet rationem legis." Obviously, this is a difficult 
question, and I am only trying to show the radioal differ-
ence between Brownson and st. ~homas. !he metaphysieal 
difference ia perhaps made clearout ins. Th., I, q. 16, a.4. 
~hee,,B.&d22•, st. Thomas says "Primo est ratio entia, 
seoundoratio veri, tertio ratio boni ••• " This unequivooal 
ptiority of being and true over good is one with which 
Brownson was not in sympathy. His constant tendency was to 
platonize. Moreover, he did not make the necessary dis-
tinction between the speculative and practical reason, even 
in God. However this is not an explanation of st. Thomas• 
doctrine, but an attempt to indicate that he and Brownson 
are on divergent lines of thought. 
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Suoh a view is, however, clearly incompatible with the 
Christian conception of God, for God is free. He is above all 
law. His will eannot be conceived as being restricted by law. 
He is under no compulsion in regard to creatures or to the laws 
whereby He governs them. Both are produced from nothing by a 
free act of God. In order to conceive of God as a free legis-
lator it is therefore necessary to oonolude that God's will is 
the ultimate source and foundation of law in the sense in which 
law imposes an obligation. 
Thus far Brownson has shown that legislative power is 
derived from ownership and is coextensive with it. Further, he 
has shown that God is sole and ex~lusive owner of creatures be-
oause He alone is responsible for their existence. Since he 
takes this position it is clear that Brownson must hold that 
legislative power is vested solely and e xolusively in God. On 
this point is is very explicit: 
God is sole legislator. He is not merely 
supreme legislator with subordinate legis-
lators under him, each a proper legislator 
within a given sphere, but sole and universal 
legislator, not in the sense of eminent legis-
lator only, as he is the eminent cause of 
all that is done by tacond causes, but in 
the sense of direct legislator, so that all 
legality, all the binding force of law, all 
law as law, emanates directly from his will. 18 
In this case Brownson's meaning is quite clear. He says 
18 XIV, 332. 
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simply that creatures do not participate or share God's legisl~~ 
tive authority as they do His causal power. This means that God 
aommunieates His causal power to oreatures but He does not oom-
munioate to them His authority as a legislator. Consequently 
there are second causes but no seoond legislators. 
This view of Brownson is in harmony with and is neeessi-
tated by the general doctrine presented thus far. First o~ all 
he has shown that right is legislative in oharacter. Bight, in 
turn, is based upon ownership. And sinoe God is solely and oom-
pletely responsible for the existence of creatures, He owns all 
that they are and oan acquire. Beeause he owns them in toto, 
no part is left over for anyone else to own. Consequently no 
one else has any right to any part of the creature or of his 
activity. And since God alone has right, it follows that He 
19 
alone is legislator. 
Now it is olear that beoause Brownson denys legislative 
authority to creatures he must also deny that they have rights. 
Consequently they cannot be owners. While this is clearly 
Brownson's doctrine it is equally evident that he does not deny 
19 "We can owe only on aondition that we are, to the extent of 
our indebtedness, not our own, and oan owe only him whose we 
are. We owe God because we are his, and all we are and have, 
because all we are and have is his, sinoe he is its author and 
giver. We eannot owe beyond all we are and have, this is, 
beyond our whole being, and if we owe the whole to God, it is 
olear that we oan owe no one else." V, 2'12. 
L 
the reality of second causes, for he has Just said that God is 
20 
the eminent cause of all that is done by second causes. 
It is hardly necessary to point out in detail that these 
views of Brownson seem to be mutually incompatible. For in 
conceding that a creature is a cause, Brownson must obviously 
concede that he is responsible for the existence of things, for 
this is the function of a cause. Since the creature is to some 
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extent responsible for the existence of things, he must be, to 
that extent, owner. Consequently he must also have right and 
with it legislative power. Sinoe such a conclusion is ineom-
patible with Brownson's view of God as sole and exclusive legis-
lator, he is obliged to show how he oan maintain consistently 
that creatures are real second eauses but not real legislators. 
Now in order to understand Brownson's view it is obviously 
necessary to understand precisely what he means when he says 
that creatures ere second causes. His meaning is discernible b7 
comparing and contrasting the activity of seaond causes with 
that of the first cause. In doing so it will be shown why God's 
20 Of. also the following: "But either creatures are second 
causes or they are not. If not, they are merely phenomenal, 
and we must be ~antheists, for the essenoe of Pantheism is 
in denying second causes. If ereatures are second causes, 
then, as they have confessedly their type or exemplar in 
God, they must in the order of second causes copy or imitate 
the divine creative act." I, 376. 
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sotivity gives Him right while that of creatures does not. 
In the first place the creative activity of God presents 
itself under two aspects. According to Brownson one of these is 
"••• the procession by way of creation, not emanation, of 
existences from God, as their first or efficient cause, and the 
other their return, without being absorbed into God, ••• to him 
21 
as their final cause or last end." The procession of oreatures 
from God is referred to as the initial order of creation or its 
first ayale. Their return to Him is referred to as the second 
22 
oyele or the teleological order. 
Now the aetivity in the initial order, and to some extent 
in the teleologioal order, is distinctively God's. Creatures do 
not and cannot participate or share in the act by whioh God 
has produoed them from nothing: "To assert such participation 
would place us in the order of the first cause, give us at 
least a share in the work of creation, and thus assert, if not 
23 
pantheism, polytheism." 
God has willed not only that creatures exist, but also 
that they return to Him as final cause. God has created them, 
but He has created them for Himself alone. The plan according 
to which creatures proceed from God and return to Him is also 
distinctively God's. He is sole creator, acting for an end; as 
21 XIV, 206. 
22 III, 363; XIV, 206. 
23 XIV, 313. 
suoh he alone designates the end and imposes the obligation or 
the law aocording to whioh His creatures must act in order to 
attain their end. Thus far the creature has no voioe, no will, 
24 
no activity. 
In Brownson's estimation, therefore, the aativity of the 
creature is confined to the teleological order. As causes their 
activity is produetive, but it is productive only in relation to 
their end. This means that while the divine plan does not and 
eanc~ot give the creature any share in the aot whereby Me is 
created and obliged to return to God, it does include the 
existence of man as a second cause whose own aetivity is re-
quired ~gr the attainment of·the end God has willed him to 
attain. 
The position and the activity of the ereature is thus more 
elearly defined. God has imposed upon His creatures the obliga-
tion to return to Him. Further, each ereature must tend toward 
God or return to Him according to his nature. This is the only 
eonceivable way in which he can tend toward God because the 
nature of the creature is the only center of his activity. From 
a different viewpoint this means that God direots all things to 
their end in accordance with the nature He has given them. That 
is, having given a nature to a creature, He ;overns it accord-
ingly. Sinee man•s nature is rational, God governs him accord-
24 III, 74. 
25 XIV, 206, 312; III, 74. 
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ing to it. God imposes upon man the obligation to return to Htm; 
sinoe his nature is rational, the return to God must be ·rational.. 
In terms of the teleologioal order, this means that man's 
activity is confined to the seoond oyele of creation. It is the 
sole sphere of his activity. His return to God must be intelli-
gent; but man has a faculty whi•h is superior even to his intel-
lect, and is more truly the source of his own activity. This is 
his free will. Consequently man is obliged to tend toward God 
by his free, voluntary aet. Thus Brownson says that the seeond 
oyole of oreation "••• is the sole sphere of man's,aotivity, and 
26 
it consists in voluntary obedienoe to the law of God •••• " 
Brownson does not, therefore, deny the activity of second 
oauses. He concedes to them the highest activity compatible with 
their position as creatures who owe everything to God: 
The activity of second causes is none the lese 
activity because confined to the second •yale, or 
return to God as the end for which they were made. 
Undoubtedly all activity is, in a oertain sense, 
productive, otherwise it would not be aotivity; 
but the activity of second causes produces only in 
the order of the end, and in man is termed virtue, 
whioh is the product of dut.f discharged, and there-
fore is inaluded in the return to God. This return 
to God is in man more than an instinctive, more even 
than an intelligent return; it is a free, voluntary 
return, in whioh the end is not only apprehended, 
but freely willed. There is no higher conceivable 
activity of seaond oauses than this, none which 
approaches nearer the similitude of the divine 
activity. Man is never more truly or distinctively 
man, and never performs an aot more properly his 
own, than when performing an act of obedienoe, or 
discharging a duty. 27 
26 III, 76. 
27 XIV, 313. 
Now it is olear that Brownson's dootrine, while denying 
absolute ownership, does not ·deny ownership to ereatures in 
every sense of the term. For he has asserted that God has 
_!iven to the ereature a nature whioh is the souroe of his 
activities. But it is elear that whatever God gives, He has 
•· 
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the right to give, for He is absolute owner. Consequently what 
ever He has as a faot given to oreatures is really their own. 
He merely denies that suoh ownership originates in the oreature 
and affirms that its ao.uree is God who wills him to have it. 
On this basis, however, it is clearly impossible for the 
oreature to own anything, even his own existence, absolutely. 
For if the creature were absolute owner, he oould do with him-
self whatever pleased his fancy. Thus his aotivity would not 
be subject to God's law. 
This is impossible, however, for God Himself aannot dis-
pense the creature from the obligations arising from his posi-
tion as God's subject. For God's dominion over the oreature is 
founded on His oreative aot. He is absolute owner of man by 
the fact that He is his maker or creator. For the same reason 
man owes everything to God. Therefore he is obliged to render 
to God the tribute of his being. Thus God's dominion over man 
remains as long as His creative aot persists. And sinee man 
is and must remain a 0reature, he is, and must remain, subject 
.28 
to God's law~ ... 
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It is olear, therefore, that man*s ownership of all things, 
including himself, is and must remain ownership subject to God's 
will. Consequently his ownership is never absolute. This, how-
ever, is not ownership in the strictest sense of the term. For 
anyone who owns a thing absolutely has the right to do What he 
pleases with his own. Consequently man*s ownership, or that of 
any creature, is more aeourately deseribed by the term steward-
29 
ship. 
Now in view of the faet that creatures are owners as stew-
ards or trustees of God, it is clear that they have rights in 
the same way, for right is consequent upon ownership and ooex-
tensive with it. Thus it is convenient to speak of the rights 
and duties of creatures to themselves and to eaoh othe~ in the 
same way that they are spoken of as owners. But since the 
ereature has rights only as a steward of God, it is clear that 
his rights must be respected only in that way. That is, the 
creature is not and cannot be the ultimate recipient of that 
which is due to him. For if he were, he would own his rights 
28 Of. above, n. 6, wherein Brownson says that God's sovereignty 
is founded on His creative aot. In V, 271, Brownson shows 
that God oannot dispense us from the obligation to worship 
Him, whioh "inoludes all our obligations," without annihila-
ting His own essenoe. 
·ao 
in his own name rather than as God's steward. 
This means that areatures have rights and duties to them-
salves and to others, but their rights and duties are binding 
because of God's law. For as absolute ow.ner God doos not de-
mand direot and immediate payment of all that is owed to Him. 
He has, in His goodness, transferred part of that devt to His 
31 
creatures and made it paya~le to themselves on His order. 
For example, in willing the existence and preservation of 
men, God wills them to have and to preserve that existence. 
Consequently each individual has not only a right to his exist-
enee as God's 'gift, but also the obligation to respect it in 
himself and in others. For if God had not willed the obliga-
tion to respeot the rights He has given, the rights themselves 
would be meaningless. Beeause the creature does not have in 
and of himself the right to his existence, he aannot in his own 
name bind himself and others to respect it. Consequently it is 
30 "I am aware that moralists are s~eoustomed to divide our 
duties into three classes - duties to ourselves, duties to 
our neighbor, and duties to God, and that some persons sup-
pose that each class stands on its own ground, independent 
each of the others, so that we might deny our duties to God, 
and still assert duties to ourselves or duties to our neigh-
bor. But this is, as you perceive, a grave error. The divi-
sion of our duties into the three classes just mentioned is 
convenient and perfectly proper, when the question is not 
as to the ultimate ground of duty, and it is only proposed 
to treat our speoifio duties simply in relation to their im 
medi&te objects; but when we are treating of the principle 
of duty itself, the ultimate ground of all obligation, it i 
not admissable; for then all duties resolve themselves into 
duties to God •••• " V, 273. 
31 XIV, 301. 
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alear that the righ$s and duties of areatures to themselves and 
32 
to others derive their binding foree direetly from God's will. 
This means simply that in the event a ereature is deprived 
for example, of his life, to whioh he has a right as God's gift 
he suffers a loss of something God has given to htm. The one 
who deprives him of the right sins, or oommits a moral evil be-
eause he has broken God's law whieh binds his will to respeot 
the lives of others. Brownson says "The evil ts to the sufferer 
t~e moral wrong is to God, whose property is injured, and whose 
33 
law is broken." 
Thus far !rownson has maintained that the sole purpose of 
the ereature is to return to God. His return must be made in 
sooordanae with his nature, for that is his only source of 
aativity. Sinee man is a creature endowed with a free will, ae 
must tend toward God by his own free, voluntary aot. He does 
this by freely willing to obey God•s law. 
It is impossible, however, for man to eonform his own will 
to God's unless he has some knowledge of What it is that God 
has oommanded. Consequently, sinoe God's plan requires man. to 
obey His law, it also requires him to have some knowledge of 
it. Without suoh knowledge obedience would be impossible. 
As a matter of faot God has made it possible for man to 
disoover the law aoaording to whioh he is governad. In the firs~ 
32 XIV, 336-339. 
33 XIV, 337. 
place He has made a revelation to man. The positive commands 
34 
embodied therein are referred to as the supernatural law. 
54 
Beeondly, God's command is embodied in the universe He has 
created, and it is diseoverable therein by the light of the 
reason natural to man. Brownson does not prove this statement 
by any elaborate argumentation. He says simply that since God 
has willed the existence and preserva~ion of the natural order 
it is evident that "••• when we have aseertained that this or 
that is necessary to its preservation, we may know without 
35 
further inquiry that God commands it." It is termed natural 
because it is promulgated through natural reason. 
While the term natural law is a convenient one, it cannot 
be used in any sense which implies that there is a law whieh 
the natural order itself imposes or originates. For nature, or 
the natural order, is a creature. As suoh it has no right or 
ownership absolutely, or in its own name, independently of God. 
Therefore it has no authority whatsoever to impose obligations. 
Consequently in speaking of the natural law one must be 
careful to refrain from using the term in a sense which implys 
that nature is a seeondary or intermediate legislator. Thus 
Brownson says that "The law of nature is, we grant, true law, 
but it derives its character of law directly from the will of 
34 XIV, 385. 
35 XIV, 306. 
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God, not from nature as second oause." 
Brownson describes accurately the sense in whioh he uses 
the term natural law when he says: 
We do not deny the obligation of the law of 
nature, but we do not call it law precisely 
because without fulfilling it we-cannot ful-
fill the purpose of our existenoe, nor the 
law of nature precisely because it is impressed 
upon nature, innate, intrinsic, and operative 
in all natural actions, but because it is 
the law of God, the will of our sovereign, 
commanding us to observe the order of nature, 
and forbidding us to depart from it. 37 
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This means that the natural order must be preserved because God 
has willed its e:x:istenee and preservs.tion. Whatever is neoessar 
to the existenoe and preservation of the natural order is, ipso 
faoto, willed by God. The souroe of the obligation to obey 
nature, to preserve its existence, is not in nature itself, but 
in its Author. In this sense the natural law is in no sense 
distinct from God's law, or from His direet and immediate com-
mand. It is called natural only beoa.use it is promulgated not 
supernaturally, but through the reason natural to man. 
Before proceeding with the discussion it is necessary to 
examine the position Brownson has taken thus far. The chapter 
is, in a sense, an outline of what Brownson intends to say 
specifically about the state. A summary is presented with a 
view to determining why Brownson has taken the position he has, 
36 XIV, 332. 
37 XIV, 312. 
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and what it means to him as a politiaal philosopher. 
He has held that God is the sole and exclusive legislator 
of the universe. He derives His right to legislate beeause He 
is its maker, and therefore ow.ner with absolute right. There 
are no intermediate legislators having authority to impose obli-
gations in their own name, beaause there are no intermediate 
ereators. There are none who have the kind of ownership that 
is consequent upon creation. The natural law is the command of 
God, promulgated through nature or natural reason, which obliges 
man to preserve the natural order created by God. Anything 
necessary to its preservation is by that fact authorized or 
commanded by God. 
On this basis it is clear that Brownson must show that 
society is in the natural order whose existence and preservation 
is obligatory beaause God oommands it. In this way, the obliga-
tion to ~eserve the existence of soeiety is an obligation im-
posed by God. Obedience is consequently a duty, a moral virtue; 
disobedience is a sin, a violation of God's command. Thus 
Brownson's position requires him to defend the view that the 
authority of society is derived from the natural law. 
An analysis of his view of right presented above indicates 
that it is merely a continuation of his exposition of individual 
rights presented in the preceding ehapter, wherein he has shown 
that the right of the state must be derived - it oannot be abso-
lute. If its authority is absolute, underived, there is no plaee 
for the rights of the individual. 
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In the present Qhapter he has merely ap~lied that same 
view to the individual rather than the state. For he has said 
that the individual has no native, inherent, underived right. 
The rights of the individual must be derived from God - as muoh 
so as those of the state. 
He has endeavored to show, somewhat eireuitously perhaps, 
that God alone possesses right in the absol~te and unqualified 
sensa of the term. Consequently all other rights must be not 
absolute, but deriwed - and from God alone. Thus it is false to 
hold that the right of the state is underived and absolute. On 
the same ground it is equally false to hold that the right of 
the individual is underived and absolute. 
Further, to say that God gives man rights is not to deny 
that man has sueh rights. They do not lose their reality by the 
faat thut ~od gives them to man. Sinae man derives his rights 
from God, who wills him to have them, anyone depriving a man of 
suoh rights violates God's law. Thus if man•s rights are eon-
sidered as gifts from God, their preservation is more certain 
than if they are considered as his own. 
Brownson's discussions of right inalude, in a sense, the 
limple statement that he will not present his conception of the 
state until he has shown that there cannot be in it any absol-
utes whieh may eollide. Again, in the preceding ahapter he has 
Ehown that the possession of a right carries with it the right 
to define, to judge, to determine its limits. Affirmed of the 
state, sueh right involves absolutism. Affirmed of the indivi-
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dual, it is nothing more than the extension of the Protestant 
38 
prinaiple of private judgment in the politieal order. It is 
anarohy. 
Having stated the conditions under which he will discuss 
the problem of individual liberty versus publia authority, Brown 
son endeavors to prove the proposition that the authority of the 
state must be derived from God through the natural law. In doing 
so Brownson must show that society is natural and that its pre-
servation is consequently commanded by God. Thus his solution 
of the p~oblem of the·respective rights of the individual and 
the state must begin with his discussion of the origin of 
soaiety and its authority. 
38 XIV, 308, 344. 
CHAPTER IV 
TEE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT IN CONTRACT 
When he deals with certain questions, the analyst of B~own­
son's thought sometime's feels that there is mue~ justiee in 
James Russell Lowell's fine lines: 
The worst of it is, that his logic'• so strong, 
That of two sides he commonly chooses the wrong; 
If there is ohlr one, why he'll split it in two, 1 
And first-pummel this half, then that, black and blue. 
One suoh question is the origin of government. Brownson 
wrote a good deal on it. But he wrote as a reviewer, and as a 
Catholic reviewer. Consequently he not only dissects and criti-
cizes other men's views but oomplieates his dissection and 
oritioism by his zeal for retaining truths he may find in them. 
As Arthur Schlesinger says - not altogether unfairly - B;.?wnson 
"••• usually decided that eaeh side of a question has its truth, 
and his inclination was to build a complete answer by heaping 
2 
the truths together." 
Whether or not Brownson's theory of government is a mere 
1 "A Fable for Crities", cited by Schlesinger, 278. 
2 Schlesinger, 287. Brownson's own attitude is illustrated in 
the following: "We regard it as the mark of an ill-natured, a 
narrow minded, or carping eritie to read a book simply to find 
in it something that he ean pounee upon, and hold up to publie 
execration as unsound in morals or incorrect in theology •••• 
The great aim of the generous and noble-minded Catholic eriti• 
is to recognize what there is in his author that is true and 
good, worthy of commendation, and to pass lightly over small 
ar incidental errors, for our great work is not so much to a-
void error as to bring out and appropriate truth.•' XJl~ 293-294 ----------------------------------~~~----~~~~~~~~~~~. 
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congeries of truths, the fact is that his theory of the origin 
of government must be constructed partially from his criticisms 
mf ot~er men, and other possible.theories. Prior to his con-
version, when he was unfamiliar with the scholastics, Brownson 
recognized four possible theories or grounds for the origin of 
government and of authority. Some time later he expanded his 
3 
list to include eight such theories. 
In each of these lists appear theories which endeavor to 
aooount for the origin of authority on a purely human basis. 
They appear under the oommon name of the sooial contract. Now 
the sooial contract for Brownson has two principle variants: thE 
authority of society is derived from a contract entered into by 
sovereign individuals; the authority of society inheres in the 
people collectively who possess authority as a unit. The first 
of these Brownson regards as more properly the social contract, 
and we shall present it in this chapter. The second he prefers 
to oall the democratic theory, and we shall present it in the 
3 In his first essays on the origin and ground of government 
Brownson finds that government may originate in: 1. The ex-
press appointment of God; 2. The spontaneous development of 
human nature; 3. The authority of the father in the family; 
4. The social compact formed by the people in convention 
assembled. XV, 310. In his American Republio Brownson expands 
his list to eight. Government originates: 1. In the right of 
the father to govern his child; 2. In a convention or oom-
pact; 3. In the people collectively; 4. In the spontaneous 
development of nature; 6. In the express appointment of God; 
6. Further its authority may be derived from God through the 
pope; 7. through the people; a. through the natural law. 
XVIII, 18-19. 
'4 
ehapter whieh follows. 
That "government is and must be authority exercised over 
... 5 
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subjects " was for Brownson axiomatio. Therefore he had little 
use for the term self-government. Sinoe government without a 
alear out distinetion of governor and governed was for him an 
impossibility, he looked on self-government as a misleading, 
even a perniaious misnomer. Names have more power than we oom-
6 
monly think. A failure to distinguish in so oalled self-gov-
ernment between governor and governed may lead to a loss of 
aatij.ori ty: ''~he influence of names is greater than is e~ommonly 
imagined. A misnomer involves usually an error as to the thing. 
If we oall our government self-government, and contend for it 
4 In his first discussion of the theory that the authority of 
government may originate in the people, Brownson observed tha~ 
the term people may be used either distributively or collect-
ively. Thus he aritiaized one theory which has distinot 
phases or aspects. In his Ameriean Republil he retained the 
same idea, but for the sake of elai"l""fylie treats these 
variations in distinct places under the headings: the origin 
of government in convention ( XVIII1 27-40) ana the origin 
of authority in sooiety or people eolleetively which he calls 
the demooratie theory. XVIII, 41. In his oritioism ~f the 
contract theory he mentions that it has been advocated by 
Hobbes, Loeke and Rousseau. XVIII, 41-42. 
5 XV, 413; XVIII, 16. 
6 He maintains that the masses are free from all subtlety, 
taking words in their most obvious sense, paying little or no 
attention to the refinements of philosophers. Thus a people 
will interpret the term self-government to mean that they are 
under no government as a people, and conseuqntly under no 
restraint except that which they impose U»On themselves. 
XV:, 306-307. 
under that namet we shall of necessity run in our theories, and 
'1 
in our praotioe, into no-governmentism." 
We oan put Brownson mosisimply thus: self-government is 
tolerable if the self does not destroy the government. It oould 
destroy it if the distinction between governor and governed is 
lost. Now let us see what Brownson thought of the theory in 
which individuals establish authority ove! themselves. 
He makes the theory older than that of the author of the 
Sooial Oontraot. In faat he soes baek .to Hobbes who n •. • is 
among the earliest and most distinguished of the advocates of 
8 
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this theory." Its purpose is to aooount for the origin of auth· 
ority on a purely human basis. It endeavors to aeaomplis~ its 
purpose by showing that authority to govern arises in a oonven-
tion or an agreement, either between the people and their ruler~ 
or between the people themselves to appoint rulers. Thus ruler1 
have authority beoau3e the people give it to them. People agreE 
'1 XV, 305. 
8 XVIII, 28. Brownson's exposition of the social contract 
theory does not represent in detail the complete view of any 
one of its exponents. This objection might be a serious one 
if Brownson intended to refute any one of these philosophers. 
This is not his purpose. He oritioizes here a theory whioh 
trys to aeoount for the origin of authority on a p~llY human 
basis. He does not criticize it as held preoisely by this or 
that individual. He tries to make his refutation complete 
by showing th~_t sueh a theory is false regardless of its 
possible interpretations. 
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to -be- governed-; they enter into a. aontraot a.n.d this contraot is 
the basis of the authority to govern~ On this basis it is ob-
vious that no government is just which does not have the consent 
of the governed. For the people are the only souroe of author-
ity, and if a government does not have the consent of the people 
9 
it can have no authority - it is therefore unjust. 
Further, sinae the purpose of the theory is to aaeount for 
the origin of government on the conventional basis, it must sup-
pose that civil society is not as old as men. It must suppose, 
prior to the formation of oivil society, a combination af cir-
cumstances necessitating a convention to institute government. 
Otherwise there would be no need for a theory to aooount for the 
origin of government. The situation in which men found ~hem­
selves prior to a convention authorizing government is referred 
10 
to as the state of nature. 
In general terms, the state of enture is one of continual 
w r :::·a:r · · ~ ~ch man has equal rights and each trys to appropri-
ate everything. "The strong oppress the weak; the cunning air-
11 
aumvent the simple." There is no law but the will of the 
strongest. At length, weary of perpetual warfare, men decide 
to form eivil society. They surrender their own natural free-
dom in order to secure the benefits of society. Without sueh a. 
9 XV, 311. 
10 XVIII, 27; XV, 310. 
11 XV, 311. 
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a surrender of rights, society has no legitimate authority• 
Looke states rather aoourately the position Brownson intend 
to criticize: 
Man being, as has been said, by nature all free, 
equal, and independent, no one oan be put out of this 
estate and subjected to the political power of another, 
without his own consent. The only way whereby anyone 
divests himself of his natural liberty and puts on 
the bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other 
men to join and unite into a community, for their 
comfortable, safe, and peeceable living one amongst 
the other ••• This any number of men may do, because 
it injures not the freedom of the rest: they are left 
as they were in the state of nature. When any number 
of men have so consented to make one a·ommuni ty or 
government, they are thereby presently incorporated 
and make one body politio, wherein the majority have 
a right to aot and conclude the rest. 11 
Having stated the theory, Brownson proceeds to criticize 
it. He is concerned first of all with the state of nature whieh 
must exist, on the supposition of the theory, prior to the forma~ 
tion of government. He observes that philosophers have arrived 
at a state of nature by mentally separating man from his exist-
13 
~noe in so·ciety. 
Now Brownson argues that in making suoh an abstraction it 
should be at least complete. In other words, if one will insist 
upon removing mentally an individual from society, he must be 
careful not to remove a man alre.ady civilized, imbued with the 
habits, manners, customs and knowledge of society, to some re-
li "Treatise of Oivil Government," sited from Locke, Selections 
edited by Sterling P. Lamprecht, New York, 1928, 70-71. 
13 XVIII, 30. 
...--
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mote island. In order to be consistent with its purpose the 
theory must suppose that soaiety is not natural, but purely 
artificial. There <Jannot be even the slightest trace of sooiety 
in such a state of nature; for if there were, it would be un-
necessary to institute society. The theory would account for 
the development or perfection of an existing society and not, as 
it professes to do, for the origin or institution of ~overnment. 
Furthermore, man himself oan have no natural urge, no inns.te tenc-
eney for society; if he had, society would be natural and man 
would be a social animal and consequently society would be as 
old as man. Therefore it would be unnetessary to aocount for 
14 
its origin in convention. 
Brownson argues that in terms of an abstraction consistent 
with the purpose of the theory, the people in the state of 
nature could not institute government. In the first place, if 
the primitive state of man is natural to him, then civil society 
15 
must be "supernatural, preturnatural, or subnatural." 
Man is, however, limited by the nature whioh he has; it is 
inseparable from him. It is his only souroe of activity. Con-
sequently he oan neither divest himself of it, nor by his own 
unaided efforts give himself a nature other than the one he has. 
Thus Brownson says that "If his primitive state was his natural 
state, and if the political state is supernatural, preturnatural, 
14 XVIII, 31. 
15 XVIII, 30. 
or subnatural, how passed he alone, by his own unaided powers, 
. 16 
from the former to the latter." 
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furthermore, "In the alleged state of nature, as the phil-
osophers describe it, there is no germ of civilization, and the 
transition to civil society would not be a development, but a 
11 
aomplete rupture with the past, and an entire new creation." 
In other words, it has been noted that there is not, and eannot 
be, present in the state of nature, a germ of soeial organiza-
tion - not a root tNlt eould be nurtured or developed. But man 
is a dependent being and not a creator. Re is not strictly a 
creator even in the intellectual oxder;·he cannot create an 
idea any more than he could ereate a universe. Consequently it 
18 
would be extremely diffieult to oonoeive of civil sooiety. 
Even supposing that some individual, unusually gifted, 
would aonoeive of civil sooiety, it would be impossible for him 
to execute his aonoeption. It is diffieult to introduce reform~ 
among people already imbued with the notions of authority and 
obedience. To modify already existing institutions and to 
adapt them to meet changing circumstances is a task that re-
quires a great deal of time, skill and ingenuity. But the 
16 XVIII, 30. 
17 XVIII, 33. I 
18 In Brownson•s terms, mans activity is confined to the tele-
ological order or the seeond cycle of creation: his causal-
ity, ~ile real, is productive only for the attainment of ~ 
end. Consequently he does not originate; he can develop, 
explicate, combine, but there is no sense in whieh he oan 
create. 
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people in the state of nature have no habits of obedience, no 
habit of aammanding one another. Consequently the introduction 
of government ia at least a mueh greater aohievement than the 
most radical modification of an existing institution. Conse-
quently Brownson oonaludes that: 
When it is with the greatest difficulty that 
necessary reforms are introduced in old and 
highly civilized nations, and when it can seldom 
be done at all without terrible political and 
social convulsions, how o~ we suppose men with-
out society, and knowing nothing of it, o~n 
deliberately, and, as it were, with •malioe 
aforethought' found society? To suppose it, 
would be to suppose that men in a state of nature 
••• are infinitely superior to the men formed under 
the most advanced civilization. 19 
B~ownson observes also that the advocates of the state of 
nature assume, unconsciously, that the people living in it have 
the habits and trJditions of a people already civilized. Oon~ 
sequently the advoeates of the theory beg the question because 
they assume the existenee of oivil society as the eondition upon 
whieh it aan be instituted. He elarifies this point in the 
illustrations which follow. 
Brownson maintains that it is obviously impossible to esta-
blish an ideal government aueh as that p~oposed by the various 
20 
authors in their Utopias. He eontenls that they "••• remain 
Utopias not solely beeause intrinsieally absurd, though so in 
19 XVIII, 33. 
20 Brownson mentions,of eourse, !he Utopia, or 'he Land of No-
where, by Thomas More, published ii 1516. 
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faet, but ehiefly beeause they are innovations, have no support 
in experienee, and require for their realization the modes of 
thought, habits, manners, eharaeter, life, whieh only their 
21 
introduetion and realization oa..n supply." 
Likewise, the introduetion of eivilization is an innova-
tion. It has no support in experienee. It requires for its 
realization the things which only eivilization oan supply. Unles 
it is assumed that the people of the state of nature have the 
habits of a eivilized people, it would be mueh more diffieult to 
introduee a eivil order de novo than a Utopia in a eivilized 
state. Sinoe the latter is impossible, so also is the former. 
Thus the advoeates of the theory must beg the question; failing 
to do so they suppose a oombination of eireumstanees from whieh 
it is impossible to institute government. In either ease the 
theory fails to accomplish its purpose. 
By the same fallaey the advoeates of the theory assume un-
eonseiously that government is essential to progress. For if 
progress were possible without it, there would .be no need for 
the people of the state of nature to institute government. With-
out government people are therefore unprogressive. Consequently 
in pieturing the people as oapable of instituting government tbe 
advooates of the theory pioture t~em as a progressive people -
therefore as a people already in possession of one of the 
21 XVIII, 33. 
~· 
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elements essential to progress, namely, government. 
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Thus far Brownson's objeotions to the eontraet theory have 
,. 
been aimed at the state of nature whieh preeeeded oivil soei-
ety. If the state of nature is not prior to soaiety, then 
soeiety is as old as man. Consequently there is no need for a 
theory to aeoount for the institution of eivil soeiety. There-
fore a state of nature prior to eivil soeiety must be asserted. 
The state of nature is arrived at by mentally removing maa 
from eivil soeiety. In order to be eonsistent with the purpose 
of the theory, the abstraction must be eomplete - no root, no 
germ, no natural inolination for soaiety ean remain. If any of 
these factors are present in the inhabitants of the state of 
nature, the theory ean aoeount only for the development or per-
feation of an already existing soeiety. Thus it would not ae-
oount for the institution of eivil society. 
On the other hand, if all traoes of soeiety are removed 
from the state of nature, man would have to be a ereator in 
order to institute eivil society. First of all he would have 
to disaover a means whereby he eould ehange his original 
nature. Seaondly, he would be required to oreate the idea of 
eivil soeiety. If he eould get the idea, he eould not exeeute 
it. 
Consequently Brownson eoneludes that the advocates of the 
22 XVIII, 30. 
theory either beg the question or else pioture a eombinatioA 
of oireumstanees whieh render impossible the institution of 
eivil sooiety. This point was illustrated with referenee to the 
utopias and to the fundamental assumption that government is an 
indispensible eondition of progress. And sinoe the theory must 
either beg the question or present a state o~ nature from whieh 
it is impossible to derive eivil sooiety, it must be rejeeted. 
Brownson eontinues his objeotions to the eontraet theory 
on still another ground. Even supposing the state of nature and 
granting a eonvention to institute government, it is still im-
possible to aoaount for the authority of government. His ob-
jeetions are based upon the view stated in the beginning of the 
ohapter, that government is authority exereised over subjeots. 
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Now in the state of nature there is no sovereign, no oivil 
authority, beoause a oonvention is oalled for the purpose of 
establishing a government with authority. In other words, 
individuals presumably institute a government to whieh they are 
subjeet, whioh has the right to oommand and to exereise auth-
ority over them. But Brownson argues that individuals oannot 
oreate a sovereign, beoause the ereator is, obviously, not sub-
jeet in relation to the oreature. Consequently, if government 
is ereated by individuals, individuals are sovereign and the 
government thus established is subjeot to them as oreature to 
23 
areator. Government is then the agen~ of the oreature. 
That government must be eoneeived as the agent of the in-
dividual is also indioated by the manner in whioh government 
reputedly originates. The individuals who meet in oonvention 
71 
are sovereign, and therefore free, with equal rights. Eaeh must 
be sovereign in relation to the other beeause there is no auth-
ority above the individual to whiah he is subjeoted. In estab-
lishing a sovereign, the individual agrees to surrender some of 
his own sovereignty to a governor; in doing so, the governor 
has the right to govern beoause of the voluntary oonsent of the 
individual. 
Now Brownson argues that the individual is obliged, on the 
supposition of the theory, to surrender all of his sovereignty, 
a part of it, or none of it, to the government. It is evident 
that if the first alternative is taken there is no basis for 
individual freedom. For if he surrenders all to soaiety, he 
has no rights left. He is oonsequently a eomplete slave of soei 
ety with no rights of his own whioh he may plead against it; he 
is no longer an integer, but a fraction of a whole with nothing 
23 "In the state of nature, there is no sovereign; the oonven-
tion is oalled for the purpose of oreating the sovereign. 
But is sovereignty a thing to be ereated? The sovereign is 
over and above the individuals to be governed; that to whieh 
they owe allegianoe; whioh has the right to command them. 
Can these individuals ereate it? Can the oreator be subjeat 
to the ereature; owe allegianoe to it; be loyal to it? 
Obviously, then, if there be in the state a sovereign~· 
power at all, it is not ereated by those who are to be sub-
jeeted to it."XV, 314. 
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exoept that whieh sooiety ohoses to give to him. In that ease, 
as Brownson observes, "However unjust or oppressive the aots of 
the state, he has not only no redress, but not even the right to 
24 
oomplain." 
Supposing the last alternative, the individual retains his 
sovereignty but merely delegates instead of surrenders his 
rights to sooiety. Yet if he retains his oomplete sovereignty, 
then it follows that as sovereign he may revoke at his eon-
venience the powers delegated to his agent, and government would 
have no authority over him • Brownson observes that this is a 
very eonvenient theory for some, beeause "The disaffeeted, the 
eriminal, the thief the government would send to prison, or the 
murderer it would hang, would be very likely to revoke his eon-
25 
sent, and refuse to permit his agent to punish him." Thus it is 
a perversion of language as well as of eommon sense, to eoneeive 
of government as a mere agent of the individual with no author-
ity exoept that whioh is given to it by the individual. 
The other alternative is reputedly a via media between the 
extremes, but praotieally it is redueed to either one or the 
other of the extremes. If the individual surrenders a portion 
of his rights and retains some, who is to deoide where the line 
is drawn? If the interpretation is left to the individual he 
24 XV, 315. 
25 XV, 316; XVIII, 37. 
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ean, obviously, interpret his rights to the extent that it 
virtually denys all authority over himself. If the government 
defines the rights of the individual, determines their bound-
aries, the individual has, practically speaking, no appeal from 
the decision of the government. On the supposition that the 
state has the sole authority to define the rights of the indivi-
dual, there is no guarantee against absolutism. Thus Brownson 
says that "If then, we found government in eompaet, we either 
leave the individual his natural freedom, and then we have no 
government; or we sub3eet the individual to the state, and then 
no individual liberty. Either oonsequenee should lead us to 
21 
rejeet the theory." 
Further, sinee the authority of governme~t is derived from 
a eompaat, it is evident that its authority extends only to the 
contracting parties. For in the state of nature all men have 
equal rights. Consequently no one has the authority to govern 
another, for the supposition is that authority to govern origin-
ates in a eontraot. Therefore it follows that government has 
27 
authority only over those whose eonsent has been given. 
Now it is apparent at onee that few people aetually eonsent 
to be governed. While voting may be eonstrued as an aet of assen 
very few people, espeoially in Brownson's day, eould vote. 
26 XV, 316. 
27 XVIII, 38. 
women and ehildren, for example, were excluded. Government 
therefore has no rights over them, for they have entered into no 
aompaot and therefore the terms of a oompaet cannot bind them. 
Furthermore, Brownson notes also that Jefferson maintained (and 
he was logical in doing so) that the oontraot must be renewed 
28 
by eaoh generation. This means that an existing government 
would of neoessity expire with the expiration of each generation 
Consequently, an existing government has no legitimate authority 
unless it has the free, formal, explioit oonsent of eaoh indi-
29 
vidual it governs. 
In other words, Brownson denies that eonsent to an exist-
ing government may be tacitly given by oontinued residence in a 
territory. He argues that residenee may be a matter of neeesaity 
Likewise, the silenee of individuals, or their lack of opposi-
tion to an existing goyernment, may be a matter of necessity 
rather than formal approval. Sinae eaeh individual is pre-
sumably free and equal, "••• by what right can individuals form 
an agreement to whioh I must eonsent or else migrate to some 
30 
strange land?" 
A summary of the seoond series of arguments shows that the 
28 Of, Jeferrson, Writings, (Memorial Edition), Washington, 
1905, III, 459: "No society ean make a perpetual constitu-
tion, or even a perpetual law." 
29 XVIII, 35. 
30 XVIII, 36. 
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origin ot government in eontraet is incompatible with the idea 
ot government as authority exereised over subjeets. The theory 
is eritieized on the basis ot the eonsequenees,t~owing trom the 
adoption of sueh a theory. It individuals instituted government 
it would be the agent ot individuals. Consequently it would not 
be an authority above them. This is illustrated in the manner in 
whieh individuals reputedly institute government. They must sur-
render either all or none of their· rights. A !!! media is inad-
missable beeause it is resolved praetioally into, either ot the 
extremes. Thus the theory if adopted would lead logieally to 
anarchy or absolutism. 
Furthermore, on the supposition that eaeh individual has 
the right to eomplete freedom, equality, independenee, govern-
ment eould extend, rightfully, only to the eontraoting individu-
als. This means that government eannot be extended to women and 
ehildren, for they are deemed incapable of entering into sueh 
a eontraat. It means also that each individual of eaeh sueeeed-
ing generation must renew the eont;a•t; tor no group ot indivi-
duals have the right to negotiate a eontraet to whioh other 
individuals, with preeisely the same rights, must either assent 
or move to a foreign land. In terms of the soeial oontraet 
theory, sueh power eannot be legitimate - it is not authority o 
the right to govern. Thus government in the sense of authority 
exeraised over subjects cannot be derived from a eontraet of 
sovereign individuals. 
'inally, Brownson objeets to the soeial eontraot theory ot 
•tQ 
soeiety and government on the ground that a soaiety resulting 
from a voluntary assoeiation of individuals is merely an aggre-
gation; it aan be held together by nothing stronger than the 
will of individuals to assooiate. Consequently there is nothing 
to prevent any number of individuals, whether the group be large 
or small, from withdrawing from the assoaiation and setting up 
a state of their own. 
This oonelusion follows beeause the individual, aeoording 
to the theory, is sovereign in virtue of his manhood. Sinee he 
is a man ::·:"·regardless of time or plaoe, the individual is sov-
ereign at any time and at any plaae. Consequently any three or 
more individuals may at any time or plaoe oall a convention and 
institute a government of their own, thus bidding defianee to 
the offiaers, tax-eolleetors and agents authorized by other and 
similar oonventions. On what grounds is suah a right denied? 
Certainly not beaause a oonvention of one hundred is stronger 
than that of merely three individuals. This would identify 
right and might, thereby legitimating every aat of might, how-
ever oppressive it may be. In other words, however absurd it 
may seem, there is no authority in a state grounded on the oon-
traot tb:eory whieh eould prevent any three individuals from 
31 
seaeding, aalling a eonvention and instituting government. 
In order to maintain itself, it is quite evident that gov-
31 XV, 411-413. 
ernment must have the right to exercise authority over all who 
are within a given area. Ita jurisdiction must extend, not only 
to those who ehooae to aeknowledge it, who assent or eonsent, 
but to those who are in a territory. 
'' 
If government has sueh authority, it eannot be derived from 
a eontraet, voluntarily entered into by individuals who are 
sovereign in virtue of their manhood whieh they retain irregard-
less of time and plaee. If it does not have jurisdiction over a 
territory, government oould not maintain itself because any 
number of sovereign individuals would be authorized, at any time 
or plaee, to oall a eonvention and institute government. In 
order to avoid sueh an absurditt the oonoeption that government 
has no power exoept that whiah it derives from the voluntary 
eonsent of individuals, must be rejected. 
This final objection to the eontraot theory of government 
is in a sense similar to those previously stated. It rejeets the 
theory because the oonsequenees flowing from its adoption are 
inoompatible with the ooneeption of government as authority 
exereised over subjeets. 
It is, however, different from the other objections, inas-
mueh as it introduees a new element into the eoneeption of 
government -that its authority must be territorial. Further, 
territory has not been introduced as an ineidental element of 
government. It has been viewed as something essential, inasmueh 
as government eannot exist as authority over subjeets unless its 
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authority extends to all within a territory. 
In simple and positive terms, Brownson's theory will emerge 
the more olearly if we now sum up the grounds on whi•h he objects 
to the soaial eontraot theory. 
The Soeial Oontraot Theory is untenable: 
A· because soeiety is natural to man, whereas the soeial oontrao 
theory postulates 
1. a man who is a soeial being only subsequently to his own 
free deeision to beeome a social being. Therefore it 
postulates 
2. an unreal state of nature 
3. a history for man prior to the formation of soeiaty 
4. a society whioh is totally artificial, a production de 
~ rather than a development; 
B. because man, being naturally soaial, is governed naturally, 
whereas the social eontraat theory postulates 
1. government as ~urely contractual; therefore, 
2. any three individuals m~ convene and oontraot to form 
government; 
3. the eontraet binds only the contracting parties; 
4. under the eontraet the individual must surrender, 
a. all of his rights - despotism 
b. none of his rights - anarahy 
So mueh, then, for the theory which looks to men taken 
individually for the origin of authority and government. There 
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is another sense of "the people" as the origin and ground of 
government and its authority. We have already mentioned it. We 
must now tura to what Brownson oalls the "demoeratie theory." 
Can the people, as a eolleotive whole, be the souree of a 
valid and morally binding government? 
CHAPTER V 
THE DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
Demoeratie theories and demoaratie principles have for 
Amerioans a sacred eharaeter. Brownson was no exception. Of the 
"prineiples of demosraoy" he himself says: "They were given me 
by the publie sentiment of my oountry. I had taken them in with 
my mother's milk, and had never thought of inquiring whether 
1 
they were tenable or not." 
Brownson had a too sineerely inquisitive mind to let his 
prineiples rest in this unexamined state. He inquired what 
people meant when they prated so piously of majority rule, of 
universal suffrage and eligibility, of demooraoy as asserting 
and maintaining equality as a aatural right - whieh means "I am 
2 
as good as you, if not a whit better." 
He inquired also whether the people would have the good 
sense to adopt the measures necessary to prevent universal auf-
frage and eligibility from being a mere hoax. He says that at 
one time he "••• had had the inoredible folly of treating the 
equality asserted as if it meant something, as if it oould be 
3 
made a reality, instead of a miserable sham." 
Both inquiries were answered in his "Essay on the Laboring 
1 v, 114. 
2 V, 103-114; X, 33. 
3 V, 117. 
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Classes." He proclaimed, somewhat bluntly, that if people want 
equality, they must be prepared to remove heads protruding above 
the eommon level. For.this Brownson says that "I was denouneed 
in the press, from the pulpit and the rostrum. My friends shook 
their heads, and were very sorry that I had been so imprudent; 
•••• The doetrines of my essay were reeeived by my eountrymen 
5 
with one universal seream of hozror ••• " 
Brownson had diseovered that politieal equality means soeia: 
equality; his eountrymen were not ready.to adopt the measures 
necessary to secure it. Having reeeived a praetieal demonstra-
tion of the faet that theory and reality did not eonform, he re-
examined his position. He oontended, both at this time and later 
that his reasoning was sound. His eountrymen had said two and . 
6 
two - he had merely added four. 
Having found no fault with his reasoning, Brownson began to 
examine his premises. He defines democraey as the sovereignty of 
the people. Taken negatively, it may mean the denial of "••• the 
king, the nobility, or the right of any one maa, or any set of 
7 
men, easte, or elass, to rule over the people," Taken positivel~ 
5 v, 103. 
6 Of., e.g., the following: "People, though adopting the demo-
oratie prinoiple, told me I went too far, but I knew I was 
logieal." XVIII, 224. Also, "But I ean hardly read the essay 
over without being myself ehooked, and wondering at my temer-
ity in publishing it •••• plaoe me where I stood then ••• and 
I would today repeat and endorse every paragraph and every 
w.ord I then wrote." V, 104. 
7 XV, 408. 
it means the assertion "••• of the absolute right of the people 
8 
to govern, or their native, inherent, underived sovereignty." 
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In the same plaee he notes also that the term may be used also tc 
designate the end of government - that it is to be administered 
for the good of the whole people. Brownson oonoedes that he is a 
demoerat in this latter sense of the term, but in no other. 
In diseussing the demoeratio theory, the term is used in ite 
positive sense to designate a doetrine that the people oolleet-
ively or the politioal oommunity, is the souree and origin of 
the authority to govern. The objeotions to the theory are stated 
from two viewpoints. It will be shown, very briefly, that the 
theory itself is erroneous; more important for Brownson is the 
faet that, despite its error, there is a tenden•y to adopt it. 
Consequently the tendeney itself must be exposed as erroneous. 
In asserting that the people originate authority, it is 
evident that the first requisite is to determine what is meant 
by the term - not to define it, for that has already been done -
but to limit the extension of the term. For obviously in speak-
ing of a people the term does not inelude all of the inhabitants 
of the globe. Rather, it refers to.! people, to the inhabitants 
of a more or less definite portion of the globe. This is evi-
9 
dently what is meant by the people who institute government. 
8 XV, 409. 
9 XVIII, 42; XV, 409. 
The first problem whieh arises, therefore, is to determine 
whether or not the people who reputedly institute government in 
habit a e1early defined territory. The problem is a very import 
ant one. If the territory in question is undefined, it is evi-
dently impossible to define the people who are to institute 
10 
government. 
Even on the supposition that an undefined people, inhabit-
ing an undefined territory, could institute government, the 
government thus established would have no authority over a 
definite territory. Its authority would be eonsequently popular 
' 
only, and not territorial. This, of oourae, is to return to the 
eontraet theory whieh has been rejeeted already. 
On the other hand, if the term people signifies the inhab-
itants of a territory that is clearly defined, the difficulties 
are equally serious. Then the problem is to determine by whom, 
and on ~at authority, territory is marked out and defined. The 
organized people eannot determine it, for the theory presumably 
aeeounts for the origin of the organized people. Thus to say 
that the people themselves fix their own territorial boundaries 
is to say :thattlilleJlpep!Jler,aes eul::;.!lpeople before they exist as 
11 
sueh. For the same reason government eannot mark out a defin-
10 XVIII, 43. The problem is a problem only with referanee to 
a theory which aeeounts for the origin or institution of 
government, and is consequently not a problem in relation 
to nations whieh are already established under a government. 
11 XVIII, 42; XV, 410. 
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ita territory; for there is no government until authorized by a 
people, and no people until a territory has been defined. 
84 
It is therefore neoessary to go outside population in order 
to diseover what constitutes a people as sueh. Without that 
faGtor the people are not sovereign beoause they are not even a 
people. With that faator they are not sovereign becs.ust=j it; is 
that which f!lV3S t:ing to population as a people. Therefore a 
people is dependent upon it as a cause is dependent upon its 
effeat. Consequently that factor, whatever it is, is more ulti-
mate than the people. On either ground it is eertain that people 
12 
alone are not the souroe of authority. 
Furthermore, supposing a definite territory and therefore 
a people, it is still impossible to aeoount for the authority of 
government. It eannot be aooounted for on the basis of a unaai-
mous eonsent of individuals, for that again is the theory that 
has been rejeoted in the preceding ehapter. It eannot be asserte 
that the majority has the righ' to authorize government and 
enaot laws, beeause it then beoomes neaessary to determine 
in the majority derives its right to govern. Obviously, it does 
not have right because it is a majority and therefore strongest. 
For this reason Brownson says, "••• would identify right and 
might, and legitimate every government able to maintain itself. 
Every aet of power, however oppressive, on this ground would be 
12 XVIII, 42; XV, 411. 
13 
right, just." 
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Therefore the right of the majority to govern must be 
grounded upon some'thing more ultimate than its might. The only 
alternatives possible are that it is somekow based upon nature 
or is authorized by government. However, neither of these alter-
natives are admissabla. 
The nature of one man is equal to that of any other. Con-
sequently no two men have an inherent natural right to govern a 
third. If the theory were asserted within sueh a limited sphere, 
it would tend to many absurdities. If no three individuals have 
the natural right to govern any two, why should the will of the 
hundred prevail over that of ninety nine? The right of the major~ 
14 
ity cannot be a natural right. 
It is intelligible, however, to base the rule of the major-
ity upon oivil regulation. The politioal body adopts it as the 
most praotioal rule possible to secure the good of the governed. 
In this sense, however, the majority of the people does not in-
stitute or m~iginate the authority of government. It supposes 
15 
an authority already existing whioh authorizes majority rule. 
Thus the fundamental objeotion to a theory whieh states 
that a people is the souree of its ow.n authority is that it must 
argue in a viaious circle, Bora ooneeption of~ people, or a 
eommunity, must be that of a people united in some way, as by 
13 XV, 339, 
14 XV, 339, 
15 XV, 321. 
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the oooupation of a definite territory. ~ut this is precisely 
the conception of the people as a nation and therefore already 
invested with authority. 
Now Brownson has maintained consistently that few people, 
if any, would maintain theoretically that the people as a unit, 
16 
a nation, or a soeiety, is the source of its own authority. The 
reason for this is that the theory, as he has stated it, asserts 
despotism, absolutism, or as he prefers to call it, Caesarism 
or Soaialism. The fact that few people would maintain sueh 
theories openly is evineed suffieiently well by the reeeption 
given his ow.n essay on the laboring elasses. 
The faet that the democratic theory as he has defined it 
involves desf'Otism, is not diffieult to establish. He has said 
that government is authority exercised over subjects. Consider-
ing it striotly, and from the viewpoint in Which it is authority 
its authority is unlimited. For in relation to tha.t whieh ~es- .,,_, 
tra~~s or limits its authority in any way, government is obvious 
ly not the authority, but the subject. Therefore government, so 
far forth as it is government and nothing else, is that whieh is 
sovereign. The eeareh for the origin of authority is therefore 
17 
the searoh for the sovereign. 
further, the right of the sovereign to eommand admits of no 
16 XV, 439-441; XVIII, 575-576. 
17 XV, 414. 
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limitations whatsoever, for inasmueh as a sovereign is limited 
he is not sovereign, but subjeet. Sinae he has the right to 
oommand, his subjeets have the duty to obey. Therefore his eom-
mand is the basis of all rights and duties, as has been indi-
oated in the ehapter on law. Thus it is that man has no rights 
in the sense that •a ean plead them against the sovereign. Jor 
if he had, the sovereign would be subject in relation to those 
18 
rights. 
Jurther, it has been noted that man*s freedom eannot eon-
sist in freedom from law - Whioh aaoording to Brownson is the 
19 
conception prevailing in Amerioa. ~ather, man's freedom eon-
slats in obedience to the law of the sovereign - freedom from 
all restraint, whether ofoonscienoe or anything else, is lieense 
and inoompatible with government. 
Therefore, if the people are sovereign, and if man's free-
dom aonsists in obedience to the sovereign, it follows that man'1 
freedom consists in obedience to the wtll-"-·ofetl).e people. In eawe 
18 XVIII, 266; XV, 414. "Now, if the people are, in their own 
native might and right, the primary and fundamental sovereign 
ty, then, they have the inherent right to eommud, and, what-
ever they eammand, is law; therefore right; and therefore, 
binding in foro eonseientiae." XV, 415. 
19 Of,, e.g., ~following: "••• we put it to our young friends 
in sober earnest too, whether with them freedom is something 
positive; or whether they are in the habit of regarding it as 
merely negative? Do they not look upon liberty merely as 
freedom from eertain restraints or obstaeles rather than as 
positive ability possessed by those who are free? "XV, 272, 
sa 
the term people is interpreted demoeratioally, this means that 
the individual does not have the moral right to resist the will 
of the majority: 
The sovereignty, whioh is asserted for the people, 
must, then, be transferred to the ruling majority. 
If the people are sovereign, then the majority are 
sovereign; and if sovereign, the majority have •••• 
the absolute right to govern. If the majority have 
the absolute right to govern, it is the absolute 
duty of the minority to obey. Who who ehanee to be 
in the minority are then completely disfranehised. 
We are wholly at the mer•y of the majority. We hold 
our property, our wives and ehildren, and our lives 
even, at its sovereign will and pleasure. It may do 
by us and ours as it pleases. If it takes it into 
its head to make a new and arbitrary division of 
property, however unjust it may seem, we shall not 
only be impotent to resist, but we shall not have 
the right of the wretehed to aomplain. Qonsaienee 
will be no shield. The authority of the absolu~e 
sovereign extends to spiritual matters, as well as 
to temporal. The •reed the majority is pleased to 
impose, the minority must in all meekness ani sub-
mission reoeive; and the form of religious worship 
the majority is good enough to prescribe, the min-
ority must make it a matter o~ oonsaien•e to observe. 
Whatever has been done under the most absolute mon-
arehy or the most lawiess aristooracy, may be reenaetec 
under a pure demoeraey, and what is worse, legiti-
mately too, if it be onoe laid down in prineiple that 
the majority has the absolute right to govern. 20 
But this is to disrobe domooraay - it is demoara•y in its 
pristine purity. No one will aeeept it in its nakedness. Brown-
son eoneedes this: "We aheerfully admit that there are probably 
21 XV, 5. Brownson wrote this in 1838 two years before the pub-
lication of his essay on the laboring olasses during the 
eleetion of 1840. This indicates that his view of demoeraoy 
has remained substantially the same. His eontinual berating 
of democracy after the publication of his essay is therefore 
a ohange of emphasis; or rather a ehange in what it was nee-
essary to emphasize in order to eombat evil. Thus the essay 
and the eleetion orystalized ideas formerly presented vaguely. 
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few men in the eountry who would, in general thesis, maintain it 
21 
as we have statal." 
Brownson's thesis, stated most simply, is that there is a 
tendeney toward absolutism, existing both here and in Europe, 
and espeaially in Young Italy and Young Germany, whieh has not 
22 
as yet been aetualized. He speaks of seeds of dissolution whieh 
23 
are sown and germinated, but have not as yet attained fruition. 
He says that even in his own day: 
Not a few of the European democrats recognize 
in the earth, in heaven, or in hell, no power 
superior to the people, and say not only people-
king, but people-God •••• The people not only 
found the state, but also the ahuroh •••• Yet 
this theory is the dominant theory of the age, 
and is in all oivilized nations advaneing with 
apparently irresistible faree. 24 
His thesis is, further, that the tendenoy toward avsolutism 
25 
or soaialism or humanitarian or eaesaristie demoeraey is latent 
in demoeratio theories and principles, and is promulgated, al-
though not avowedly so, in the promulgation of demoeratie prin-
eiples. 
21 XV, 4:39. 
22 X, 86. 
23 XV, 440-441. 
24 XVIII, 42. 
25 Brownson's meaning of these tarms is clear from the eontext; 
they signify the sovereignty of soeiety, the eolleetive 
people, the state. 
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His reasons as to why the theory cannot be avowed openly 
are plausible. In order to gain a•eeptanee for a theory, it 
must be presented under the aspeit of the good and the true. 
Falsehood as such is never embraced by the intellect, nor does 
;he will accept anything under the aspeet of evil. Consequently 
he says that "Soeialism commends itself to the intellect of its 
adherents only in the respect that it is trp, and to their 
26 
hearts only in the respect that it is good." 
Therefore, for Brownson the domoeratie theory is so ex-
tremely dangerous beeause it is eombined with what is good. In 
aecepting what is good and true about it, people unwittingly 
aecept the evil along with it. As a Catholic reviewer, he felt 
obliged to expose this tendeney bectau:Je he believed that if it 
were uneheeked it could result only in absolutism. 
The demoeratie iendeney or theory is eehoed in the domin-
ant sentiment of the day. It is expressed in the slogans adopte 
by the press, and by the politieians who speak of the sovereign 
people, of government •f the people and by the people. The 
people are told that democracy reeognizea the equality of man, 
whieh "••• is not displeasing when applied to those above us, 
but is very disgUsting, unreasonable, unnatural, when applied 
27 
, to those below us." jeing equal, all men must partieipate 
26 X, 532. 
27V,ll3. 
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equally in the administration of government. Thus demoeraey must 
seoure to everyone the right to vote and to be voted for - and 
it must enoourage reforms neaeesary to se•ure universal suffrage 
and eligibility. 
Brownson!s eontention is that if these slogans are aeeepted 
and acted upon by the masses who invariably fail to say, ~­
tinggo, it is only a matter or time before some form of absolu-
tism is aeeepted. In eontending for politieal equality, for ex-
ample, Brownson says that one must demand, in order to be eon-
28 
sistent, social equality. Theoretieally, the vote of the poor 
pan is equal to that of his more wealthy neighbor. Rr,etieally, 
however, the vote of an individual aounts for nothing unless he 
. 
aasts his ball~t for either of two parties. 
To organize and to eontrol a party requires a great deal of 
both skill and money. Those who have neither the skill nor the 
money to exert influenee in shaping the polioies of a party are 
therefore not the politieal equals of those Who are so endowed: 
"Now pretend that you and I are equal, when you oan influenee a 
thousand votes, while I ean hardly eontrol my own, unless I have 
29 
the spirit of a martyr." This aaeording to Brownson is "••• the 
great and stubborn faet, whieh knoeks in the head all your fine-
30 
spun temocratia theorizing." 
28 v, 114. 
29 v t 103. 
30 XV, 423. 
~------------------------------------------9,2 
The point is, of Gourse, that demoeratie principles en-
courage reforms necessary to secure political equality. Having 
secured the privilege of voting and bein! voted for, it has by 
no means secured genuine politieal equality. Thus the causes 
which led the reform thus far have not spent themselves; they 
must of neeessity remain in all their force to earry the reform 
still further. In other words, reforms are not inaugurated to 
stop with a sham - agitation for equality fostered by demooraey 
cannot stop logieally at the ballot box. It m•st extend to soei-
ety itself in order to aecomplish ant good that it has set out t 
31 
accomplish. 
Since the tendeney of the age is toward political, and 
therefore social, equality, it oan stop at nothing short of •ts 
ultimate goal: complete social equality. If there is property in 
sooiety, it may be distributed unequally; therefore logie demand 
the elimination of property. Sinee individuals exist, they are 
unequal; their continued existenee is a barrier to the social 
equality demanded by the logic of the age. Therefore, eliminate 
the individual - make him not an individual, but a part of soei-
ety. This is the goal of the age; whether he knows it or not, 
this is the aim of the h~anitarian democrat: 
31 Schlesinger adds, "His flin~y in~elligenee saw how tragically 
the favorite liberal remedies fell short. Universal suffrage 
is little better than a moakery where the voters are not 
aoeially equal. No matter what party you support, no matter 
what men you eleet, property is always the basis of govern-
mental aetion." 107-108. 
Yesterday he' agitated for the abolition of 
slavery, to-:iay he a~:L tates for negro suffrage, 
negro equality, and announoes that when he has 
seeured that he will agitate for female suffrage 
and the equality of sexes, forgetting or ignor-
ant that the relation of equality subsists only 
between individuals of the same sex; •••• Having 
obliterated all distinotion of sex in polities, 
in sooial, industrial, and domestie arrangements, 
he must go further still, and agitate for the total 
abolition of property. But sinee property, if 
reeognized at all, will be unequally aoquired 
and distributed, he must go further still, and 
agitate for the total abolition of property, as 
an injustiee, a grievous wrong, a theft •••• It 
is unjust that one should have what another wants, 
or even more than another •••• Nor ean our humani-
tarian stop there. Individuals are, and as long 
as there are individuals, will be unequal: some 
are handsomer and some are uglier, some wiser or 
sillier, mora or less gifted, stronger or weaker, 
taller or shorter, stouter or thinner than others, 
and therefore some have natural advantages whioh 
others have not. There is inequality, therefore 
injustiee, whish oan be remedied only by the aboli• 
tion of all individualities, and the reduetion of 
all individuals to the raoe, or humanity, in 
93 
general. 32 
Commenting upon the politieal upheavals in Europe in 
1848-1849, Brownson says that the reforms sought are basieally 
sooial, not merely politieal: "Young Italy is sooialistie; so 
is Young Germany; and it was its sooialistio oharaoter that 
gave to the movement of Ronge and his assooiates its signifi-
33 
oanoe and its moderate sueeess." Even in 1849 Brownson held 
that the reform movement of the age oan find no logieal resting 
plaee short of absolutism: 
32 XVIII, 186-186. 
33 X, 86. 
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Onee eoneede that even politioal equality is a 
good, an objeet worth seeking, you must eoneede 
that sooial equality is also a good; and soeial 
equality is neoessarily the annihilation of re-
ligion, government, prope~ty, and the family. The 
same prinoiples whieh would justify the Moderate 
Republicans of Franee in dethroning a king would justify M. Proudhon in making war on property, de-
olaring every rioh man a robber, and seeking to 
exterminate the bourge.oisie, as these have already 
exterminated the nobility. There is no stopping-
plaoe between legitimaoy - whether monarohieal or 
republiean legitimaoy - and the most ultra social-
ism. Onee in the eareer of politieal reform, - we 
say politieal, not administrative, reform, - we are 
pledged to pursue it to its last results. 34 
While soeial reform oulminates neeessarily in the annihila-
tion of religion, government, property and family, its suoeess 
is not attained by stating suoh things explieitly. People would 
reeoil from the eonolusions on the ground that they are radieal 
and destruetive. Consequently with the exeeption of a few who 
are regarded as idle dreamers, the soeialistie theory is not 
36 
drawn to its logieal eonsequenees. 
Soeialism is therefore presented under its aspeet of good. 
It is developed, not merely as harmonious with Ohristianity, but 
as more Christian than organized Christianity itself. It pro-
elaims the great truth that God has ereated all men free and 
34 X, 86. Brownson does not say explieitly that Italy and Ger-
many will be totalitarian states. He says that sooial reforms, 
and he mentions those in Italy and Germany partioularly, will 
oulminate in absolutism, if anarrested. In XIV, 471, he 
suggests that the Catholieity of Franee would save it from 
absolutism. 
36 X, 83. 
equal. Consequently He gave etual rights to all men. He waa no 
diseriminator of persons, so obviously He did not intend poss-
ession by the few while the many are dispossessed of the good 
things He has areated. The mal-distribution of God's ereation 
is therefore an evil whieh should be remedied. Consequently 
socialism urges the removal of evil. In doing so it plants it-
self upon an apparently solid Christian foundation. 
95 
Sinee soeialism is presented as a truth of Christianity and 
in its garb, Brownson says that: 
We eannot deny it without seeming to them to be 
warring against the best interests of soaiety, and 
also against the gospel of our Lord •••• How 
adroitly too, it appeals to the people's envy 
and hatred of their superiors, and to their love 
of the world, without Skoeking their orthodoxy 
or woulding their piety. Surely Satan has here, 
in Soeialism, done his best, almost outdone 
himself.... 36 
The evils pointed out by soaialists are real evils. Soaial-
ism emphasizes the evil; it presents a remedy whieh is at onee 
simple, understandable, appealing to men's passions while not 
seemingly at varianee with orthodox eonvietions. This aspeet of 
it gives socialism its driving foree and renders it aaoeptable. 
In presenting its ease soeialism dwells exelusively upon physi-
eal evils. It thereby exaludes moral evil. Thus it goes along 
with the spirit of the age, whieh is worldly, and whose eon-
eeption of evil is restriated to physieal evil. Likewise in 
36 X, 94. 
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emphasizing that good should be sought, it refers to physical or 
temporal good. The assumption that man's good lies in the temp-
37 
oral order alone is the root evil. 
Furthermore, socialism states axiomatically that in order 
to avoid evil and attain to the good, men must organize and 
cooperate. Being attainable through organization rather than 
isolated individual action, it follows that " • • • the social 
organization must be such as to avert equal evil from all, and 
38 
to secure to each an equal share of temporal goods." 
The reasoning of socialism is therefore based upon an ambi-
guous conception of good and evil. Its advocates proceed on the 
assumption that there is no good other than a material good and 
no evil other than physical evil. However, in retaining the 
familiar terms, good and evil, those who have inherent convic-
tions of moral good and evil will be deceived more easily. Fail-
ing to perceive the real purpose of the reformers, they accept 
pious platitudes. The package is pleasing and acceptable be-
cause it is wrapped in terms which are pleasing and acceptable. 
Now if man's good lies in the temporal order, there is no 
37 "Analyze these reforms and the principles and motives which 
lead to them, which induce the :people in our days to 
struggle for them, and you will find at the bottom of them 
all the ass~~ption, that our good lies in the natural 
order •••• 11 X, 95. 
38 X, 95. 
need for a two-fold organization to seeure man's good. Conse-
quently the Ohureh must be re~eeted. Yet Christianity eannot be 
rejeeted openly: 
The Christian symbol needs a new and more Catholie 
interpretation, adapted to our state in universal 
progress. Where the old interpretation uses the 
words God, ehureh, and heaven, you must understand 
humanity, aoeiety, and .earth; •••• But while you put 
the human and earthly sense upon the Catholie words, 
be oareful and retain the words themselves. 39 
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In thus retaining familiar terms, people will not pereeive 
so readily that their familiar ideas have vanished. Consequently 
the opposition of Christians will be neither immediate nor 
violent. Nevertheless, in retaining the term eharity, while 
ohanging ita meaning so that it signifies philanthropy, eharit.y 
is no leas effeetually destroyed; if religion is used to signify 
a religion of humanity, religion is destroyed. The destruotion 
is rendered all the more effectual beeause it goes on under the 
40 
pretenee of preserving them. 
In thus presenting Brownson's analysis of the aoeialistie 
tendency of his age, it is elear that he was not eombatting 
absolute or eaesaristie demoeraey as a reality whieh had attaine 
already its fruition in Amerioa. His avowed purpose is to draw 
from the demooratie prineiple of equality its ultra-soeialistie 
eonelusion. He maintains that the delusive demooratie doetrine 
39 X, 93. 
40 X, 93-95. Cf. also his essay, "Charity and Philanthropy," 
XIV, 428 ff. 
of equality fosters unrest, agitation for reform, first for pol-
itieal equality. Politieal equality requires soeial equality 
as a eondition for its praetieal realization. This in turn is 
not realized eompletely until the individual loses his identity 
in the raee. Having disrobed demoeraey, Brownson hoped· that his 
41 
country-men would disavow its destruotive tendeneies. 
It is abundantly elear also that in protesting against a 
tendency toward oaesarist or absolute demoaraey, Brownson is not 
protesting against the simple idea that people should have a 
41 Of. the following: "As a protest against an absolute or 
Oaesarist demoeracy, a demooraey whieh deifies the people -
(or a ahanee majority of them) - if sueh really existed out-
side his imagination- Brownson's political writings undoubt-
edly did real aerviee." Maynard, 403. Of. also Maynard, 181 a~d 
the following: "Brownson ••• destroyed an enemy who was 
hardly more than a figment of his imagination •••• he tri-
umphantly disproves what no sensible man ever doubted.n 346. 
One wonders at the outset what real serviee Brownson 
might have rendered by eombatting an imaginary opponent. one 
wonders also whether Mr. Maynard ever heard of Hitler, who, 
as Mr. Erik R. Y. Kuehnelt-Leddihn points out, was a Fuhrer. 
"He marehes ahead but is, theoretioally at least, an 'equal.' 
As a modernized tribunis plebis he is not only the produat 
of politieal but also of soeial demoeraay." "A Critique of 
Demoeraey," The New Saholastiaism, (July, 1946), XX, 229, n. r 
49. 
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voiee in the administration of government. He is protesting 
against a theory whieh holds that the people are sovereign, and 
against a tendeney to adopt sueh a theory. He has defined the 
people as the eolleotive people, the politioal oommunity, the 
state, the nation. Consequently he objects to any theory or 
form whieh leaves the popular will supreme, subjeet to no 
43 
authority, bound by no higher law. Whether the authority of the 
nation is exeroised by one, by few, by many, is of no eonse-
quenoe to his argument. He says that the demoeratie prinoiple 
of the supremaey of the people "••• is not eonfined to a popu-
larly eonstituted government, but is aooepted and aeted on by 
most modern governments, espeeially by the Sardinian, the 
44 
Prussian, the Russian, and we fear also the Austrian •••• " 
Beeause of his opposition to demooratie prinoiples, Brown-
son also eondemned the tendenoy toward aooepting them in Amer-
ica. He believed that the adoption of popular demoeraey is a 
step toward politieal atheism, or the denial of any law above, 
42 "I am not arguing against a republie, or a government 
largely popular in its eonstitution and administration ••••" 
XVIII, 226. "I repeat, I am not warring against the politi-
•al eonstitution of my eountry, nor am I seeking in any 
respect to ehange it; ••• "XVIII, 228. 
43 XVIII, 226. 
44 XVIII, 226. 
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and binding the oonseienoe of, the will of the people as a 
45 
nation. In presenting his argument for this oonolusion, Brown-
son observes that the legislators are eleeted by popular vote. 
In order to seoure votes one must be popular; he is required to 
please at least the majority of his eonstituents. 
Brownson oontends that the easiest way to please the 
people is to flatter them, to defer to them, to take the law 
46 
from them. To flatter them, the eandidate for offiae must ap-
peal to the wisdom and virtue of the people, 'telling them also 
that they are sovereign. As a subjeet the aandidate avows his 
intention to asoertain, and to bow to, the will of his sovereigJ. 
Having been imbued with the idea that they are sovereign, that 
\ 
their will must be obeyed, the people repeat to the legislator, 
47 
" remember your aeeountability to the people." • • • 
It is rather a grevious offenee for a oaaditate to oppose 
popular opinion. The penalty for the erime is removal from 
offiee. Consequently there is, aoeording to Brownson, an in-
sidious eirole inherent in the nature of the demoeratie form. 
Appeals, both in terms of the people to the legislator, and the 
46 He opposed it as a radieal departure from the inherent 
nature of our politieal constitution, whieh he believed to 
be a eonstitutional republie rather than a demoeraey. Of. 
Chapter IX below. 
16 XV, 438. 
47 XV, 440. 
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legislator to the people, are, and must be. primarily popular. 
It is nearly impossible to get outside of the eirole of popular-
ity and appeal to justiee, truth, right, as a basis for legisla-
tive aotion: "If you repeat always to your statesmen 'remember 
your aoaountability to the people,' you must expeet them to ask 
48 
always, not,. what -is right? but, what is popular?" 
For this reason Brownson says that "In praatiee, demoeraey 
will assume but one meaning - a meaning whiah has passed into 
the axiom, 'The majority .!!!! rule;' whieh again is always 
49 
praotieally translate, 'The majority have a right to rule.'" 
In this way the will of the people, popular opinion, is the 
eriterion whieh determines whether or not a legislator should 
support a meansure. Consequently he seldom, if ever, supports or 
opposes a measu.r.tJE~beeause it is right or just. Sueh faetors ean-
not enter into an argument, beeause it is assumed that the 
majority have the right to rule. 
This, for Brownson, evinees the faot that the people eol-
leotively, as a politioal people, are adopting politieal athe-
ism. For truth, justiee, right, the moral law above the will of 
the people is not reeognized and appealed to either by the leg-
islator who prates of his obedience to the will of his majesty 
who put him in offioe, or by the people who, having been told 
48 XV, 40. 
49 XV, 40. 
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that they are sovereign, demand only that the legislator remain 
50 
subservient to their will and to no other. 
Thus Brownson oontends that demooraey does not beget ~ust 
habits of mind. It is not, as a system, eondueive to the develop· 
ment of the virtues neoessary to sustain its existenee. On the 
eontrary he says that: 
It ereates a multitude of demagogues, pretending a 
world of love for the dear people, lauding the people's 
virtues, magnifying therr-sovereignty, and with moek 
humility, professing their readiness ever to bow to 
the will of the majority. It tends to make publie men 
lax in their morals, hyproeritioal in their eonduet; 
and it paves the way for gross bribery and eorruption. 
It generates a habit of appealing on nearly all 
ooeasions, from truth and justiee, wisdom and virtue, 
to the foree of numbers, and virtually sinks the man 
in the brute. It destroys manliness of eharaeter, 
independenee of thought and action, and makes one 
weak, vaoillating, - a time-server and a ooward. It 
perverts inquiry from its legitimate objeets, and 
asks, when it oonoerns a eandidate for offiee, not, 
who is the most honest, the most eapable? but, who 
will eommand the most votes? and, when it eonoerns 
a measure of poliey, not what is just? what is for 
the publie good? but, What ean the majority be indueed 
to support? Now, as men, as friends to good morals, we 
oannot assent to a doetrine whioh not only has this 
tendeney, but which declares this tendeney legitimate.5J 
Having adopted publie opinion as a oriterion for the mor-
ality of statesmen, Brownson believes that it is only a matter 
of time before it is adopted, almost universally, as an ethioal 
standard for individual aotion. If the phrase, everyone wants 
50 XVI, 88. 
51 XV, 6. 
~· .&.VQ 
r-----------------------------------------~ 
it, will justifY the action of a legislator, why is it wrong for 
the individual to justify his action by the phrase, everyone doeE 
52 
it? 
Popular demooraoy tends to oreate an atmosphere in whish 
even the individual is required to guide his aotivity by publie 
opinion. :&at the people will ao, say, or think about what he 
does beeomes a criterion of what may or may not be done. The 
The standard of moxality, popular opinion, is material rather 
than spiritual. Consistently with that eriterion of marality, 
material well-being is the sign of respectability. There is a 
universal struggle to acquire riohes as a means of equality. Not 
a few are induced to live beyond their means to make a show of 
53 
wealth which they have not, in order to be equal. 
The tendenay toward popular demoeraoy is, then, a tendenay 
toward politieal atheism. It involves a materialistie standard 
of morality, It tends to recognize, practieally, no right above 
the popular will. This, then, is Brownson's eonelusion: 
No man ean attentively study our politieal history 
and analyze with some eare our popular institutions, 
but must pereeive and admit that our state eontains 
the seeds of its own dissolution, and seeds whieh 
have already begun to germinate. Unless the tendeney 
we have thus far obeyed ean be arrested,. and a 
stronger and more eoneervative prineiple be bro~t 
62 XV, .440-441. 
53 "As a rule, men live for their families, especsially for their 
wives and daughters, whom they would see live as well, be as 
well edueated, and as well dressed as the wives and daughters 
of the better-to-do, whom demoeraey teaehes them to regard 
as equals." XVIII, 235. 
in to our relief, all hopes of a sueoessful 
issue must be abandoned. 54 
Stated briefly and simply, the demooratio theory of govern-
ment and authority asserts the absolute, underived sovereignty 
of the people oolleotively. In its nakedness it is repugnant; 
Brownson has therefore endeavored to show that The Demooraoy, 
clad in the apparently appealing garb of politiaal equality and 
the right of the majority to rule, ooneeals the despotism. 
Phrases like majority rule and political equality evoke an 
emotional response and oonsequently are not subjeoted to ration-
al analysis by the multitude. 
As a Oatholio reviewer, Brownson oould not approve of the 
tendency of statesmen to aaeept popular opinion, with the eon-
sequent rejeotion of the moral law, as the standard of right. 
Of the "democratic politieian" who professes to defer to nothing 
other than popular opinion, Brownson said: 
54 XV, 441. 
55 XV, 346. 
No man has so muoh aonfidenee in the people; 
no man has so deep, so ardent a love for the 
hard-handed and sun-burnt-faeed many; none 
so ready and willing to defer to the wishes, 
the opinions, the instincts, the will of the 
masses. He has no interest, no opinion, no. 
will of his own; he is one of the people, and 
knows only one thing, to serve the people by 
merging his feeli3gs, wishes, interests, and 
eonviotions to theirs. Find a man who so pro-
fesses, and you find one you may set down to 
be satan attempting to disguise himself as an 
angel of light. 55 
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Rejecting the spiritual, there is no alternative but to 
substitute the material. On a materialistie basis, good and 
evil ean mean only one thing: material possession or a laek of 
them. Refor.ms to seeure equal good for equal individuals, 
fostered by the demooratio doctrine of equality, may attempt, 
on this basis, to secure the good expressed by the term politi-
eal equality. For Brownson, individuals, unequal soeially, are 
not transformed into equal politiaal powers by the mere poss-
ession of a ballot. Consequently a genuine refora for politi-
eal equality_finds no logieal resting plaee at the ballot box. 
Its resting place is a sooiety in whieh the individual is a 
fraetion rather than an integer. 
Brownson has now disposed of the most important of the 
erroneous theories of government and authority. Authority has 
been attaehed to the people. Viewed thusly, government is 
fixed to a pendulum which has swung away from individualism, 
in the soeial eontraot theory, toward the despotism of demoe-
raoy. In Brownson's theory it rests in the eenter of the 
extremes. 
,....-· ________________ _, 
CHAPTER VI 
THE NATURE Alffi ORIGIN OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 
Brownson presents his doctrine of the nature and loca-
tion of political authority before proceeding to a discussion 
of its origin. He sets forth his view rather clearly, although 
somewhat circuitously, in his American Republic, where he 
pursues his discussion of authority in terms of its historical 
1 
origin. He proceeds by stating the patria~chal theory of 
government. He says that it endeavors to account for political 
authority by tracing its development in the evolution of the 
2 
family into the tribe and nation. It may be viewed either as 
an attempt to determine the origin of government as an histor-
ical fact or as a theory which accounts for the moral rightness 
3 
of civil government. 
In his criticism of the theory Brownson concedes that it 
is a true explanation of government if the question is con-
1:.. ::<•~ solely to its historical origin. l!1or the family,_ Adam 
and Eve, is the first society. As it grows the family expands 
into a tribe and finally into a nation. Thus Brownson says 
that the transition from the family to the tribe is 
1 XVIII, 18-26. 
2 XVIII, 19. 
3 XVIII, 19. 
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natural and easy, as also from the tribe into the nation." Just 
as all soaiety is derived from the family so also is government. 
It has been noted already that government exists whenever soei-
ety exists. Consequently it is obvious that government begins 
with the family. 
Having thus aeeepted the patriarahal theory as stating a 
truth whiah is more or less obvious, Brownson proaeeds to •riti-
aise it as an attempt to aecount for the authority of government 
In order to present his aritiaism aeaurately, it is neaessary 
to state briefly Brownson's position before advaneing the line 
of argument whioh whioh he justifies it. 
Brownson maintains that a soeiety invested with politiaal 
authority is radieally distinet as an entity from the family. 
Consequently it aannot be developed from the family by a proeess 
of direet growth or simple evolution. He tells us that if there 
is nothing but mere growth and expansion, the family develops 
into a barbarous tribe or nation. Thus he says that "With bar-
barians the authority of the patriaroh is developed simply by 
way of explieation; in eivilized states it is developed by way 
I 
of transformation." Repeating substantially the same opinion 
4 XVIII, 19. 
5 This view aoinaides with an earlier opinion: "I do not regard 
the family as the germ of the state. It aontains elements 
whieh are not in the state, and wants elements without whiah 
the state aould neither be aonstituted nor preserved. Both, 
in my view, are primary institutions, and neither is 
seeondary; aertainly neither is derivable from the other." 
XV, 325. · 
~·---------------------lo_a..., 
Brownson says that the direet development of the family results 
not in a eivilized state, "••• but gives us barbarism or what 
6 
is ealled oriental despotism." 
Brownson•s interpretation of the terms barbarism and des-
potism are indieated in his eritieism of the patriarehal theory 
as an attempt to aoeount for the authority of government. In 
aommenting upon the development of parental authority, Brownson 
observes first of all that the authority of the family is vested 
in the father who is its natural head. Being in possession of 
authority in his family the father may as a faet eontinue to 
exereise it with the growth and expansion of his family. Thus he 
may beeome chief of a tribe or king of a nation. 
Now Brownson argues that the mere faet that a father eon-
tinues to exereise authority in beeoming ehief or king, is not 
7 
in itself sufficient to render that authority legitimate. This 
is obvious beeause rights eonsequent upon fatherhood are ~egit­
imate only within the limited sphere of immediate parental 
relationship. Beeause he may govern his own ohildren, it does 
not follow that a parent has the right to govern anyone else, 
or any ehildren of others. Therefore if the father retains his 
authority to govern in the expanded family, something other than 
a 
the mere faot itself is required obviously to legitimate it. 
6 XVIII, 26. 
7 XVIII, 26. 
8 XVIII, 26. 
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Consequently it may be eonoluded at the outset that politieal 
authority oannot be deduoed or evolved from parental authority. 
Thus Brownson argues that the patriareh has no inherent 
right to govern in virtue of the faot that he is a patriareh. 
His oonelusion does not depend upon the way in whieh patriarehal 
authority is exeroised. For if he has no right to govern others, 
the patriareh has no authority to govern them leniently or 
affeetionately. In order to legitimate his government it is 
therefore necessary to go outside of the family itself. 
Having dismissed the patriarohal theory as a basis of the 
moral rightness of oivil government, Brownson proeeeds to 
analyse the politieal system based upon patriarehal authority 
9 
with a view to determining its essential element. His view has 
been indioated to some extend for he has maintained that the 
distinetive eharaoteristios of authority in regard to the family 
is the faet that it inheres in the father as a natural right. 
Transferred to the state, this means that the ruler possesses 
10 
politieal authority as his own personal right. Possessing 
authority as a personal right, the ruler may exereise it aooord-
ingly. Thus its exereise depends upon the pleasure of the per-
son possessing it. It is therefore arbitrary. Thus the way in 
whioh the ruler exereises his authority is aeeidental; his 
9 XVIII, 20. 
10 XVIII, 20. 
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government may or may not be tempered with affeetion. Consequent· 
lY the essential eharaoteristie of a patriarehal government is 
the faet that authority inheres in the individual as a personal 
right, thus giving him the opportunity to exereise it arbitrar-
ily. 
In other words, Brownson's argument is based upon the faet 
that authority is exereised in the same way that it exists. To 
the extent that authority exists as the right of an individual, 
he may use his own authority aecording to his own pleasure. This 
is despotism. In view of the faot that the patriarehal system is 
based upon the prinoiple that political authority may inhere in 
an individual as his personal right or privilege, Brownson 
maintains that it is despotie in prineiple. 
Now Brownson refers to any government based upon the eon-
oeption of authority as a personal right as a barbarie govern-
11 
ment. In using the term to designate a oertain type of politi-
eal organization Brownson denys that iis radical meaning is 
. 12 
"foreign, wild, fieree" as Webster indieates. He argues that 
foreign eannot be its primitive meaning beeause the Greeks did 
not refer to every foreigner as a barbarian. Furthermore, sqme 
of the nations whieh they designated by the term were rather 
eultured and refined, having made oonaiderable progress in 
seienee and in art. Consequently the terms wild and fieree oan-
11 XVIII, 21. 
12 XVIII, 21. 
lll 
not signify the essenoe of barbarism. Sinee the primary meaning 
of the term is at least dubious it may be eonjeetured, aeeording 
to Brownson, that the Greeks used the term in a politieal sense 
to "••• designate a soeial order in whioh the state was not 
developed, and in whieh the nation was personal, not territorial 
13 
and authority was held as a priyate right." Having used the 
term baraarian or barbarous to signify a politiaal order that is 
patriarehal in eharaeter, thus using them synonymously, Brownson 
says that the essenee of barbarism consists in the faet that 
authority is privately owned. 
Brownso~ argues further that barbarism and eivilization are 
opposed to one another. Therefore the essential ebaraeteristia 
of the eivil order is the direet opposite of the barbarie order. 
Thus the essence of the civil order is the faet that politieal 
authority is a publie trust instead of a right privately owned. 
This is signified very appropriately by the term !!! publiea, 
whieh means, in regard to authority, that it is publie rather 
14 
than private. 
Now in order to make authority a publie affair, it is not 
suffieient to say that it is invested in the population as a 
13 XVIII, 21. 
14 "All tribes and nations in whieh the patriarehal system re-
mains, or is developed without transformation, are barbarie •• 
•• In aivilized nations the patriarehal authority is trans-
formed into that of the oity or state, that is, of the re-
publie; but in all barbarous nations it retains its private 
and personal eharaeter." XVIII, 22. 
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whole rather than in one individual. In the nature of things no 
man has the authority to govern another as a natural right, Con-
sequently no group of men, merely beeauee tbey are men, however 
great their number may be, have in and of themselves the author-
ity to govern any other man. The reason for this is that all men 
are naturally equal, Consequently to give any one man authority 
over another by reason of his nature, is to assert the natural 
inequality of men. Therefore if authority is the right of a pop-
ulation merely beeause they are persons, authority is still per-
sonal. It cannot be eonverted into a publie trust merely by re-
ferring it to a whole population as persons or private individu-
als, "••• for what is private, partioular in its nature, is not 15 
and oannot be general." 
There is no reeourse, therefore, but to go outside of people 
as population in order to discover the eharaoteristia whiah makes 
it possible to eoneeive of authority as a publie trust rather 
16 
than a private right, This faator, Brownson says, is territory. 
It was introduoed as an essential aharaeteristie of authority in 
the politieal order of Gree•e and Rome. In Rome full politi•al 
rights were possessed only by those who oeeupied "••• the saared 
16 XVIII, 136, 24. Thus Brownson says that "••• when demoerats 
assert that the eleetive franahise is a natural right of man, 
or that it is held by virtue of the fa•t that the eleotor is 
a man, they assert the fundamental principle of barbarism and 
despotism." XVIII, 24, 
16 XVIII," 20. 
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territory of the eity whioh has been surveyed and marked by the 
1f 
god Terminus." Thus its politioal order was organized on a 
territorial, rather than on a purely personal, basis. Politieal 
rights pertained not to the population as people, but to persons 
18 
belonging to a elaarly defined territory. Territory is thus 
introduoed as the faotor whioh determines who has politieal auth-
ority. Thus in Rome the state and its authority is no longer per-
sonal. It is based upon territory. Aeeording to Brownson the 
introduotion of the territorial element marks the passage from 
"••• the aeonomieal order to the politieal, from the barbarie to 
the eivil eonstitution of soeiety, or from barbarism to eiviliza· 
19 
tion." 
In other words, Brownson argues that if there is no oommon 
or publia territory, than there is and ean be only that whioh is 
personal and therefore private. Consequently if there is auth-
ority in a system that has no~ publioa, it must be on a per-
sonal and therefore privata basis. It is not rendered lass 
personal by inoreasing the number of persons. If authority is 
personal, it oannot be publio. In order to make it publio, it 
must be based upon a !!! publiea, a oommon wealth. Therefore 
politieal authority respresented by the state must have a terri-
torial basis. 
17 XVIII, 20. 
18 XVIII, 22-26. 
19 XVIII, 21. 
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Territory and population are therefore mutually dependent 
·in Brownson's theory of ]Olitical authority. Without territory 
there eould be no~ publiaa, and oonsequently no republia. 
Without a state or a people there eould be no public to inhabit 
it. Thus territory is an essential element of politieal author-
ity because it defines the republie in which authority inheres. 
Thus Brownson says: 
The state is territorial, not personal, and 
is eonstituted by publie, not by private wealth, 
and is always!!! publiea or commonwealth, in 
distin~tion from despotism or monarchy in its 
oriental sense, which is founded on private wealth, 
or whieh assumes that the authority to govern, 
or sovereignty, is the private estate.of the 
sovereign. All power is a domain, but there is 
no domain without a dominus or lord. In oriental 
monarahies the dominus is the monareh; in repub-
lics it is the publie or people fixed to the 
soil or territory, that is, the people in their 
territorial and not in their personal or genealog-
ieal relation. 20 
Being thus organized on a territorial basis, the state and 
its authority is in its very nature a publie thing, for politi-
cal authority exists only in the republie. Existing only in this 
way its activity is limited aoeordingly. From a negative view-
point this means that the authority of the state eannot be 
exereised as the private right of an individual or group be•ause 
it does not inhere in them in this way. Thus the barbarie or 
despotie element of the state is eliminated. Positively, it 
20 XVIII, 21. 
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means that the authority of the state, by whomsoever exereised, 
must be exereiaed in the name of the republie and for its wel-
fare. Thus the ruler may aot only as a representative or an 
agent of the state because it is only in this eapaoity that he 
possesses authority. Consequently ia lodging authority only in 
the republie and therefore viewing it as publie, Brownson be-
lieves that he is eonstituting it on a prineiple whiah obliges 
21 
the state to exercise ita authority only for the publie welfare. 
In presenting his view of the nature and loeation of politi-
cal authority Brownson has used the terms barbarism and des-
potism to signify a politieal system in which the nation, and its 
authority, is personal. He has used the term republie to signify 
the eivil order or the state whose politieal order is based upon 
a!!! publiea, whieh is territory. Thus its authority is publie 
rather than private. Summarizing his meaning of these terms 
Brownson says: 
Monarehy and Republie are terms often vaguely 
and loosely used. Ill governments that have at 
21 Brownson does not believe, of eourse, that states whieh are 
republiean in prineiple never abuse their authority. He says, 
for example, that Rome was in theory, although not always in 
praotiee, a republie: "However arbitrary or despotie some of 
the eaesars may have been and eertainly were in praetiee, in 
prineiple they were elective, and held their power from the 
politioal oommunity •••• The sovereignty vested in the polit-
ioal oommunity, never in the person of the emperor. The 
emperor represented the state, but never was himself the 
state." XIII, 110. 
their head a king or emperor are usually oalled, 
by even respeetable writers, monarehies, and these 
that have not are usually ealled republie, whether 
demoeratie like aneient Athens, aristoeratie like 
Veniee prior to her suppression by General Bona-
parte, or representative like the United States. 
But this distination is not philosophieal or 
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exaet. All governments, properly speaking, in whieh 
the sovereignty is held to vest in the people or 
politi•al eommunity, and the king or emperor holds 
from the eommunity or represents the ma~esty of the 
state, are republiean, as was imperial Rome or is 
imperial Franee; all governments, on the other hand, 
in whieh the sovereignty vesta not in the politieal 
aommunity, but in the individual and is held as a 
personal right, or as a private estate, are in 
prineiple monarohieal. This is, in reality, the 
radical distinetion between republieanism and mon-
arehy, and between eivilization and barbarism, and 
it is so the terms should be understood. 22 
Before proeeeding with the diseussion it is neaessary to 
indieate briefly the position Brownson has taken as a eonse-
quenee of his eritieism of the patriarchal theory of government. 
He has shown that the eoneeption of government as a private 
right involves despotism. The despotic or barbaric element of 
government is eliminated with the introduction of territory, 
eommonly held, as the basis of government. In basing politieal 
authority upon territory, it may exist only in a!!! publiea, 
or a people fixed to a territory. Existing only in a republie 
authority may be exeroised only in the name, and for the welfare 
of the republie possessing it. Thus Brownson has indieated 
22 XIII, 110. 
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where politiea1 authority must be lodged and how it must be 
exereised. 
Furthermore, in rejeeting the patriarehal theory as an 
attempt to aeeount for the moral rightness of government, Brown-
son has eliminated entirely the possibility of aoaounting for 
authority on a purely human basis. For he has show.n already that 
the authority of government is not something whieh may be insti-
tuted by the people, wither as individuals or as a politieal 
eommunity. If the people as individuals institute its authority, 
government ean be nothing more than the ereature of the indivi-
dual. Having been ereated by individuals it eannot exeroise 
authority over them, for the ereature has no authority over his 
ereator. 
On the other hand, government eannot be derived from the 
people as a eommunity. For if the politieal eommunity were the 
souree of its own authority, it woUld be The Sovereign. This is 
despotism, soeialism, eaesaristie or humanitarian demoeraey. 
Thus the position of Brownson in regard to the origin of 
authority is more elearly defined. Having demonstrated the im-
possibility of legitimating government on a purely human basis, 
Brownson maintains that it is neeessary to rejeet, plainly and 
unequivocally, the authority of eivil government, or else admit 
that its authority is derived from God. Thus anyone eoneeding 
the existence and the legitimaey of eivil government ean deny 
the existenee of God only at the expense of logieal eonsisteney. 
On this point Brownson himself was consistent for he says that: 
,....-· 
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"When I believed in no God I believed in no government •••• When 
I renounced my atheism I derived all power from God, the source 
23 
of all law and of all justice." 
It is evident, therefore, that Brownson must hold that 
political authority is derived from God. Having shown already 
that it must inhere in a republic, Brownson's theory must include 
the view that the ruler derives authority from God through the 
people. In adopting this position Brownson believes he is accept~ 
ing the traditional view of Catholic theologians, including both 
suarez and st. Thomas. He believes, however, that his own formu-
lation of the theory is more accurate because it is more com-
plete, for his own theory. includes the explanation that the 
people derive authority through the natural law. Conee~tly he 
amends the theory to read: "The right of government to govern, 
or political authority, is derived by the collective people or 
society, from God through the law of nature. Rulers hold from 
God through the people or nation, and the people or nation hold 
21 
from God through the natural law." 
Now it is in the light of this theory that Brownson en-
deavors to solve the fundamental problem of political philosophy, 
the reconciliation of public authority and individual liberty, 
thus avoiding both anarchy and despotism. In order to understand 
23 V, 101. For Brownson's proof for the existence of God, of. 
his "Essay in Refutation of Atheism," II, l, ff. 
24 XVIII, 72. 
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what is involved in his theory it is necessary to reoall briefly 
that the natural law is law in the striot and proper sense of 
the term. It is imposed upon the rational creature by God. What 
is authorized under it is therefore obligatory, just as muoh so 
as that whioh is authorized by the revealed law. It is oalled 
natural because it is promulgated through the reason natural to 
man. It is distinct, but not separated from the supernatural. 
Thus the natural and the revealed law are distinct parts of one 
and the same divine law. 
In view of the fact that the state derives authority 
tbrough the natural law, which is an expression of God's will, 
individuals are obliged to obey its enactments. In obeying them 
the individual obeys God who has authorized tt to legislate. 
Consequently civil allegiance is a moral virtue. Thus it is ole 
that the state has authority, and that its authority must be 
25 
obeyed. 
Since the people hold authority from God, they hold it as 
they do all other things He has given them, as a trust, which i 
forfeited by its abuse. Since the authority vested in the 
people is not their own, they cannot do with it whatever they 
25 "••• the state is guarantied against sedition, insurrection, 
rebellion, revolution, by the elevation of the civic virtues 
to the rank of religious virtues, and making loyalty a 
matter of conscience." XVIII, 69. 
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please. Therefore any enactments contrary to God's law, under 
which the people are authorized as legislators, are ipso facto 
26 
null and void. Furthermore, since the ruler holds authority 
from God through the people he ~s accountable to the people as 
well as to God for the use made of his authority. 
On this basis the freedom - not the license - of the indi-
vidual is secured. For freedom, it has been noted, consists not 
in being free from law, but in obedience to God's commands. The 
individual is free to do that which is right, and he h~s the 
right to do that which is not forbidden. In disobeying God's law 
the individual is neither right nor free. Such action is license 
not liberty. 
The state, being authorized by God, has the right to legis-
late. Having the right to legislate, it cannot be right for the 
individual to resist any enactments not contrary to the law of 
God. If laws are contrary to God's law, they are not authorized 
by Him. Therefore they are not obligatory. Consequently the 
individual is free, and has the right to resist them, for the 
individual is always free to obey God. 
In this theory authority and liberty are therefare united 
harmoniously. Individual rights are secured without resorting 
to extreme individualism or anarchy. The authority of the state 
is secured without asserting openly or by implication, social-
26 Brownson holds that this is the traditional doctrine of 
Catholic theologians. XVIII, 66. 
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ism or despotism. 
While the theoretical solution of the problem of authority 
and liberty is thus solved rather simply - inasmuoh as God's 
will, whioh is never in oontradi~ttan with itself, is the souroe 
of both authority and liberty - its praotioal application is 
somewhat more difficult. For it is obvious that there may be, ana 
frequently is, a oonfliot between the liberty of the individual 
and publio authority. Therefore it is neoessary to indioate 
briefly the basis on which the praotioal problem of authority 
and liberty may be solved. 
It has already been noted that Brownson maintains that the 
problem may be solved only by the praotioal recognition of the 
supremacy of God and His law. If His law is not supreme, and 
recognized as suoh, then there is no moral law, no moral right 
or wrong. Being unable to demand obedience on moral grounds, the 
state has nothing to appeal to exoept its might. The individual, 
being unable to proteot his freedom on moral grounds, must re-
sort likewise to might. In other words, the failure to recog-
nize God's law emancipates both the individual and the state 
from all moral obligation. Consequently it is inevitable that 
both will appeal or resort to might. Thus it is likewise inevit-
able that: "Today it [sooietyJ is torn by a revolution in favor 
of sooialism; to-morrow it will be torn by another in favor of 
individualism, and without affeoting any real progress by either 
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27 
revolution." Thus the problem of authority and liberty cannot 
be solved with the practical recognition of God's supremacy. 
Furthermore, the mere recognition of God's law, and the 
appeal to it by both the individual and the state, is not suffi-
cient to settle practically the controversy between autho~ity 
and liberty. It may be assumed that God's law is the criterion 
of right and wrong for both the individual and the state, thus 
defining the limits of the state's authority and the rights of 
the individual. Yet who is to define God's law if a practical 
conflict arises? If the political philosopher will concede 
nothing more than God's law, individuals, and the state, he is 
no closer to a solution of his problem than if he denied God's 
28 
law and God entirely. If the authority to define the limita-
tion of the state's power is lodged in the individual he would 
be in a position to justify any act of disobedie~e by appealin 
to hie interpretation of God's law particularly when enactments 
seemed inconvenient to him. Similarly if the state is the judge 
of its own cause, it may justify every act of tyrany. Socialism. 
for example, professes to be Christian, and it is in the nsme 
of Christianity that it contends for equality and the subse-
quent abolition of property. 
In this way Brownson endeavors to show that if political 
27 XVIII, 46. 
28 XVI, 69-70; XIII, 492-494. 
authority is based either upon a total rejection of God's law. 
or upon God's law privately interpreted, it is not based upon 
truth. Its foundation is false. There is not the remotest 
possibility of solving the problem of authority and liberty 
since the truth, in the light of which it must be solved, is 
lacking. Since a solution is impossible it is necessary to 
assert principles which, if adopted, lead either to anarchy or 
absolutism, revolution or passive obedience. 
In order to solve the problem of authority and liberty it 
is consequently necessary to recognize the truth that God is 
not only supreme lawgiver, but also that He has constituted a 
church capable of determining infallibly what He has commanded. 
This is the truth. It is only by building upon it that indivi-
duals and society can progress. This is the message Brownson 
endeavored to convey to his public. The following is typical of 
his attitude: 
Since the government derives its authority 
from God, and is amenable to his law, evidently 
it can be tried only under that law, and before 
a court which has authority to declare it, and 
to pronounce judgement accordingly. 
But what shall be done in case there be no 
such court of competent jurisdiction? We reject 
the supposition. Almighty God could never give 
a law without instituting a court to declare it, 
and to judge its infractions. We, as Catholics, 
know what and where that court i8, and therefore 
cannot be embarassed by the question. If there 
are nations who have no such court, or who refuse 
to recognize the one Almighty God bas establiShed, 
that is their affair, not ours, and they, not we, 
are responsible for the embarrassments to which 
they are subjected. They, undoubtedly, are 
obliged either to assert passive obedience and 
non-resistance, or to deny the legitimacy of any 
government by asserting the right of revolution; 
that is, they have no alternative but anarchy or 
despotism, as their history proves. But this is 
not our fault. We are not aware that we are 
obliged to exclude ~od and his church from our 
politics in order to accommodate ourselves to 
those who blaspheme the one and revile the other. 
We are not aware that we are obliged to renounce 
our reason, and reject the lessons of experienoe, 
because if we admit them, they pr·ove that Almighty 
God has made his church essential to the maintenance 
of civil authority on the one hand, and of civil 
liberty on the other, - because they prove that 
the state can succeed no better than the individual 
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without religion. 29 
This position of Brownson follows as a consequence of his 
view that the natural and the supernatural order, the natural 
and the revealed law, are distinct parts of one whole. Forming 
a unit, the natural and the supernatural are not separated; botl 
are parts of God's plan. It is therefore false to conceive of 
them as separated and unrelated. A theory of political author-
ity based upon the supposition that the state is or can be 
separated from spiritual authority is based upon a falsehood. 
It must fail. 
While it is false to conceive of the state as entirely 
separated from the church, it is equally false not to dis-
tinguish between them. For the channel through which the state 
derives its authority from God is the natural law, which is 
distinct from the revealed law. The state does not therefore 
29 XVI, 70. 
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derive its authority through the church or the ecclesiastical 
30 
authorities. It follows that since the state and church derive 
their authority from God through distinct channels and exist in 
distinct orders, neither can absorb the other. They are and must 
31 
remain distinct as external governing bodies. 
In order to complete and to summarize Brownson's views on 
the nature and origin of authority, it is necessary to note that 
he has criticised and rejected in part, seven contrary theories 
32 
before formulating his own. His criticism of each theory is 
voluminous and somewhat repetitious, and not at all essential to 
the comprehension of his own theory. The brief statement of each 
theory which follows indicates that his reasons for rejecting 
it have already been incorporated in the chapter. 
I. The patriarchal theory is rejected as an attempt to 
account for the moral rightness of government. It is essentiall 
despotic because authority is considered a private right. In 
30 "Yet, though derived from God only through the people, civil 
authority still holds from God, and derives its right from 
him through another channel than the church or spiritual 
society, and, therefore, bas a right, a sacredness, which 
the church herself gives not, and must recognize and respectV 
.XVIII, 66-66. 
31 Brownson's view of the ideal relationship between the church 
and state is indicated in Chapter IX wherein be maintains 
that the American republic is a concrete illustration of the 
ideal relationship. 
32 XVIII, 18-74. 
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order to transform authority into a public trust territory must 
be introduced as a constituent element of political authority. 
33 
Thus the state and its authority is a!!! publica. 
II. The social oontraot theory must be rejected because 
government is the creature of the individual. As suoh it can 
34 
have no authority over the individual, who is its creator. 
III. The democratic theory must be rejected because it 
goes to the opposite extreme. The practical adoption of the 
theory would result in despotism or absolutism. It has an ele-
ment of truth inasmuch as it invests authority in the people 
35 
oolleotively or the community. 
IV. There is a theory which states that government is a 
development of nature. If the theory holds that it is nature in 
the sense of a spontaneous development independently of God's 
will the theory is wrong. It is the natural law, whiCh is an 
expression of God's will that aooounts for the moral rightness 
36 
of gCIII'ernment. 
v. The next theory whioh is oritioised maintains that 
rulers hold their authority directly from God and not through 
the nation. This is the doctrine of the divine right of ki~s. 
The sole redeeming feature in the theory is that it derives 
33 XVIII, 18-26. 
34 XVIII, 26-40. 
35 XVIII, 40-47, 
36 XVIII, 47-54. 
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power from God. But "••• it consecrates tyrany, and makee God 
37 
the accomplice of the tyrant." In other words, it asserts the 
unlimited power of the ruler which is despotism. 
VI. Another theory of the origin of authority states that 
political authority comes from God thro~ the pope. This 
theory must be rejected because the state derives its authority 
38 
from the natural law which is distinct from the revealed law. 
VII. The traditional doctrine of Catholic theologians 
asserts that rulers derive authority from God through the people ' 
This view is sound and must be adopted without reservation. 
However, it does not state explicitly that authority comes from 
39 
God through the natural law. 
VIII. "The right ·of government to garern, or political 
authority, is derived by the oolleotive people or society, from 
God through the law of nature. Rulers hold from God through the 
people or nation, and the people or nation hold from God through 
40 
the natural law." When the implications of this theory are 
unfolded, it is discovered that it contains all of the truths 
and none of the errors of the previous theories. It asserts, 
neither openly or by implication, anarchy or despotism. Thus it 
solves the fundamental problem of political philosophy, the 
reconciliation of authority and liberty. 
37 XVIII, 54·58. 
38 XVIII, 58-61. 
39 XVIII, 61-72. 
40 XVIII, 72-74. 
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It solves the problem not only theoretically, but also 
practically. In viewing the natural and revealed laws as dis-
tinct but not separate parts of one divine law, the state can 
never be separated from the church, whiQh is the representative 
of God on earth capable of declaring infallibly God's law. On 
any other basis, aueh sa a denial of either God's law or His 
church it is impossible to reconcile public authority with 
individual liberty. 
Having thus disposed of the question of the nature and 
origin of autho~ity, Brownson turns his attention to the state 
in which that authority resides. He has already limited the 
state in terms of its function, for the extremes to be avoided 
in its activity are anarchy and absolutism. In doing so Brown-
son obviously places a limitation upon the nature which he 
may attribute to it, for the nature of anything is the source 
of its activity. He cannot on the one hand attribute to it a 
nature whose parts are held together so loosely that it is in 
constant danger of disintegration, for he has affirmed the 
necessity of its continued existence as an organization having 
the authority to govern. Otherwise there would be anarchy. 
Again, he cannot give it a nature whose parts form a unit so 
sompletely that the existence of the individual, as a being 
with rights of his own, is endangered. Thus the boundaries 
within which Brownson must pursue his discussion of the state 
are already clearly defined. 
,r·r-------------------. 
OHA.PTER VII 
THE liATURE OF THE STATE 
Brownson's exposition of the nature of the state rests 
1 
upon various philosophical foundations. Unfortunately he bas 
no formal treatise on the state in which he presents in an 
orderly fashinn his view of the constituent elements of the 
state. It is consequently necessary to impose an orier upon 
Brownson's view of the state, ani perhaps correct certain term-
2 
inological inaccuracies. 
In order to select a starting point which will serve to 
unify Brownson*s doctrine, it is necessary to commence with 
his statement of the elements which constitute a state. He says 
that: "Sovereignty, under God inheres in the organic people, 
1 For example, when he was a Platonist Brownson's theories 
were based largely upon his interpretation of the Platonic 
theory of ideas; later he based his views partially upon 
Leroux's doctrine of communion. 
2 Inasmuch as Brownson wrote so voluminously on political 
problems this may seem at first sight to be a statement that 
is slightly,exaggerated. In the first place, however, many 
of Brownson's views are expressed in rather brief articles, 
some of which were composed hastily to meet a publisher's 
deadline. In his American Republio Brownson does profess to 
organize doctrines previously expressed briefly and 
hurriedly. Still a glance at its table of contents indicates 
the fact that not one of its fifteen chapters is devoted 
explicitly to a discussion of the state. He has many chap-
ters on government. In these he discusses the state. These 
discussions are extremely confusing because Brownson's posi-
tion demands a sharp distinction between state and govern-
ment. In the light of his doctrine which follows there is 
no excuse whatsoever for Brownson to use these terms inter-
changeably. 
~50 
or in the people as the republic; and every organic people fixed 
to the soil, and politically independent of every other people, 
is a sovereign people, and, in the modern sense, an independent 
3 
sovereign nation." 
Brownson's conception of tba state as an organism is de-
rived from his interpretation of the Platonic theory of ideas. 
This theory has been treated in a previous chapter on the "Right 
of the Individual." In order to understand how it supports the 
conclusion that the state is an organism, it must be recalled 
briefly that humanity is an idea. It exists in the divine mind 
as a simple, indivisible, generative principle. Its activity 
results in the production of individual men and women. It is to 
the individ:ual ''••• what the principle of vitality or vital 
4 
farce is to the human body." 
Now according to Brownson the vital force of the individual 
is its unif,ving principle; it makes the members of his body part~ 
6 
of one whole. For example, the eyes and ears of the human body 
are related as members of one body because they derive their 
vitality from the simple, vital force which pervades the entire 
body and makes it one. Similarly, individuals derive their 
vitality from one and the same vital force. This is humanity. 
Since it is one and simple, it pervades all individuals equally. 
3 XVIII, 100. 
4 XV, 372. 
6 XV, 372-374. 
,...-
r-------------------------------------------~1~31 
Therefore it unites individuals as members of an organism; it 
makes them parts of one body. Thus Brownson says that society 
is not merely an association of individuals, but a "Living 
6 
Organism." 
The de~elopment of this analogy gives us a true picture of 
the nature of society. Since it is an organism, it follows 
that society has different members. It follows also that each 
individual, considered as a member of the organism, has a speci-
fic function, just as the fUnction of the eye is to see and the 
7 
ear to hear. However, Brownson points out, "What is essential 
to the life and growth of the whole is, that each member be pre-
served in his sound and healthy state, so as to be able to per-
a 
form, without obstruction, his special function." In other words, 
the welfare of the body as a whole depends upon the welfare of 
its members. Just as the ~an organism suffers if the function 
of the eye is obstructed, so also does the social organism 
suffer if the function of an individual is obstructed. 
6 "This [ h1l1Ilanity] is essentially one and identical in all men, 
and is to the great body of individual men and women, under 
the relation I now consider it, what the principle of vital-
ity, or vital force, is to tm human body. It is the one 
vital force active in all, the life-current that flows throug 
all individuals, making them all members of one living body. 
It is to establish this fact, that I have insisted on the 
Platonic doctrine af ideas, and attempted to demonstrate 
man's existence as an idea or as the genus, to speak the 
language of science." XV, 372. 
7 XV, 372. 
8 XV, 372. 
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This means, therefore, that man's welfare and that of soci-
ety are intimately interwoven. Society is in a sense the comple-
·t~on of man because it fills up a need that is rooted in his 
nature. The reason for this is that man's nature is at once 
individual and social. The humanity whiQh constitutes him an 
individual is the same humanity that unites him to others as a 
member of an organism. Consequently he cannot exist without 
deriving life from the organism of which he is a member, any 
8 
more than the eye could exist apart from the body. 
Thus far Brownson haa said nothing explicitly about the 
state. He has given us a conception of individuals who cannot 
8 Brownson never modified his conception of society as an organ-
ism, although he did modify his Platonism, as is evident from 
the following, written in 1867: "We confess that we are not 
able to make out from Plato a complete, coherent, and self-
consistent doctrine of ideas." II, 289. His later view is 
grounded on Leroux's doctrine of communion, which has been 
stated in a preceeding chapter. Presenting his view in terms 
of this doctrine, Brownson holds that man is a dependent being 
and cannot exist without God. He depends upon him directly 
through religion, and indirectly through nature and society. 
Without society he can neither be born nor sustained in 
existence. Therefore society is necessary to man and conse-
quently as "••• indestructible as human nature itself." V, 
131. This is another instance in which Brownson maintains one 
conclusion consistently but supports it on different grounds. 
exist apart from society. Since the individual cannot exist 
apart from it, his relationship to society is that of a member 
who cannot exist if it is out off from the body to which it 
belongs. His pnDoedure is clear, however, inasmuch as he has 
already established the fact that government is necessary to 
society. He has shown that the family, which is the smallest 
society from the numerical standpoint, cannot exist without 
9 
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government because it would fail for lack of unity. Consequently 
government is introduced as the factor which renders effective 
10 
man's existence as a member of an organism. 
In other words, government is necessary to society just as 
society is necessary to man. Being essential and indispensable 
to society, which in turn is necessary for man, government must 
exist as the condition upon which man expresses or actualizes 
his nature. Thus Brownson says, "Extinguish government and you 
ll 
extinguish society; extinguish society and you extin~ish man." 
Now government exists in both the family and in the repub-
lic or a people fixed to a territory. Parental authority, how-
ever, is confined within the narrow limits of an immediate fam-
ily. Being legitimate only within a family, it ceases to be 
legitimate with the natural growth and expansion of the family. 
------·-···- ... 
9 XVIII, 14. 
10 XVIII, 15. 
11 :!VII, 10. 
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Consequently the government of the parent or the patriarch must 
be replaced or transformed into that of the state in order to 
be lagitimate. The family grows and expands naturally into a 
larger society, but the father can have no natural right to 
govern a society larger than his immediate family. Consequently 
authority in such a society must be based upon something other 
than the conjugal relationship. It has been indicated already 
that the basis of this authority must be somet~ing common, a 
12 
res publica, or a territory commonly held. 
Being an organism, the state is required to secure the 
good of the individuals constituting it as the condition of se-
curing its own welfare. It has been noted previously that the 
welfare of the whole depends upon the welfare of its parts. Now 
18 
the individual is at once an individual and a member of society. 
Therefore in order to secure the good of the individual the 
state must permit him to fulfill his function both as an indi-
vidual and as a member af society. 
Since government is necessary for society, which in turn is 
necessary for man, there is no intimation in Brownson of the 
view that gaFernment is a necessary evil, or that it is rendered 
necessary by man*s fall. Ita function is positive rather than 
12 XIII, 110. 
13 Brownson maintain's consistently that the recognition of the 
fact that the individual is an integer aswell as a part of 
society is due to Christianity. The following is typical of 
what he holds: "The doctrine af individnal freedom before the 
state is due to the Christian religion, which asserts the 
dignity and worth of every human soul, the accountability to 
God of each man for himself •••• " XVIII, 45. 
negative. It is the oondition upon whioh man may develop and 
perfeot his natural oapacities. Consequently it is a good for 
mgn, aeoond only to religion. In Brownson*a words: 
It is needed to render effeotive the solidarity 
of the individuals of a nation, and to render 
an organism, not a mere organization - to oombine 
men in one living body, and to strengthen all with 
the strength of each, and each with the strength 
of all - to develop, strengthen, and sustain indi-
vidual liberty, and to utilize and direot it to 
the promotion of the common weal - to be a 
social providence, imitating in its order and 
degree the action of the divine providence itself, 
and, while it provides for the common good of all, 
to proteot each, the lowest and meanest, with the 
whole force and majesty of sooiety. It is the min-
ister of wrath to wrong-doers, indeed, but its 
nature is beneficient, and its aotion defines and 
proteota the right of property, oreates and main-
tains a medium in whioh religion oan exert her 
supernatural energy, promotes learning, fosters 
soience and art, advanoes oivilization, and contri-
butes as a powerful means to the fulfillment by 
man of the divine purpose of his existence. Next 
after religion, it is man's greatest good; and even 
religion without it can do only a small portion of 
her work. They wrong it who call it a neoessary 
evil; it is a great good, and, instead of being 
distrusted, hated, or resisted, except in its 
abuses, it should be loved, respeoted, obeyed, and, 
if need be, defended at the cost of all earthly 
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goods, and even of life itself. 14 
fhus far Brownson has said that the state fulfills a need 
existing in man•s nature and that it is consequently a good. He 
has said also that its authority inheres in the people as a 
whole and is oonsequently the attribute of the whole organism 
rather than of any individual. 
14 XVIII, 15. 
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At this time, however, Brownson introduces doctrines which 
are not precisely ordinary, at least not with respect to the 
manner in which he expresses them. The first of these doctrines 
is introduced to explain why or how people come to be organized 
into particular states. That is, he endeavors to indicate the 
basic factors which unify a people and give it a distinctive 
existence as a people. 
Adopting his usual procedure, Brownson begins by criticising 
contrary theories before presenting his own view. He begins by 
denying that a written dootUI.I!Ult, ordinarily referred to as a 
constitution, is the basio or fundamental factor which organizes 
people into a state. A written constitution, being the act of a 
community or a people, obviously presupposes the existence of 
individuals already organized in some way. Since it presupposes 
~n organized people, a constitution cannot be the sole organizing 
15 
~actor of a people. In other words, on the supposition that a 
~ritten constitution is the fundamental factor which unifies a 
people or gives being to them, it would be possible to conceive 
pf a state as a purely artificial production. The nation would be 
similar to " ••• a temperance society or deyating club, a simple 
voluntary association which men are free to join or not as they 
16 
please." ~hus Brownson rejects entirely the view that states 
15 As is evident Brownson is again criticising the contract 
theory, that people can get together voluntarily, draw up a 
written constitution and thus bring a state into existence. 
This theory has been treated in some de,ail in a previous 
chapter. 
16 XVIII, 75. 
oome into existence or oan be formed suddenly, oreated!! ~· 
by the formulation of a written constitution. 
137 
In opposition to the oontraot theory of Rousseau, Brownson 
says that states oome into existenoe by a prooess or growth or. 
development, rather than a production. That whioh constitutes or 
gives being to a people is its own internal organization, repre-
sented in the habits, the manners, the oustoms, the living tradi· 
tions whioh grow and develop as a people grow and develop. It is 
this internal organization whioh gives the state its vitality, 
"••• that whioh oontrols or governs its aotion, and determines 
17 
its destiny." 
Now the habits, manners, traditions, ouatoms of a people 
that oome into existence by a prooess of growth or development 
represent, for Brownson, an internal unifying faotor whioh pre-
aedes, and is more fundamental, than its written constitution. 
He speaks of the sum of these faotors in terms of an organio, 
18 
or unwritten, constitution, or in terms of its unwritten or 
19 
living law. 
The point that Brownson endeavors to oonvey, in terms whiah 
appear somewhat confusing, is the faat that an individual gov-
ernment must be adapted to, and be an expression of, the funda-
mental and distinotive ha'its and traditions of a people. It aan-
17 XVIII, 80. 
18 XIII, 44-46. 
19 XIX, 368-360. Brownson also refers to these faotors as the 
Providential Constitution. 
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not be created artificially and imposed from without. "It must 
be born and developed with the nation •••• Constitutions ot 
states are not things that can be made to order, and imposed by 
authority, regardless of the habits, manners, customs, and tra-
20 
ditions of the people who are to live under them." 
This means that if, for example, a monarch is included in 
the fundamental, internal organization of a people, it is the 
sheerest folly to remove the monarch and attempt to impose an-
other form which has no basis in the traditions of a people. 
The French people adopted constitution after 
constitution of the most approved pattern, and 
amid bonfires, beating of drums, sound of 
trumpets, roar of musketry, and thunder of 
artillery, swore, no doubt, sincerely as well 
as enthusiastically, to observe them, but all 
to no effect; for they had no authority for the 
nation, no hold on its affection, and formed no 
element of its life. 21 
Brownson believes, therefore, that the fundamental and 
primary organization of a people determines the particular form 
of government which is most suitable for that people. He could 
never bring himself to consider seriously the question as to 
whether or not one form of government is inherently better than 
22 
another. "The constitution of government must grow out of the 
constitution of the state, and accord with the genias. the 
20 XIII, 44. 
21 XVIII, 81. 
22 Of. Summa Theol. l-2, q. 95, a. 4, c., in which St. Thomas 
enumerates the various forms of government and indicates 
briefly the merits of each, and the merits of a combination. 
oharaoter, the habits, oustoms, and wants of the people, or it 
will not work well, or tend to seoure the legitimate ends of 
23 
80Vernment." 
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In other words, Brownson holds that a people develops a 
unity or organization whioh is distinctively their own. Anything 
rooted in that organization as an integral element, cannot be 
uprooted without destroying the people. Consequently a govern-
ment imposed from without tends to eliminate or destroy a radi-
cal element of that organization. Such a government seldom, if 
ever, has a hold on the people and is consequently seldom a 
good government. It must be maintained by force because it is 
not the expression of a living organism. 
Brownson also attempts to answer the question as to why or 
how people beoome organized on a territorial ba?is and thus be-
gin to exist as states, and why some survive and others are 
extinguished. His answer, whether philosophical or not, is that 
the providence of God is the only ultimate explanation. God in 
His providence has permitted states to be extinguished, and some 
of them by violence. Why He has done so "••• is no question for 
the statesman; it is the seoret of Providence. Failure in this 
world is not always a proof of wrong; nor success, of right. The 
good is sometimes overborne, and the bad sometimes triumphs; but 
it is consoling, and even just, to believe that the good oftener 
23 XVIII, 97. 
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triumphs over the bad." 
Likewise, God in His :providence is ultimately responsible 
for the existence of a particular :people, state, or nation. Con-
sequently Brownson also refers to the organic or unwritten con-
stitution which gives being to a state as its :providential con-
25 
stitution. In order to discover what he means by it, it is 
necessary to discover what he means by :providence and thus de-
termine the respective roles of providence and human agency in 
the formation of the state. 
Providence, for Brownson, means the action by which God 
sustains, cooperates with, and directs His creatures:"J?roVidence 
is as necessary as creation, or rather,_providence is only con-
tinuous creation, the creative act not suspended or discontinued 
26 
or not :passing over from the creature and returning to Go d." He 
distinguishes between'God's providence and God's natural law: 
"The law of nature is not the order or rule of the divine action 
27 
in nature which is rightfully called providence •••• " 
The necessity for the divine action in nature called provi-
dence is to be found in the nature of the creature. He is a 
second cause, a substantial existence, but nevertheless depend-
ent; consequently God must concur, cooperate with, and direct 
every action of every creature. Having given man a nature which 
24 XVIII, 107. 
25 XVIII, 74-75. 
26 XVIII, 67-68. 
27 XVIII, 72. 
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is free, God must direot him, but he " ••• must leave his freedom 28 
intaot •••• How this can be done, we do not undertake to say." 
Applying this doctrine to the state, Brownson says that men 
cannot produce a state de novo. A germinal organization must be 
given them to start with. This germinal organization which men 
cannot produce is present in families, in families united into 
tribe. It develops in the migrations of families and in colonies 
through wars, conquests, rebellions, amalgamation of conquered 
and conqueror. In a word, the development of a nation presup-
29 
poses a germinal organization which may be developed. 
Now Brownson maintains that· it is by reason of circumstance~ 
such as those mentioned that nations begin to exist. These cir-
cumstances are providential in his estimation, but not therefore 
30 
fatalistic. The germ whioh is given to a people by reason of 
these events is not, properly speaking, made; it is rather a 
generation. Granted such a germinal organization, men may develo] 
it. They may deve.lop distinctive habits, oustoms, and instinctivE 
unity as a people, but they oannot by their own voluntary effort1 
bring into existenoe or produoe the germinal organization they 
28 III, 365. 
29 XVIII, 77. 
30 In traoing the development of Rome, for example, he says that 
the "Roman people, had they ohosen, could have given a dif-
ferent direction to the developments of their constitution. 
There was Providence in the course of events, but no fatal-
ism." XVIII, 89. 
31 
have to begin with. This is the work of providence. 
As an indication of what Brownson means by the providential 
constitution with respect to human liberty in its formation the 
following brief passages are cited: 
•••• cohstitutions are generated, or developed, not 
created de novo, or made all at once. But nothing is 
more sure-tnan-that a nation can alter its constitu-
tion by its own deliberate and voluntary action, and 
many nations have done so, and sometimes for the 
better as well as the worse. 32 
Providence is always present in the affairs of 
nations, but not to work miracles to counteract the 
natural effects of the ignorance, ineptness, short-
sightedness, narrow views, public stupidity, and 
imbecility of rulers, because they are irrepraach-
able and saintly in their private characters and 
relations. 33 
The doetrine presented thus far means that Brownson has 
established the fact that the state is an organic people fixed 
to a territory. On the basis of his analysis of man's nature, 
he has show.n that man is related to society as an organ is 
31 As is evident, Brownson derived this doetrine from Joseph De 
M.aistre, (Anon. trans.), Essay on the Generative Principle 
of Political Constitutions, Boston, 1847. Brownson's review 
of this essay indicates that he accepted it rather enthusi-
astically at first. This first discussion is characterized 
by extremely confusing terminological taexactitudes. While 
he accepts the terms of the doctrine, such as providential 
and generated constitutions in his later works, they appear 
to have an entirely different meaning. He refers to the 
doctrine rather f~~quently, e.g., XVII, 494-600, and XVIII, 
74-92 where he says that the doctrine is not true as held 
by that "illustrious Count." 
32 XVIII, 76. 
33 XVIII, 91. 
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related to the body from which it draws life. Society requires 
authority, whioh in turn exists only in people related terri-
torially. The possession of both territory and living tradi-
tions are unifying factors of the state which precede the 
adoption of its written constitution. Thus the state is an 
organic people fixed to a territory. 
143 
The consequences whioh Brownson draws from this position 
are, if nothing else, at least somewhat startling. Brownson 
argues that if political authority is an attribute of the peop-
le as a whole, it cannot be prior to, but must be consequent 
upon, the existence of an organism. Unfortunately, Brownson 
states the conclusivn derived from this position rather abrupt-
ly and without sufficient warning, for he says in no uncertain 
terms that "A nation de facto is a .nation de jure, and when we 
have ascertained the fact, we have ascertE:ined the right. There 
34 
is no right in the case separate from the fact." 
It is rather unfortunate that Brownson 1 s arguments are 
stated somewhat vehemently and abruptly on any side of a 
question because it is rather easy to select certain passages, 
such as that abuve, and prove that Brownson was an advocate of 
the doatrine that.might makes right. It is also easy to select 
passages from Brownson to prove that he was an anarchist. 
Brownson himself notes this, and rather frequently, when he 
J't·,_XVIII, 105. 
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says that HWe are not infrequently aooused of being one-sided, 
narrow-minded, and disposed always to push the prinoiples we 
36 
may have happened to adopt to extremes. Nothing is more untrue.n 
.And again, 
••• if we oppose false liberty, or lioense 
presented under the name of liberty, we are 
oharged with being enemies of true freedom; 
if we assert authority, however legitimate 
or neoessary, then we are despots or advocates 
of despotism. The press opens its cry against 
us, and the age votes us mediaeval dreamers, 
behind the times, relics of the past, with our 
eyes on the baokside of our heads, and the 
truth is drowned in the floods of indignation 
or ridioula poured out against us. 36 
Since Brownson was notoriously imprudent and extreme it is 
neoessary to present his doctrine more prudently, without there-
by presenting it less acourately, or with a view to suppressing 
his dootrine for the purpose of vindicating it. 
In view of the fact that Brownson main tai~s that poli tioal 
sovereignty vests in the politioal oommunity, or the state, or 
the people as an organism, he distinguishes sharply between the 
state and the government commissioned under it: "The government, 
~s distinguished from the state or nation, has only a delegated 
authority, governs only by a oommission from the nation. The 
revooation of the oommission vaoates its title and extinguishes 
37 
its right." 
In other words, the people, being sovereign, may oommission 
36 X, 632-633. 
36 III, 338. 
37 XVIII, 108. 
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this government or that; they may entrust authority to a king 
or·an aristoaracy, or to a combination. The distinction between 
the sovereign people and the government is that between the 
38 
sovereign and his agent. This means that no ruler, whether he 
be king or emperor, holds his authority as he does a piece of 
39 
property. The people may, for a good and sufficient reason, 
dismiss their agent, whether he be called king or emperor, with-
out depriving him of any indefeasable right, as they would do 
if they deprived him of property. "The right of a nation to 
change its form of government, and its magistrates or repre-
40 
sentatives, by whatever name called, is incontestable." 
This, according to Brownson, is nothing more than the 
logical application of the doctrine that sovereignty vesta in 
the people, and that rulers are consequently justiciable by the 
41 
people as well as by God for the use made of authority. Al-
though sovereignty is delegated to rulers, sovereignty itself 
is in the people and persists in them. The powers delegated to 
government "••• are still the powers of the sovereign delegati 
them, and may be modified, altered, or revoked, as the soverei 
42 judges proper." 
38 XVIII, 92. 
39 XVIII, 92-94. 
40 XVIII, 99. 
41 XVIII, 99. 
42 XVIII, 99. 
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~----------------------------------------------------~ Applying this doctrine still further, Brownson holds that 
an existing government may be destroyed entirely without thereby 
destroying the state or the sovereignty of the people. If the 
people survive the destruction of their government, "••• the 
sovereign remains in the plentitude of his rights, as competent 
43 
to restore government as he was originally to institute it." 
It may happen further that a particular ruler or a parti-
cular government may be overthrown, not by the people acting as 
sovereign, but by a mob. Subsequently a new ruler may acquire 
44 
his position by an act that is manifestly unjust. In suoh a 
case Brownson contends that the people still maintain the right 
to legalize, or to legitimate, the title of the new ruler. The 
faot that the people will to retain a ruler is in itself suffi-
oient to give him legitimate authority. His right as a ruler 
is not derived from any right prior to the will of the people, 
for "He holds his power, as the emperor of the Frenoh professes 
to hold his, by the grace of God and the national will - the 
only title by whioh a king or emperor can legitimately hold 
45 
power." 
It is clear therefore, that Brownsonis dootrine does not 
mean that a government de facto is a government de jure. One who 
acquires title by violenoe may be the ruler de faoto, but he 
43 XVIII, 93. 
44 Brownson refers to conditions in France in 1848 and subse-
quently to Napoleon's suppression of the legislative assem-
bly in 1851. XVIII, 93. 
45 XVIII, 93. 
does not rule de jure unless the people he rules will to retain 
him as ruler. If he maintains power by mere foroe he is a 
tyrant, a usurper without authority. 
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Aooording to Brownson a olear out oase·of a government that 
is de faoto imposed upon the people without being de jure is 
46 
England's dominion in India. Its dominion is de faoto, but it 
is without right and consequently tyrannical. It is government 
without legitimate authority to govern and therefore barbaric 
and despotic in principle. England may succeed in maintaining 
it, according to Brownson, but if it does it will "••• wreak a 
vengeanoe on the unhappy Hindoos that will establish her char-
47 
aoter for cruelty and barbarity down to the end of the world." 
With the distinction between state and government clearly 
in mind it is impossible to maintain that Brownson holds that 
every government able to preserve itself by force is a de jure 
government. It is consequently necessary to examine his asser-
tion that every nation de faoto is a nation de jure on the basis 
of this distinction. 
In asserting that a nation de facto is a nation de jure, 
Brownson was endeavoring to discover the basis on whioh the 
state derives authority from God. He rejects the view that a 
state, in order to be legitimate, must have oome into existence 
rightfully. His reason for rejecting this view is made on the 
46 XVI, 538-544. 
47 XVI, 546. 
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ground that it would be impossible to justify, or to assert the 
rightful existence of, a single civilized state: 
A hundred or more lost nationalities went 
to form the Roman empire, and who can tell 
us how many layers of orushed nationalitieg, 
superimposed one upon another, serve for the 
foundation of the present Frenoh, English, 
Russian, Austrian, or Spanish nationality. 
What other title to independence and sovereignty, 
than the fact, oan you plead in behalf of any 
European nation? Every one has abso1·bed 
and extinguished - no one can say how many -
nationalities, that onoe had as good a right 
to be as it has, o~ can have. 48 
This argument is typical of Brownson. He says that if a 
nation must be founded rightfully in order to be just, acoept 
the principle and apply it regardless of the consequences: " ••• I 
have never in my life been able to persuade myself that a prin-
ciple, really sound and true, will not bear pushing to its last 
49 
logical consequences." He continues that if a principle cannot 
be applied, it is proof that it is untrue and aannot be adopted. 
Obviously, as has been indios ted, he maintains that the pr'inciplE 
that a nation must be founded rightfully in order to possess 
legitimate authority oannot be a criterion for determining its 
legitimacy. 
Rejecting this view as untenable, Brownson accepts the oon-
Sequenoes of the dootrine that authority inheres in the state as 
an attribute of the whole organism. As suoh it is necessarily 
consequent upon, and not prior to, the existenoe of the organism. 
48 XVIII, 107. 
49 XVIII, 224. 
Therefore it begins with the existence of the organism and is 
extinguished with its death: "There is no right behind the fact 
needed to legalize the fact, or to put the nation that is in 
50 
fact a nation in possession of full national righ1ts.n 
The doctrine that a nation, not a government, de facto is 
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a nation de jure, taken in connection with his view on the 
origin of authority, serves to unify and to render more definite 
Brownson's view of the state. He has maintained that authority 
comes from God through the natural law. It inheres in the state 
as an organism for the good of the whole. The state is consti-
tuted or given existence by the possession of a territory and 
by a distinctive internal organization of its own. Thus the 
authority of the state inheres in the state itself. A written 
enactment is consequently not constitutive; it is the product 
ot, or is written by, a people already existing as a people. 
Since Brownson maintains that a nation de facto is a 
nation de jure, he maintains that the existence of a nation is 
simply a question of historical fact. The functions of a sov-
ereign are easily discernible, as easily as any other historical 
fact. Briefly, the distinctive characteristic of sovereignty is 
the exercise of complete authority, which is the management of 
51 
both internal and external, foreign and domestic affairs. 
50 XVIII, 107. 
51 These conditions are expanded in the following chapter where-
in they are applied to a particular situation. 
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Since Brownson maintains that the existence of a nation is 
a simple question of historical fact, he is ma.rely applying his 
doctrine that its authority remains and persists in the organic 
constitution. With respect to India, for example, the histori-
cal fact is evident. The internal organizations have not been 
broken. Consequently there remains the right to resist invaders, 
who are of necessity tyrants. On the other hand, a people whose 
distinctive organizations have been broken, who have been 
absorbed, assimilated, conquered, are no longer de facto a 
people. As scattered ramnants they have no longer the right to 
52 
institute and exercise complete political authority. 
His thought is indicated clearly with respect to colonies 
existing under the jurisdiction of their mother country. Such 
colonies are not sovereign de facto. They may exercise some of 
the functions of a sovereign such as the control of domestic 
affairs. Such authority is legitimate; it is authorized through 
the political sovereign. If the authority of the mother country 
over its colonies is such that it is tyranical, oppressive, too 
great to be endured, it may be resisted even by force. This may 
be, but seldom is, the case. 
Yet a people dependent upon legitimate political authority 
may never revolt against it merely to secure complete political 
authority or sovereignty for themselves. To maintain the contraly 
52 XVIII, 106. 
that is, that individuals, groups, colonies, are inherently 
sovereign and have the right to be sovereign, is to babble the 
nonsense of Rousseau. It would, if adopted in principle, put 
an end to all legitimacy: 
Myself and two others might otherwise unite, 
and declare ourselves a sovereign state, and 
secede from the city, the state, and the Union, 
and scornfully refuse to recognize your magis-
trates, your laws, your police, your conscrip-
tion, and your tax-bills. This would be democracy 
run mad, and too absurd to be asserted even by 
the Evening Post or the New York Tribune. 53 
At this time it becomes necessary to state clearly that 
which has been implied all along in Brownson's discussion of 
the state. He is endeavoring to establish principles which he 
will endeavor to apply primarily to the concrete situation in 
which the Anglo-American colonies found themselves at the 
termination of the revolutionary war. By way of concluding the 
discussion of these principles, they will be reviewed briefly. 
Since they will be applied to a concrete situation in the 
following chapters, the summary is given in terms of a concrete 
problem, and how the position taken thus far is necessitated 
by the problem confronting Brownson. In order to accomplish 
this purpose it is necessary, at least momentarily, to break 
away from Brownson's own exposition. 
He has maintained that a people always begin their exist-
ence with a germinal organization Which is given to it. This 
53 XVII, 570. 
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organization grows with the people; it develops with them. It 
becomes a part of the living, breathing people themselves. This 
organization is represented in the living habits, traditions 
and institutions ~f a people. This living, growing organization 
is a unifying factor which is more important than written 
enactments. 
If such a people are in possession of a territory, and they 
are politically dependent, they are not sovereign. They hold 
authority dependently upon the sovereign who has authorized 
their existence. Such authority is legitimate; it is right. 
Consequently it cannot be right to revolt against it merely in 
order to obtain complete authority. 
If it were accepted as a matter of principle that such a 
people could revolt for the purpose of securing complete auth-
ority for themselves, one would accept, consciously so or not, 
the principle that people are in themselves sovereign. Being 
sovereign they have a right to unite voluntarily, to ordain 
government, to revolt in order to secure compleie authority. 
Thus Brownson maintains that if there could be a right to com-
plete authority prior to the fact, one would be in the absurd 
position of maintaining that it is right for a colony to resist 
the rightful enactments of the mother country. 
On the other hand, if such a colony does revolt de facto 
it thereby severs the channel through which it derived legiti-
mate authority. Since it has been out off from the source of 
its authority, (1) it must be left without authority, or (2) 
its authority must be derived from some other source. (3) The 
source can be none other than that indicated by Brownson in the 
exposition of his own doctrine. 
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(1) Authority exists only in the state. The colony is a 
transplanted dependent group, deriving authority legitimately 
through the mother country. If by a wrongful act they sever that 
channel, it is impossible for them to convene as isolated indi-
viduals and re-institute, by a convention, a legitimate govern-
ment. They cannot, in other words, make their g~ernment a 
rightful government by surrendering rights, agreeing to be 
governed, or consenting voluntarily; in a word, their government 
cannot be legitimated in terms of Rousseau's social contract. 
Thus, if the channel through which legitimate authority is 
derived is severed, and if the state must come into existence 
rightfully, there is no possible way for Brownson to introduce 
legitimacy into any government of Europe, and more importantly, 
into the government of the United States. 
(2) Having severed the channel from which they derived 
authority, Brownson endeavors to discover a new channel through 
which authority may be derived. It cannot come from God through 
separate individuals, because individuals, again are equal. God 
has given to man no dominion over man. Further, authority 
obviously could not be derived through the written enactments 
existing in virtue of the authority of Britain. With the term-
ination of·the authority through which the written documents 
were authorized, they were no longer law. Thus individuals as 
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as such and any previously existing written documents are elimin 
ated of necessity for Brownson as a means whereby, or as channel 
through which, any new enactments might be legitimated. 
(3) Brownson solves the problem, of course, on the basis of 
his conception of authority as derived from God through the law 
of nature. It is given to the nation when it exists as such. It 
inheres in the people as an organism, fixed to a territory. The 
people are constituted a people by the presence of living insti-
tutions and traditions which are prior to, a.nd able to survive 
the destruction of, written documents. Thus with the termination 
of the war, authority, under God, inhered - not certainly in 
Americans as individuals - somewhere in the living organizations 
which persisted despite the termination of the authority of 
their written documents. 
This summary of Brownson's view, made in terms of a concret 
problem, indicates two things. First it indicates the reason 
for Brownson's doctrine that a nation de facto is a nation de 
jure. Second, it indicates that the problem confronting Brownson 
in the following chapters is not at all concerned with a justi-
fioation of the Revolutionary :lar. Furthermore, it cannot be a 
problem concerning the forms of government to be adopted, for 
he has maintained that the question of forms of government is 
an idle one. 
He has maintained that the most important characteristics 
of a state are precisely those which cannot be written down. 
Further, it is important to maintain institutions whioh have a 
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hold on the people, whiah grow and develop with them. It is 
important to maintain intaat the fundamental organization - the 
inherent, internal organization of the nation, and to keep the 
government in aonformity with it so that it may be invigor-
ated by the life blood of the nation itself. For this reason 
Brownson endeavors to present the basio nature of the organism 
he aalls the Ameriaan Republia. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE UNION OF STATES 
It has been noted in a previous ohapter that after the 
eleotion of 1840, Brownson's theory and the reality confronting 
him refused to harmonize. The infallible people had betrayed 
their birthright for a barrel of aider. Being thus rudely 
awakened, Brownson was driven to an examination of the princi-
ples upon whioh he had based his views. 
A somewhat similar situation confronted Brownson during 
the period preoeeding the oivil war. His oomments upon praoti-
oal affairs were based upon the principle that the Union is a 
oonfederaoy of independent states or nations. He notes later 
that "This view is simple, and is easily taken in, and we eon-
fees we held and defended it down almost to the breaking out of 
1 
the rebellion." As seooession threatened he found himself on 
the side of the Union. Here again was a situation in whioh his 
theory and the oonorete reality confronting him refused to 
harmonize. 
His procedure was similar to that followed in 1840. ~irst 
of all he tested his theory for consistency. He had reasoned 
1 XVII, 500. His exposition and defense of state rights is con-
tained principally in XVI. He followed, as is evident, the 
dootrine of Calhoun on this point. His oonneotion with Calho 
is indicated very well in Schlesinger, 114-124. 
- ,~~ -
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that if the states were in the beginning sovereign and inde-
pendent, then the relationship between state and union is that 
of the sovereign to his agent. He had supplied the fact that 
they were sovereign when they began their existence as states. 
The conclusion is inescapable. Finding no flaw in his reasoning, 
or that of Calhoun to which it is similar, his only alternative 
was to examine the fact which he had taken in and assumed to be 
true. 
Now the terms in which Brownson's investigation must be 
conducted have been indicated in the concludi~g remarks of the 
preceeding chapter. He has maintained that the formation of a 
nation or a people with a distinctive internal organization or 
constitution of its own is a process of growth and development 
rather than a production. On the basis of his theory, a people 
are constituted by the development of distinctive habits, cus-
toms, living traditions and institutions - not by the product-
ion of a written document. Consequently he is obliged to in-
vestigate the formative period of the nation, for this period 
reveals its radical and distinctive elements. 
In addition to this view Brownson has maintained that the 
government of the people must be rooted in these elements. It 
must retain them. If it does so it is envigorated by the life 
blood of the nation itself. If it tends to eliminate anything 
radical, it can be maintained only by physical force. Conse-
quently the conclusion of the investigation reveals Brownson's 
conception of the organic constitution to which the existing 
government must conform in order to maintain the Ameriaan 
Republic. 
The immediate results of Brownson's investigation, to the 
surprise of no one, reveals the fact that he had been wrong in 
assuming without a thorough investigation that the states were 
originally sovereign. In terms of vindicating either North or 
South, his arguments leading to that conclusion are unimportant. 
They are, however, indispensable for a comprehension of Brown-
son's interpretation of an existing reality. It is for this rea 
on that it is necessary to begin with his presentation of the 
argument for an original nation. 
Sinae it is Brownson's avowed purpose to discuss the organ 
ic constitution, which cannot be embodied completely in written 
documents, his case for union cannot rest entirely upon an 
interpretation of a document such as the Articles of Confedera-
tion. He concedes that those who formulated these documents 
looked upon the union as a oompaot between sovereign states. 
But he also remarks that these men, for the most part, looked 
upon the state itself as a oompaot entered into by sovereign 
individuals, as is evident in the statement that government 
2 
derives its legitimacy from the oonsent of the governed. 
Brownson argues that the mere faot that some individuals 
2 XVII, 486. 
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of the period viewed society in terms applicable only to a 
temperance society does not mean that the society called the 
state is really that kind of organizattmn. It is not a simple, 
voluntary association despite the fact that these men thought 
so. Likewise, the fact that some men thought they were forming 
a simple contract between sovereign states does not imply that 
their thoughts on the matter were in conformity with reality. 
The real intention of those in authority has something to do 
with the matter, but it is not the court of last resort beyond 
which there is no appeal. Consequently the crux of the issue is 
3 
the reality itself rather than previous interpretations of it. 
Thus there are in a sense two courts in which the case for 
an original union of states may be tried. One of these is ob-
viously the written documents, such as the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution as 
amended by the convention of 1787. However, to the extent that 
these documents embody the philosophy of those who framed them, 
such as the view that government derives its just powers from 
the consent of the governed, they include opinions or interpre-
tations of an existing situation. Since Brownson has questioned 
the philosophical basis of such opinion, he is led to question 
the opinions and interpretations of the founding fathers. Thus 
3 XVII, 575, 484. 
1 
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their opinions represent a court in which the case may be tried. 
but it does not represent the supreme court ~rom whose decision 
there is no appeal. The other court, the supreme court, is the 
existing situation itself independently of previous interpreta-
tions. 
Brownson states the case in commenting upon the philosophi-
cal judgment of the founding fathers. 
Men may have a good understanding of facts and 
yet fail utterly, and become grossly absurd, when 
they attempt to construct theories for their 
explanation. The question for us is, not what 
theories our fathers held with regard to the seat 
of the sovereign power, but where it was actually 
lodged as a matter of fact, for the fact overrides 
all theories on the subject. 4 
Brownson's view is of course based upon the doctrine pre-
sented in the preceeding chapter, that a nation de facto is a 
nation de jure. A nation derives authority from God by the fact 
that it exists and maintains itself. If an organized people 
institute civil government and exercise within and without t4e 
functions consequent upon a nation, they are by that very fact 
invested with authority. The rightfulness, or lack of it, by 
which a nation comes into existence is not the criterion for 
determining whether or not it has authority. 
This means first of all that Brownson is not required to 
justify the revolution by which the colonies acquired a status 
as a nation. The United States has legitimate authority regard-
4 XVII, 576. Of. also XVIII, 126. 
less of whether or not the revolution was justified.5It means 
secondly that since sovereignty is a fact and not a right prior 
to the fact, there is no~ priori ground on which it is possible 
to determine whether sovereingty existed in the states or in the 
6 
union. 
This means that Brownson must discount arguments designed 
to show an antecedent rightfulness of each state to sovereignty. 
There is no right prior to the fact of sovereignty. It means, 
too, that he must throw out of court arguments designed to show 
that each state thought it was sovereign and had the right to be 
, 
sovereign. The men who thought this way also thought that soci-
ety itself was composed of individuals who are sovereign in 
their own right. Accepting the theory that the state itself 
derives legitimate authority because sovereign individuals sur-
render rights to it, it was natural for them to speak of a union 
of states in terms of rights surrendered by sovereign states. 
Brownson's basis for asserting an original union of states 
is thus clearly defined: 
The historical fact determines who is the sovereign, 
who are the sovereign people, where, in a sovereign 
5 Of., for example, the following: "Whether they were justified 
or not in throwing off the authority of the British crown was 
a momentous question for them, but is none for us •••• " XVII, 
483. Referring to the same revolution he says, "We do not 
understand how any revolution can be effected by legal author-
ity. '1 XVII, 491. 
6 "There is no reason~ priori, that we know of, why the origin-
al British sovereignty could not have inured to the states 
severally. There was no positive law in force, or legal princi 
ple prohibiting it." XVII, 568. 
161 
nation, the sovereignty is lodged, and through what 
channels it is exercised; because the existenoe and 
constitution of the national sovereignty is an hist-
orical fact, anterior to all written constitutions 
and to all positive legislative enactments. What 
might ha~e been, what is desirable, should have been, 
are political and ethical questions, - very interest-
ing, very important, no doubt, but of no moment in 
determining what is. 7 
The facts which Brownson presents briefly are the following 
The original unit wf organization was the colony. Further, 
••• the colonies were mutually separate and independent 
political corporations, or, if you prefer, political 
communities before the Union existed, and, unless in 
the British people, did in no sense constitute one 
political community. We do not pretend, and do not 
recollect, that we ever have pretended, that, dis-
tinguished from their unity under the British crown 
and parliament, they were alwafs one political 
people •••• They were original y separate and mutual-
ly independent political communities. 8 
Another fact: The people acting through colonial organizations 
waged a war for independence. With the termination of the war, 
the sovereignty of Britain with reference to the colonies was 
terminated. The Crown was no longer the sovereign as a fact and 
consequently was not rightfully sovereign. But sovereignty did 
not lapse. It passed to those who won independence as a fact 
and as a matter of fact exercised it: 
Sovereignty never lapses, is never in abeyance, 
and the moment it ceases in one people it is 
renewed in another. The British sovereignty 
ceased in the colonies with independence, and 
the American took its place. Did the sovereignty, 
which before independence was in Great Britain, 
pass from Great Britain to the states severally, 
7 XVII, 168. 
8 XVII, 673. 
or to the state• united? It might have passed to 
them severally, but did it? There is no question 
of law or antecedent right in the ease, but a 
simple question of fact, and the faot is determined 
by determining who it was that assumed it, exer-
cised it, and has continued to exercise it. 8 
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Brownson maintains that the obvious fact of the matter is 
that people acting thro8gh colonial organizations waged the 
suooessful war for independence. It is further obvious that the 
colonial organizations did not merge to the extent that they 
lost their identity as distinct organizations; but it is equally 
obvious that they were not separated to the extent that they did 
not aot jointly. 
At this point it ~ust be noted that Brownson nowhere at-
tempts to explain why the colonies acted jointly. There is no 
intimation in his doctrine that the colonies united because of 
a mutual love for one another, or with the avowed intention of 
forming one nation. Nor is there an attempt made to disoover why 
the people were distributed into colonies whioh acted jointly: 
"How they became so united and so divided is o:f no consequence 
in determining what was or is the real constitution of the 
9 
American people." fhatever reasons may be alleged to explain 
it, the faot remains that people distributed into colonial 
organizations aoting jointly through these organizations waged 
a successful war. 
Having maintained that sovereignty was wrested from Britain 
8 XVIII, 111. 
9 XVII, 485. 
by the joint action of people existing in distinct political 
corporations, Brownson must endeavor to defend the thesis that 
it was exercised in the same way that it was secured. In his 
estimation a sovereign nation is one which maintains, within 
and without, the functions consequent upon every civilized 
nation. 
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Brownson is obliged to show first of all that with the 
termination of the war political authority remained in, and con-
tinued to be exercised by, distinct political corporations. 
Secondly, he his obliged to show that these political corpora-
tiona continued to act jointly. No one of these distinct com-
munities exercised and continued to exercise de facto the 
functions consequent upon a civilized nation. Consequently they 
were never independent nations de facto, and therefore not de 
jure. 
Brownson argues that after independence the states contin-
ued to exercise the functions formerly performed by them as col-
onies. There was therefore a continuity of function from colony 
to successfully rebelled colony or state. The people who re-
belled through distinct organizations continued to act through 
distinct communities after the rewellion. Consequently it is 
certain that "••• the political people of the United States have 
never existed as a consolidated mass, without organization or 
distribution into separate and mutually dependent states, 
10 
corporations, or political societies." 
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It is equally oertain that the individual state has never 
proved its ability to maintain civil government as a sovereign 
nation by fulfilling within and without the functions conse-
11 
quent upon suoh a nation. The functions which it has failed to 
exercise as a fact are those which conoern its relationShip to 
foreign powers, such as the negotiation of treaties and the 
12 
right to declare war. Thus, "••• bating a few irregularities 
not to be counted, ••• " individual states have never existed 
and maintained themselves as individual nations fulfilling all 
13 
of the functions consequent upon sovereignty. 
Brownson argues therefore that there is a continuity of 
function from Crown to individual-states-acting-jointly. In 
terms of a federal government, which at this point represents 
whatever allianoe existed among the states, this means that the 
federal government performed the functions formerly reserved to 
the crown. Thus the funotion by reason of which the colony it-
self lacked complete political authority, Which is the distinct 
ive characteristic of a sovereign nation, is also lacking in 
the successfully rebelled colony or the state considered 
10 XVII, 565. 
11 XVIII, 109. 
12 XVI, 566; XVIII, 109. 
13 XVI, 485. The few irregularities probably refer to those 
instances in which some states attempted to negotiate 
treaties. 
14 
separately. 
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Consistently with his theory of the organic constitution, 
which maintains that the formation of a state is a process of 
growth and development, Brownson does not and cannot maintain 
that a nation emerged from the struggle for independence with 
15 
institutions fully formed and developed. Consequently he does 
not and oannot maintain that there was a clearly defined line 
of demarcation between federal and state governments as early 
as 1776. For this reason irregularities existin8 during that 
period, or a confusion as to the precise function of each 
organization, are to be discounted, for these lines of demarca-
tion are part of the development and formation of the nation. 
Thus he describes the period immediately following 1776 as a 
transitional period during whioh the nation was struggling for 
possession of the faculties whereby it oould maintain its 
existence. 
In its struggle to maintain itself, the people, acting 
through colonial organizations, adopted the Articles of Oonfed 
eration. The congress under it failed. It was acknowledged as 
a failure. The very fact of failure proves that the Articles o 
14 XVII, 566-672. Of, eg., the following: "The political 
rights of the states hold from or continue the political 
rights of the colonies while the Union inherits and contin-
ues the political rights or sovereignty held by the British 
Crown, prior to Independence." XVII, 666. 
16 XVII, 493; XVIII, 113. 
Confederation were not in harmony with the needs and wants of 
the people. If they had met and had continued to meet the cir-
cumstances which confronted the people, thore wo~ld have been 
'10 .need t::> ::~.jc;1ct them. Their failure is consequently conclu-
sive proof of the fact that the central government authorized 
16 
under them was too weak. 
In terms of Brownson's organic constitution, the doctrine 
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presented thus far means that the Union began with the distri-
bution of people into distinct colonies under the Crown. While 
dependent upon the Crown the people began to act jointly 
through colonial organizations. The instinct or habit of acting 
jointly in this way was strengthened by the struggle for inde-
pendence. Circumstances necessitated concerted action for sue-
cess. 
The instinct for concerted action which the people had 
developed, while present at the termination of the conflict, 
was not clearly recognized by the people themselves. Thus they 
formed a central government without taking into consideration 
the instinct for joint action which had already been formed. 
It was doomed to failure because it was not constructed in 
accordance with the needs and customs of the people who had to 
live under it. The fact that it was not in accord with the 
16 "The Artioles of Confederation, it is well known, proved a 
failure, did not meet the wants of the country, and pre-
cisely because they left the oen tral government too weak." 
XVII, 487; XVIII, 113. 
with the needs and wants of the people is proved by the fact 
that it failed. 
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Powers were more clearly defined under the institutions 
adopted subsequently. Individual states retained jurisdiction 
over particular interests, the general government over general 
affairs. Being incomplete, neither government performed the 
functions of a sovereign by itself. Consequently both govern-
ments are necessary for complete authority which is the distinct-
ive characteristic of a nation. The fact that such an arrange-
ment is in harmony with the basic structure and needs of the 
people is proved by its success. 
Thus Brownson contends that it was a people acting jointly 
through colonial organizations who waged and won the war for 
independence. It was a people acting jointly through state organ-
izations who proved themselves capable of performing within and 
without the functions consequent upon a civilized nation. Both 
particular commun~ties and communities acting jointly are integ-
ral parts of the American Republic. Thus states are sovereign 
l!l 
in union or joint action but not in separation. 
17 The following brief passage is cited to illustrate Brownson's 
argument on this point. "••• if the English colonies, now the 
United States, had separately declared and won their inde-
pendence, they would unquestionably have become separately 
independent states, each invested by the law of nature with 
all the rights and powers of a sovereign nation. But they did 
not do this. They declared and won their independence jointly, 
and have since existed and exercised sovereignty only as 
states united, or the United States, that is, states sovereign 
in their union, but not in their separation. This is of it-
self decisive of the whole question. XVIII, 110. 
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Brownson is somewhat vague in regard to the point at which 
sovereignty lapsed in Britain and became a fact in the United 
States: 
Independence was declared in 1776, but it was 
not a fact till 1782, when the preliminary treaty 
acknowledging it was signed at Paris. Till then 
the United States were not an independent nation; 
they were only a people struggling to become an 
independent nation. Prior to that preliminary 
treaty, neither the Union nor the states severally 
were sovereign. The articles were agreed on in 
Congress in 1777, but they were not ratified by 
all the states till May, 1781, and in 1782 the 
movement was commenced in the legislature of New 
York for their amendment. Till the organization 
under the constitution ordained by the people of 
the United States in 1787, and which went into 
operation in 1789, the United States had in 
reality only a provisional government, and it was 
not till then that the national government was 
definitely organized, and the line of demarcation 
between the general government and the particular 
state governments was fixed. 18 
Before proceeding with Brownson's exposition of the 
union of states it is necessary to note that he attempts to 
gain additional support for his case by an interpretation of 
historical documents. Of his rather ingenious comments in 
this regard the following is typical. He says that the framers 
of the original articles of confederation called it "confed-
eration, but only because they had not attained to full con-
sciousness of themselves; and that they really meant union, 
not confederation, is evident from their adopting, as the 
official style of the nation or new power, united, not confed 
18 XVIII, 113. 
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erate states."19 
A part of this statement is tenable inasmuch as the people 
who were required to meet rather pressing problems immediately 
after the war did not recognize clearly the extent of the joint 
action required to win the war and to maintain themselves. Thus 
the statement that the people had not attained to full con-
sciousness of their institutions is tenable. Yet when Brownson 
adds that 11they really meant union" and not confederation, he 
is clearly making a statement for which he can have no factual 
evidence. One would begin to suspect that Brownson had no in-
sight into the minds of these men and consequently had no way 
of determining what they really meant or did not mean. 
Brownson's position with regard to an interpretation of 
these documents is indicated in the following: 
There can be little doubt that the strongest 
nationalists in 1787, if they had been asked 
where was our political sovereignty prior to 
the adoption of the federal constitution, 
would have answered, in the states, or the 
people of the states, severally; and would 
have maintained, if pressed, that the national 
sovereignty they asserted was created by the 
surrender of a certain portion of the rights 
of the states to the general government. The 
possibility of such surrender nobody questioned, 
and nobody saw anything absurd in the assertion 
at once of the sovereignty of the Union and of 
the states severally •••• Even in the preamble 
to the declaration of independence, by the congress 
of 1776, we find the assertion that "government 
derives its just powers from the consent of 
the governed.n Holding this doctrine, the 
statesmen of 1787 could concede without difficulty 
19 XVIII, 116. 
that the states, or the people of the states 
severally, were sovereign prior to the adoption 
of the federal constitution, and yet deny them 
to be sovereign afterwards •••• To oonoede the 
original sovereignty of the states severally, 
and then to deny the right of seooession, is 
simply to outrage common sense. 20 
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With this view of the philosophy prevailing at the time, 
Brownson says it is necessary and important to take suoh a 
factor into consideration in interpreting these historical docu-
ments. It is olear that the convention of 1787 recognized the 
faot that states had been acting jointly or in cooperation with 
one another, for one of its purposes was "to p~ovide for a~ 
perfect union." Brownson argues therefore that if there had 
been no union or joint action whatsoever, " • • • it would not and 21 
would not have spoken of providing for a E!2.!! perfect union." 
In view of the faot that Brownson maintains that a oonven-
tion does not "institute or constitute society he maintains that 
the words "to provide for a more perfect union" should be inter-
preted to mean that the convention of 1787 recognized the faot 
that there were states, that these states had.been acting joint-
ly or in union with one another, and that it was necessary to 
provide a government whioh would express more perfectly the join 
action whioh had always been present. 
Brownson's oase for an original union, however, is based 
2m XVII, 561-563. 
21 XVIII, 120. 
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primarily on the assertion that it was states acting jointly 
who declared independence and fought for it, It was states act-
ing jointly who exercised and maintained that oomplete authority 
which is the distinctive characteristic of a sovereign. 
In terms of Brownson's organic constitution this means that 
the fundamental ge1·minal organization present in America was a 
unity in diversity - states ani a union of states. This is the 
original organic constitution of the American Republic, 
With the recognition of independence and the subsequent 
illegality of existing documents, this fundamental organization 
of the people remained, Consequently sovereignty passed to the 
states in union. Being invested with authority the organized 
people were authorized to enact legal documents. Being the act 
of a political sovereign, these documents are binding. They are 
22 
the legitimate enactments of a sovereign. 
Thus far the basis on which Brownson expands his meaning 
of the constitution, both organic and written, has been estab-
lished, Brownsonls conception of its merits is a lofty one. 
Before proceeding with his exposition, it is necessary to dis-
cover the respective roles assigned to providence, and the 
statesmen whose philosophy he has berated in the fonnation of 
both the written and organic constitution. 
First of all the elements from which the organic union of 
22 XVIII, 113, 
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states developed - that is, the presence of colonies acting 
jointly - is not the product of human wisdom, foresight or de-
liberation. The organism called the union of states is provi-
dential, "••• as much the work of Providence as the existence 
23 
in the human body of the living solidarity of its members." 
Brownson does not hesitate to say that this Union is the 
best possible system for the American people. Although it is the 
best it is not mandatory therefore that it should be supported: 
When we place the obligation to support our 
institutions on the notion we may have that 
they are the best, we give them only an in-
tellectual basis, and can enlist only the 
intellect in their behalf; but when we demand 
obedience to them on the ground that they are 
the law, we base them on morality, and place 
them under the protection of religion. We 
demand then obedience as a duty, not merely as 
a sound judgment, and make loyalty not merely 
a sentiment, but a virtue. 24 
Although it may not appear such, Brownson's praise of the 
statesmen of 1787 is genuine. Their genius is to be found in the 
fact that they were, for the most part, guided by reality in-
stead of their own speculations. They had the good sense to 
adopt existing institutions. To the extent that they were guided 
by reality they wrote well: 
The merit of the statesmen of 1787 is that 
they did not destroy or deface the work of 
Providence, but accepted it, and organized 
the government in harmony with the real 
order, the real elements given them. They 
23 XVIII, 127. 
24 XV, 558. 
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suffered themselves in all their positive 
substantial work to be governed by reality, 
not by theories and speculations. In this 
they proved themselves statesmen, and their 
work survives. 25 
For a more thorough comprehension of Brownaon 1 s stand on 
these points it is now advisable to invest;gate his exposition 
in the American Republic. In it he maintains that the American 
Republic is the best practical solution of the problems con-
fronting the political philosopher, not only with reference to 
~ 
the reconciliation of liberty and authority, but also to the 
problem of the relationship between church and state. 
25 XVIII, 139-140. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
Brownson's exposition of the nature of the Ameriaan Repub-
lic is for him the most important part of his political phil-
osophy. There is no complete authority except in the union of 
states. Consequently the American Republic is an organism 
whose immediate members are states. Thus individuals are member 
of the organism only inasmuch as they are members of states. 
Since the people constituted a nation by the union of 
states are by that fact sovereign, they are authorized to insti 
tute government or to modify the existing government. It is 
their privilege as sovereign. In America the distinctive organ 
1 
for the exercise of authority is the convention. 
It is quite obvious however, that for Brownson a conven-
tion called at random, appealing to the people as a consolii&*e 
mass irrespective of state organization, does not represent 
supreme political authority. He has just shown that the poli-
tical people exist only as distributed into distinct but insep-
arable units. They have authority to ordain and institute 
government only as assembled through states in union with other 
states. 
1 XVIII, 116. 
- , '7f\ -
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For Brownson, therefore, the traditional phrase "We the 
people of the United States" is very expressive. It places 
authority exactly where it is located: in the people of states 
united. The phrase "in convention jointly assembled" is also 
expressive because it indicates the distinctive organ through 
which the sovereign speaks and commissions the agencies whereby 
he exercises complete authority. 
The convention is really the fundamental government of the 
country because it is the immediate organ of the sovereign. Thus 
the government of the country, as its sovereignty, is one and 
indivisible. The sovereign exercises his functions through two 
mediums, a general government and particular state governments. 
This division of powers is according to Brownson dis-
tinctively American. It is found nowhere else in the world and 
is similar to no previously existing form of government. It is 
this distinctiTe feature. which is the glory of the American 
2 
system. Thus it must be investigated more carefully. 
First of all, the division of power is not between a 
national and a state government. This is to imply that one is 
the sovereign government while the other is subject, which is 
inadmissable because sovereignty passed to the states united. 
If one alone were sovereign, it would be the sole, complete 
government of the country. Therefore the governments are coord-
inate. The respective spheres of each are defined. They are 
2 XVIII, 189. 
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both dependent upon the sovereign who instituted them, but not 
upon each other. Consequently each is supreme within ita own 
sphere. The basis of division is more properly between a general 
government controlling all matters of common interest and a 
particular government having jurisdiction over the particular 
3 
relations of individuals. One must be careful to understand 
exactly what is meant by general and particular welfare: 
The private welfare of each is, no doubt, for 
the welfare of all, but not therefore is it the 
"general welfare,"for what is private, particular 
in its nature, is not and cannot be general. To 
understand by general welfare that which is for 
the individual welfare of all or the greater 
number would be to claim for the general govern-
ment all the :powers of government, and to deny 
that very division of powers which is the crowning 
merit of the American system. The general welfare, 
by the very force of the words themselves, means 
the common as distinguishable from the private 
or individual welfare. 4 
Understood in this way it is clear that the American system 
does not have its basis in a system of checks and balances which 
obstruct the exercise of power in order to guard against its 
abuses. There is a division of power itself rather than mutually 
antagonistic powers. There is no attempt mo make forces collide, 
but there is an attempt to make them operate in different spheres 
in order to prevent collision. This provides for the exercise of 
power while at the same time it very obviously provides an 
effective check against the abuse of power or ita excessive 
3 XVIII, 131. 
4 XVIII, 136. 
centralization. The general government cannot oppress the pri-
vate rights of individuals because they are withdrawn from its 
jurisdiction. In regard to these the states themselves govern 
5 
supremely. 
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Furthermore, the particular state government cannot oppress 
the individual because the same division of power is carried on 
into the heart of the state itself. In some states, more than 
others, the division is carried on by means of counties, town 
corporations, cities and similar institutions, each of whioh is 
entrusted with the jurisdiction of affairs that are purely local. 
There is therefore little danger of excessive centralization of 
power within the state itself. 
Understood in this way, the American system is unique. It 
has no exact prototype in any previously existing system. Refer-
ring to the English system of checks and balances he says: 
The principle of the British constitution is 
not the division of the powers of government, 
but the antagonism of estates, or rather of 
interests, trusting to the obstructive influ-
ence of that antagonism to preserve the govern-
ment from pure c~ntralism. Hence the study of 
the British statesman is to merge diverse and 
antagonistic parties and interests so as to 
gain the ability to act, whioh he can do only 
by intrigue, cajolery, bribery in one form or 
another, and corruption of every sort. 6 
Commenting upon what he believes to be its opposite, French 
imperialism, he says: 
5 XVIII, 139. 
6 XVIII, 130. 
The emperor confessedly holds his power 
by the grace of God and the will of the 
nation, which is a clear acknowledgement 
that the sovereignty vests in the French 
people as the French state; but the imper-
ial constitution, which is the constitution 
of the government, not of the state, studies, 
while acknowledging the sovereignty of the 
people, to render it nugatory, by transfer-
ring it, under various subtle iisguises, 
to the government, and practically to the 
emperor as chief of government. 7 
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Brownson*s purpose in introducing both the English and the 
French systems is to show that they represent extremes. The 
English system as he represents it guards against the abuse of 
power by obstructing its exercise on the basis of mutually 
antagonistic interests. He remarks that if these checks and 
balances were perfect, there would be no exercise of power what-
soever. Practically, however, it is not perfect. At one time 
certain interests combine to get the upper hand, while after a 
time possession is secured by other interests. Imperialism, on 
the other hand, tends to an excessive concentration of power. 
The American system is represented as combining the best 
features of both and is consequently superior to either. It pre-
serves unity without concentrating power. It provides for the 
exercise of power without setting up antagonistic interests to 
8 
obstruct it. 
A further examination of this distinctively American sys-
tem discloses the fact that "It is not a constitutional monarch~ 
7 XVIII, 128. 
8,XVIII, 128-130. 
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not a constitutional aristocracy, but, perhaps, may be defined, 
with sufficient accuracy, a constitutional democracy, although 
the terms are to us a little incongruous. We would, if the thing 
were possible, exclude the word democracy altogether, as unnec-
9 
essary and apt to mislead.n 
However Brownson remarks in the same place that it is 
apparently "••• too late to get rid of the .term." Consequently 
he takes the position that if people will insist upon adopting 
the term, he may as well tell them what their system means in 
terms of democracy. It is not, however, without a snort of scorn 
for the term itself that he makes this concession. 
Brownson says that the only democracy compatible with Amer-
ican institutions is what he calls territorial democrracy. It is 
this conception of territorial democracy based upon the theory 
of an original union that gives him some claim to originality as 
a politiaal philosopher. It is aonsequently necessary to invest-
igate it carefully, because it is for him the most important 
10 
part of his analysis of the American Republic. 
9 XVII, 484. 
10 Brownson himself does not claim originality in regard to this 
doctrine. He says that he derived it from hints and suggest-
ions in the work of John c. Hurd, The Law of Freedom and 
Bondage in the United States, XVIII, 3. His son, Henry F. 
Brownson, claims that it is original with Orestes. Maynard, 
345, seems to share that opinion. Whatever else may be said, 
it is certain that Hurd does not present the viiw as Brownson 
does. Brownson's constitutional theory, baaed as it was upon 
Leroux, Plato, De Maiatre, et al, represents a synthesis 
that is definitely his own.----
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Brownson states simply that American or territorial democ-
racy means that the right to participate in the exercise of 
authority is derived from the territory: 
The great body of freemen have the elective 
franchise, but no one has it save in his 
state, his county, his town, his ward, his 
precinct. Out of the election district in 
whioh he is domiciled, a citizen of the United 
States has no more right to vote than has the 
citizen or subject of a foreign state. 11 
This statement merely means that the right to vote is not 
a personal right. Since it is not personal, it is not nomadic. 
Since a person cannot wander about, voting whenever and where-
ever he pleases, the political power which is represented by the 
vote cannot come from him as a person. It must be confined to or 
based upon a place or a territory. 
The doctrine that the right to vote is derived from terri-
tory is merely the particular application of a doctrine that has 
been established in Brownson's view on the origin of authority. 
In his analysis of the civil as opposed to the barbaric order, 
he has indicated that the state must be a res Eublica. Otherwise 
its authority is, and can be, only personal - a private right 
or privilege. Being personal it is therefore arbitrary, despotic 
in principle, and therefore illegitimate. It implys that man 
has dominion over man, which is inadmissable because all men are 
naturally equal. 
Since the right to vote is the right to exercise political 
11 XVIII, 152. 
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authority, it is erroneous, strictly speaking, to refer to it as 
a right, for political authority is, and oan be, only a publio 
trust. Being a trust, the extension of suffrage cannot be advo-
cated on the ground that it is a natural right of men, or that 
12 
it is the right of every person because he is a person. It in-
heres in the ~ publica as an organism to be exercised for the 
welfare of the whole. Consequently the society called the state 
may extend or restrict suffrage in order to secure its own wel-
fare. In the case of the American Republic, the organic people 
enacted written constitutions determining who may vote and the 
conditions upon which he may vote. Since these constitutions 
were enacted by an organic independent people who had the right 
to enact them, they are law. 
The constitution, however, provides for its own amendment. 
Such amendments are of course legal if they are amended in the 
manner prescribed by the constitution. The political people 
determined by the constitution may extend or restrict suffrage 
if in their judgment it is for .the best interests of society to 
do so. 
In Brownson 1 s estimation it would be illogical on the part 
of the Ameri"an people to refuse, for example, to extend suf-
frage to negroes or to impose restrictions in terms of wealth. 13 
12 XVIII, 193. 
13 XVIII, 191-194. 
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the Ameri~an Republic has in its radiaal constitution no ele-
ments of royalty, hereditary nobility, racial discrimination, or 
class distinction in terms of wealth. In addition, property has 
enough advantage in itself without making it a basis for voting. 
He did not, however, advocate the indiscriminate extension 
of suffrage. Negroes, for example, should first prove themselves 
capable of maintaining themselves as free men before being en-
trusted with the ballot. He opposed, and one might add rather 
vehemently, the extension of suffrage to women on the ground 
that it would be to no one's advantage to permit them to enter 
the political arena: 
The vary fact that woman is the weaker vessel ••• 
renders her lass morally independent, lass frank, 
open and straightforward, and in a contest with 
man, compels her to resort to art, artifice, 
intrigue, in which alone she can equal or surpass 
him. Her accession to the political body could, 
therefore, only introduce an additional element 
of political and moral corruption. 14 
Besides that, man does not separate his own interests from 
those of women; consequently she cannot claim the privilege of 
voting on the ground that it is necessary to protect her own 
. 
interests: "He always includes in his private interest that of 
some woman; and if he cheats, robs, steals, swindles, gives or 
takes bribes, it is almost always for the sake of his Eve, or 
15 
at least for the sake of his family." 
This brief survey of Brownson's view of suffrage indicates 
14 XVIII, 402. 
15 XVIII, 403. 
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that he was not opposed to the simple idea that the people 
should have a voice in the government. He maintains, however, 
that this voioe in government must find expression only in and 
through the constitution. This constitution, it has been noted, 
is based upon distinot but inseparable units. The presenoe of 
these units rendered practical a system in which the power of 
government is decentralized without checks and balances to ob-
struct the exercise of power. In order to retain intact this 
desirable arrangement, Brownson contends that democracy must be 
continued mn its teritorial basis. Each state must continue to 
be attaohed to its own distinct territory, and to exercise auth-
16 
ority over the affairs pertaining to it. 
Opposed to the conception of authority as attaohed to and 
inseparable from territory is the conception that it is attached 
17 
to persons. Suoh authority is essentially despotic. It gives 
power to govern without the right to govern. Its despotism is 
manifested either in individualism, or in humanitarianism or :' 
18 
sooialism. Brownson believed that both of these trends were 
manifesting themselves in the politioal currents of the day. 
While, theoretically, the trend toward personal or indivi-
dualistic democracy, ending ultimately in anarohy, is as danger-
ous as humanitarian democracy, Brownson believed that the danger 
16 XVIII, 178. 
17 XVIII, 178. 
18 XVIII, 178. 
of an individualistic trend had been checked effectively by the 
civil war. There is no further danger that the union will be 
broken by the undue assumption of authority by the individual 
states: "The danger to American democracy from that quarter is 
forever removed, and democracy a la Rousseau has received a 
terrible defeat throughout the world, though as yet it is far 
19 
from being aware of it." 
Brownson believed that the danger from the other quarter 
20 
was muoh more imminent. With the termination of the war he 
wrote that the Union victory would be interpreted as a victory 
for reformers fighting for social equality. Thus the movement 
for social reform would be stimulated temporarily at least 
21 
throughout the world. The pendulum would swing away from indi-
vidualism and toward the other extreme. 
Regarding its immediate effects in the United States he 
writes that the Union victory will resUlt in a tendency toward 
humanitarianism or consolidation, both within individual states 
and among the states themselves. He notes however that "The 
19 XVIII. 184. 
20 Writing in 1857 he tells us that in the event of a war be-
tween north and south, all other issues would be forgotten: 
n ••• the party opposed to slavery extension will then, in 
spite of all that can be said, be an abolition party, and 
the cry will be 'freedom to the slave'•••• The south ~an 
not afford to provoke such a conflict, for in it the moral 
sense of the civilized world would be with the north, which 
would be cheered as the champion of freedom." XVII, 65. 
21 XVIII, 186. 
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constitution, in the distribution of the powers of government, 
provides the states severally with ample means to protect their 
individuality against the centralizing tendency of the general 
• 22 
government, however strong it may be." 
He writes further, that along with the tendency to central 
ize power in the general government is the tendency to central-
ize it in the hands of the executive. States, he believed, 
would always retain their identity. But during the civil war it 
was necessary to confer almost dictatorial powers upon the 
presiQent - powers he was unwilling to relinguish with the term 
ina tion of the v•ar: "The danger that the general government wil 
usurp the rights of the states is far less than the danger that 
the executive will usurp all the powers of congress and the 
23 
judie iary. Continuing, he says that ncongress clothed the . 
president with dictatorial powers for war· purposes only, but 
the executive forgets this." 
It has been indicated in the discussion of the democratic 
theory that this centralizing tendency is inevitable, according 
to Brownson, it the proposition is defended, in simple unequi-
vocal terms, that the people must rule, that they have the 
natural right to vote, that their opionion must be consulted on 
every issue. Such appeals are and can be made only to the 
people as a mass of individuals in which case they are no more 
22 XVIII, 186. 
23 XVIII, 189. 
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sovereign than the people of a foreign state. Furthermore, the 
opinion to whioh appeals are made is, in Brownson's estimation, 
seldom anything but a oompound of ignoranoe, prejudice, passion 
caprice, and interest, constantly varying, condemning a Socrate 
one day to drink hemlock, and the next erecting a temple to his 
24 
memory. This direct appeal to the people in their oapaoity as 
individuals is vicious. Representatives ask not, what is just, 
what is right, but what will my constituents say? Opinion is 
thus the ultimate criterion of right. This is political atheism 
In Brownson's estimation a society based upon the concept-
ion that people have the right to rule is based upon the false-
hood that dominion over man is attached to man. The pendulum 
of such a sooiety must swing from individualism to socialism, 
egoism to humanitarianism, anarchy to oaesarism. Amerioan soci-
ety oannot be attaohed to suoh a pendulum. 
It is in opposition to this oonception of authority that 
Brownson proposes his theory of territorial demooraoy. The 
people who are the politioal people are determined by the oon-
stitution, whioh is a law above the people beoause it is enaote 
by a sovereign. The constitution determines further the extent 
to which, and the conditions under which, the political people 
may function. Under that oonstitution authority is oonfined to 
a definite place. ~eople acting through the constitution of the 
24 XV, 204. 
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place are sovereign in it; they perform the functions of a sov-
ereign by controlling domestic affairs. Any one not domiciled in 
it has no more authority in it than the resident of a foreign 
state. It is the people of distinct places acting jointly under 
the constitution who are the sovereign people. Thus territorial 
democracy is the only democracy compatible with both the organic 
and written constitutions of the American Republic. 
Brownson admits that a conaeption of a people who are one 
and many is a difficult one. He admits that the conception of a 
territory which is one but nevertheless distinct is a difficult 
conception. It is a conception of a society that resembles, more 
closely than any other society, the Trinity. In these passages 
Brownson takes a very lofty view of the American Republic: 
God is the author and type of all created 
things: and all creatures, each in its order, 
imitates or copies the divine being, who is 
intrinsically Father, Son, and Holy Ghost •••• 
In the Holy Trinity is the principle and proto-
type of all society, and what is called the 
solidarity of the race is only the outward 
expression, or copy in the external order, of 
what theologians term the cirouminsession of 
the three divine persons in the Godhead. 
Now, human society, when it copies the 
divine essence and nature either in the dis-
tinction of persons.alone, or in the unity 
alone, is sophistical, and wants the principle 
of all life and reality. 
The English system which is based on 
antagonistic elements, on opposites, ••• copies 
the divine model in its distinctions alone, 
which, considered alone, are opposites and 
contraries. It denies, if Englishmen ooUld see 
it, the unity of God. The French, or imperial 
system ••• denies the distinctions in the model, 
and copies only its unity, which is the supreme 
sophism called pantheism. The English system tends 
to pure individualism; the French to pure 
18' r-----------------------------------------------------~ 
socialism or despotism, each endeavoring to 
suppress an element of the one living and in-
dissoluble TRUTH. 25 
Brownson points out, of course, that the unity in diversity 
of the American system resembles more closely the model or pro-
totype of society than either of the other systems. It is the 
original, inherent unity in diversity that rendered practical thE 
division of power that is the distinctive feature of Americran 
republicanism: 
The special merit of the Ameriaan system is not 
in its democracy alone, as too many at home·and 
abroad imagine; but along with its democracy in 
the division of powers of government between a 
general government and particular state govern-
ments, which are not antagohistio governments, 
for they act on different matters, and neither is 
or can be subordinated to the other. 26 
At this point one begins to wonder why Brownson has neglect 
ed throughout his discussion of the merits of American republic-
anism to introduce the religious factor. He has maintained that 
individual liberty and public authority cannot meet harmoniously 
without the presence of infallible authority to define their 
respeotive spheres. As a matter of fact, Brownson devotes a very 
small portion of his work to a discussion af the relationship 
27 
between ohuroh and state in America. 
The reason for this is the fact that Brownson endeavors to 
show that the Amer~an Republic is based upon principles which 
25 XVIII, 203-204. 
26 XVIII, 205. 
27 Less than 22 of 222 pages are devoted in the American Republic 
to a discussion of the plaae of the church in the Ameriaan 
system. 
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are oatholio, universal. It recognizes the supremacy of the 
spiritual order whioh is all that Brownson would ask of any 
state. He has maintained that the ohuroh and state are distinot; 
they derive authority through different channels. As external 
corporations they are distinct, each having its own function. 
Being distinot, they should not be intermingled, the one with 
2$ 
the other. 
Brownson does not attempt to establish the fact that the 
founding fathers were favorable or unfavorable to Catholioity. 
It has been indicated already that the private opinions of the 
founding fathers are of no consequence whatsoever in determining 
what is and what is not. What they thought of the matter is a 
question that may be interesting, important to many people, but 
not so to Brownson. 
He says that de faoto many religious seats and denomina-
tions of one sort or another were present at the birth of the 
nation. As a matter of faot, however, none of these seats 
" • • • 
have been able to get their ~eouliarities incorporated into its 
~~ 
constitutions or its laws." Whatever reasons may be alleged to 
explain the fact, nothing that is narrow, sectarian, bigoted, 
has been incorporated into the constitution. The nation neither 
adopted nor recognized the merits of one religion as opposed to 
another. If any attempt were made now to establish a seat as the 
religion of the nation, it would only "••• array all the other 
s~ xviii, 216 
29 XVIII, 212. 
29 
sects as well as the church herself against the government." 
Another fact is that the state professes to be founded on, 
191 
and to recognize, rights which are above it, anterior to it; 
these are called the "rights of man," among which are the tradi-
tional "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."These right~ 
however, are grounded on the spiritual order. They are derived 
from God, as are all other rights. In recognizing, for all prac-
tical purposes, that these rights are above it, held independ-
ently of it, the state n••• acknowledges in reality, if not in 
form, as its basis, as its very foundation, not only the inde-
30 
pendence, but the supremacy of the spiritual order." 
Brownson is endeavoring to show that the nation does not 
feel itself free to destroy this religion or that, to im~ose 
this or that sectarian view as obligatory. There is rather a 
practical recognition of the fact that it is obliged to respect 
and to protect equally the religious convictions of its citizens~ 
~hus it protects Catholics in the exercise of their religion. 
It protects their pro~erty from violence just as it does that of 
any sect. It recognizes and protects the right of the church to 
form and to direct the conscience of her subjects, to speak 
31 
freely and to exert whatever influence she is able to exert. 
The relations between the church and state in America are 
29 XVIII, 217. 
30 XVIII, 231. 
31 XVIII, 216. 
nearly normal in the estimation of Brownson. The fact that they 
are normal is evinced by the lack of treaties and concordats, 
which are needed only where there is an attempt o~ the part of 
the stste to interfere with the church. He coneledes that suoh 
oonoordats are neoessary in other states, and if they were brok-
en it oould be interpreted to mean that the state oould do what-
aver it pleased with the church, her property and the religious 
oonvictions of her citizens. The very faot that there are oon-
cordats shows that all is not well and that oonoessions must be 
exacted to remedy an evil. Suelh treaties are unnecessary in the 
United States because the conditions necessary for the ohurch 
to exert her influence are already adopted in the constitution 
of the nation. 
192 
This errangement, while practical nowhere else, is in it-
self better than any other oonceivable arrangement for the churcl, 
If she is the official religion of a state, political and eccle-
siastical affairs tend to be inextricably interwoven. Ecclesi-
astical appointments sometimes neceasitate state clearance beforE 
becoming effective. Subsequently to appointment, clerics must 
devote considerable time to purely political affairs, thus rend-
ering less effective their spiritual ende~vors. Purely civil act~ 
are sometimes attributed to the church as part of her policy. 
Existing and flourishing in a monarchy, she is viewed as favorinE 
monarohial as opposed to republioan forms. Being involved in 
politioal affairs she is to an extent dependent upon political 
powers in order to operate. To the extent that she is thus 
19~ 
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dependent, the state may and often does use her to promote its 
'32 
own ends. 
It is in opposition to this confusion that the American 
system depicted by Brownson stands out in clear contrast. The 
principles necessary for the church to exert her influence are 
adopted not by treaties or concordats, or by a mixture of civil 
and ecclesiastical powers, but in the constitution itself. There 
is no mutual antagonism or distrust requiring concordats to esta-
blish spheres of church and state. Thus Brownson says: 
Where there is nothing in the state hostile 
to the church, where she is free to act according 
to her own constitution and laws, and exercise 
her own discipline on her own spiritual subjects, 
civil enactments in her favor .or Against the 
sects may embarrass or impede her operatio~s, 
but cannot aid her, for she can advance no 
further than sae wins the hearts and convinces 
the understanding. A spiritual work can, in the 
nature of things, be effected only by spiritual 
means. 33 
The relations between the church and state are not normal 
in any other nation in the world becau~e the American Republic 
is the only modern, civilized state tha.t is grounded in reality 
in the recognition of the fact that there are rights which it as 
a state cannmt touch. It is, in a word, the only state which is 
so constituted that the state may trust the church and the dhurru 
is free to work without the interference of the state. 
32 XIII, 127-146. 
33 XVIII, 217. 
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Suah being the case, no sensible Catholict 
aan imagine that the church needs any phy-
sical force against the sects •••• What are 
called religious establishments are needed 
only where either the state is barbarous or 
the religion is sectarian. Where the state, 
in its intrinsic constitution, is in accord-
ance with catholio prinaiples, as is in the 
United States, the church has all she needs 
or can receive. 34 
At this point BrONnson 1 s conception of ohuroh and state ia 
AmerXra are more clearly defined. There is no separation in tke 
sense that the state is above the church and feels free to do 
with her whatever pleases its fanoy. They are separate as ex-
ternal governing bodies, which is good because an attempt to 
establish here by law would 
••• only weaken her as against the seats, 
place her in a false light, partially justify 
their hostility to her, render effective their 
declrunations against her, mix her up unnecessarily 
with political changes, interests, and passions, 
and distract the attention of her ministers from 
their proper work as churchmen, and impose on 
them the duties of politicians and statesmen. 35 
Also at this point it is necessary to introduce his con-
ception of the union of church and state. He says that although 
the church and state are separate as external governing bodies, 
they are "••• united in the interior principles from which each 
derives its vitality and force. Their union is in the intrinsic 
unity of principle, and in the fact that, though moving in dif-
!6 
ferent spheres, each obeys one and the same divine law." 
34 XVIII, 216. 
35 XVIII, 216. 
36 XVIII, 217. 
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This means that the American Republia is grounded in the 
real order in a oonarete recognition of rights which are above 
it, superior to it, whioh represents a law whioh it oannot vio-
late. These rights are based upon God's law. Sinoe it is the 
purpose of the state to protect them. God's law is already em-
bodied in the state itself. It is adopted in its constitution. 
Thus the ohuroh and the state are united by the faot that both 
recognize and obey one and the same law of God. 
On this b&sis Brownson maintains that the atmosphere of 
American republicanism is oonduoive to the spread af Oatholio-
ity. In imitating as it does in its own feeble way the Trinity 
itself, it conforms to the prototype of all sooiety. It is thus 
based on the real order; it is not sectarian, copying its model 
only in its unity or diversity. It is oatholio, universal. For 
the simple reason that they are seats, protestant denominations 
are out of joint with that whioh is universal. Aooording to 
Browns on, they have "a. • .~half':"avowed. oonviation" tba. t they 
must unite, t:ba t they cannot sustain themselves in suoh an 
atmosphere. !rhus ''Whey hold conventions of delegates; they • • • 
form 'unions.' 'allianoes,• and •associations;' but, unhappily 
for their suooess, the oatholia ohuroh does not originate in 
convention •••• confederated seats are something very different 
37 
from a ohuroh inherently one and oatholio." 
37 XVIII, 215. 
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Since Amerioan republicanism is thus catholic, universal, 
the s&cts maintaining themselves in it are not on a basis of 
equality with the Ghurch. She is naturally superior to them, and 
a contest between them, especially in Ameriaa, is not a contest 
between equals: 
In the United States false religions are 
legally as free as the true religion; but 
all false religions being one-sided, sophist-
ical, uncatholio, are opposed by the princi-
ples of the state, which tend, by their silent 
but effective workings, to eliminate them 38 
Before concluding the discussion it is necessary to restate 
Brownson*s position. He has endeavored to show that American 
republicanism represents a good solution to the problem of indi-
vidual liberty in relation to public authority. Because it does 
so it also solves the problem of the nor.mal relationship between 
the church and state. In still other terms., he means that it is 
because the state has recognized and preserved the rights of God 
it has, and can have, no quarrel with the church. 
In order to clarify his thought, it is necessary to approac 
it from a slightly different viewpoint. It is necessary to re-
peat briefly his conception of individual rights as God's rights 
and the natural law as God's command to res1)eot the natural 
order. The natural order includes both the rights of the indi-
vidual and the rights of society. Sooiety is necessary and 
natural for man and man is naturally social; both hold rights 
38 XVIII, 212. 
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from God. The first aspect of this thought is that the individu-
al has rights which he holds independently of so~iety. In the 
event it recognizes individual rights above it, superior to it, 
which it cannot violate, the state is obeying God's command to 
preserve the natural order which includes such rights. It is in 
reality, although not in form, obeying God's moral law. As long 
as it continues to obey it the church can have no quarrel with 
the state. 
If, on the other hand, the state assumes jurisdiction over 
the conscience of the individual, it thereby disobeys Godts 
moral law. The church as the divinely appointed custodian of 
that law must, in such an event, quarrel with the state. Eccle-
siastical authorities must intervene, by turning politiGians, 
by extracting concordats, or in some other way, in order to se-
cure the rights which individuals hold from God. 
Suoh intervention is for Brownson abnormal rather than nor-
mal. Normally the ohurch and the state are distinct. 0ne oannot 
absorb the other. The church does not replaoe the state, render 
it unnecessary, superfluous. Nor is the contrary true. Each has 
a distinct funation. The ohurch and state must be distinct but 
not separated. Separation means that the church has no place in 
the state. It means the complete independence of the state -
absolutism. 
Thus Brownson advocates neither a mixture nor a separation 
of church~and state. The ideal is an intrinsio union of ohuroh 
and state based upon a mutual recognition and respect of God's 
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command to preserve the rights He has given to individuals, 
along with their distinction as external governing bodies. Such 
distinction is practicable no where else in the world because no 
where else is there a state which obliges itself, in its own in-
herent constitution, to obey God's natural law. For that reason 
the church is obliged elsewhere to become involved in political 
affairs, because without such intervention her right to exert 
her influence within the state would not be recognized. But this 
is necessary only when the state is so barbarously constituted 
that she must supervise its administration "••• in order to in-
fuse some intelligence into civil matters, and to preserve her 
39 
own rightful freedom and independence." 
Thus Brownson holds that the church and state in America 
are intrinsically united. Whether the founding fathers were 
aware of it or not, the constitution enacted is conducive to 
the spread of Catholicism. lt does not restrict, conflict with, 
or hamper in any way, the spiritual mission of the ohurch. 
This brief summary, based upon Brownson•s oonoeption of 
law as the command of God to preserve the natural order, has 
bean oonfined to the obligation of the state to preserve the 
natural order with respect to individuals. Since the natural 
39 XVIII, 218. Brownson believes that the only reason there were 
rights and duties in feudalism was because the churoh infused 
intelligence into oivil matters. Such rights were due not to 
the feudal constitution of sooiety, but to the ohuroh. XVIII, 
218. 
order includes society, the same command of God obliges the 
individual to sustain society. 
1~9 
Applied specifically to America, this means that allegiance 
is a moral obligation. Loyalty is a duty; duty discharged is a 
virtue. The preservation of this society may be, and in Brown-
son's estimation is, for the best interests of all concerned. 
Ye~ Brownson is never more violent in his denunciation of demo-
cratic tendencies than in his denunciation of the "stupid 
journalists and pothouse politicians" who urge allegiance on the 
ground that the American Republic is the best. They may prate, 
on the fourth of July, of the philosophical genius of the found-
ing fathers, of the burning decks of the Bon Homme Richard and 
the dark and dreary days of Valley Forge, of democracy as the 
finest form of government. This is not Brownson's vintage of 
patriotism. What is best, what is desireable, is no reason for 
allegiance. The obligation to sustain the republic is based 
upon God's command to preserve the natural order. l!'ailure to 
fulfill the obligation to sustain it is a failure to obey God's 
10 
law, whic~ commands the preservation of society. 
Brownson asks of Catholics, not only tnat they remember 
their obligations as citizens, but also that they study the 
American constitution in the light of their own theology. Their 
theology enables them to comprehend ·the difficult "unity in 
40 XVIII, 16-17; 69. 
41 
diversity-11 whiah is the glory of' American republicanism. 
On the basis of the oonoeption that Amer~an republicanism 
embodies the elements necessary for the solution of the problem 
of individual liberty in relation to public authority, it is 
thereby in possession of the elements necessary to solve practi-
cally the problem of the relationship between the ohuroh and the 
state. It is well qualified to solve that problem. The following 
passage represents the essence of what Brownson has endeavored 
to say: 
The religious mission of the United States 
is not then to establish the ohuroh by external 
law, or to protect her by legal disabilities, 
pains, and penalities against the seats, however 
unoatholio they may be; but to maintain Oatholio 
freedom, neither absorbing the state in the ohuroh 
nor the ohuroh in the state, but leaving eaoh to 
move freely, aooording to its own nature, in the 
sphere assigned it in the eternal order of things. 
The effects of this mission of our country 
fully realized, would be to harmonize church and 
state, religion and politics, not by absorbing 
either in the other, or by obliterating the natural 
distinction between them, but by conforming both 
to the real or divine order, whioh is supreme and 
immutable. It places the two powers in their 
normal relation, whiah has hitherto never been 
done, because hitherto there has never been a state 
normally constituted •••• 
Vlhether the Amerioan people will prove faith-
ful to their mission, and realize their destiny, 
or not, is known only to Him from whom nothing 
is hidden. Providence is free and leaves always 
41 "Oatholios are better fitted by their religion to compre-
hend the real oharaoter of the American constitution than 
any other olass of Americans, the moment they study it in 
the light of their own theology.n XVIII, 192. 
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a space for human free will. The American 
people can fail, and will fail, if they 
neglect the appointed means and conditions 
of success. 42 
42 XVIII, 217-219. Brownson concludes this passage optimisti-
cally, saying there is nothing in the past history of the 
country to indicate that it will fail. Some ten years later, 
however, he indicates his disappointment in the interest of 
Catholics in political affairs, saying that those who are 
politicians apparently forget about such factors as honesty, 
almost as much so as their Protestant brethern. He is dis-
appointed also in their lack of interest in the constitution, 
which they are well qualified to understand, saying that 
they know as little about it as Protestants. Even then he is 
a little optimistic that Oatholicrs will eventually raise the 
moral standards of parties instead of lowering themselves to 
party levels. These views appear in October, 1874, October, 
1875. XVIII, 562-598. His last artiole concludes: "Let them 
[Catholics] study to understand and perform the duties, as 
well as to understand and claim the rights of American 
citizens, and all may yet go well." XVIII, 598. 
CHAPTER X 
COUCLUSION 
The exposition of Brownson's political philosophy begins 
with a discussion of the rights of the individual. On the basis 
of his doctrine of communion, Brownson shows that man may sus-
tain his existence and attain to his end by communing with God 
through religion, property and society. The individual does 
not derive from society the right to practice his religion and 
to sustain his existence by using the natural forces God has 
created for that purpose. 
While admitting the possibility of proving philosophically 
the proposition that the individual has rights which the state 
may not violate, Brownson shows also that without the Catholic 
religion the individual has no practical guarantee that his 
rights will be preserved. ·,n thout the Ohurch the power to de-
termine whether or not a right has been violated must be lodged 
in either the individual or the state. Neither alternative is 
acceptable. The practical adoption of the principle that the 
individual possesses complete judicial power involves anarchy; 
if such power is attributed to the state there is no guarantee 
against absolutism. 
Continuing his exposition, Brownson endeavors to show that 
right is consequent upon ownership and coextensive with it. 
The maker of a thing is its owner. God has made all things with 
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out using any previously existing material. Therefore His owner-
ship is complete. Because it is complete, all things are owed 
to Him alone. From this viewpoint Brownson maintains that God 
is the sole and exclusive legislator, for He alone determines 
the obligations of creatures and states the conditions upon 
which He will receive payment of that which is due to Him. 
God's laws are written in the universe He has created. 
Since He has created the natural order, it is evident that God 
wills its preservation. In terms of God as sole and exclusive 
owner, this means that creatures pay their devt to God at least 
partially by respecting the things He has given to them. 
The state is included in the natural order whose preserva-
tion is commanded by God. Brownson begins his proof of this 
proposition with a refutation of contrary theories. The most 
important of these is the theory which endeavors to account for 
the origin of society and its authority on a purely human basis. 
It presents itself under two aspects: one of these, called the 
social contract theory, attempts to account for the origin of 
society in the people considered distributively; the other, the 
democratic theory, attempts to account for the origin of auth-
ority in the people considered collectively. 
Brownson rejects the contract theory because it falsely 
assumes that man is a social animal only subsequently to his 
free decision to become one. Therefore it postulates an unreal 
state of nature. Society must be totally artificial, a pro-
duction de B£!£• Furthermore the theory supposes that govern-
ment is purely contractual; consequently any three individuals 
may convene and contract to authorize a government. Moreover, 
the contract could bind only the contracting parties. Under the 
contract the individual must surrender either all or none of 
his rights. A via media is impossible. This means either des-
potism or anarchy. Because of these and other absurdities in-
volved in it, the theory must be rejected. 
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The democratic theory asserts that the people collectively 
have the right to rule. Their sovereignty is inherent and un-
derived. Stated simply, it is repugnant, for it leaves no free-
dom for the individual. Consequently a formal refutation of the 
theory is unnecessary. Brownson therefore endeavors to show that 
while the theory is not promulgated openly, absolutism is in-
volved in the equalitarian frenzy of the age. Movements toward 
political and therefore social equality assume that man's good 
is in the temporal order. They can culminate logically only in 
absolutism. 
Having rejected the most important of the erroneous 
theories of the origin of society and its authority, Brownson 
begins the statement of his own views with a criticism of the 
patriarchal theory of the state. He maintains that the state is 
radically different from the family and is not developed from 
it by a process of mere growth or evolution in time. Authority 
in the family is vested in the father who is its natural head 
whereas the authority of the state must be a public trust rather 
than a personal right. The state must be a commonwealth or a 
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!!! Eublica. It must be based upon a territory commonly held. 
Since the state is essentially a commonwealth, its auth-
ority inheres in the people collectively. It is derived from 
God through the law of nature, which is God's command to pre-
serve natural order. In view of the fact that God's command, 
which is never in contradiction with itself, is the source of 
both the rights of the individual and the authority of the 
state, a conflict between individual liberty and public author-
ity is impossible. The practical solution of the problem re-
quires a recognition of the authority of the Church. 
Brownson views the state as an organism. Man is at once an 
entity and a member of society. From this latter viewpoint he 
may be considered as a part of society. Society, being necessary 
for manta welfare, is a great good. 
Brownson's conception of the state thus far is that of an 
organic people attached to a definite territory. It includes 
also the idea that common habits and traditions represent the 
basic unifying factors of such a people. Brownson speaks of 
these factors in terms of the unwritten or providential consti-
tution of the state. 
On"the basis of his unwritten constitution Brownson dis-
tinguishes sharply between the state itself and the ministers 
authorized to exercise its authority. A people attached to a 
territory and independent of every other people is by that fact 
a nation de jure. It derives authority from God through the law 
of nature. Its authority inheres in the organism; it possesses 
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authority as long as its organic constitution remains intact. 
Thus a nation may survive the destruction of a particular govern 
ment. 
While Brownson maintains that a nation de facto is a nation 
de jure, he does not hold that every government able to maintain 
itself is legitimate. A government is legitimate only if it is 
authorized by the nation, which may dismiss its rulers or change 
its form of government v1henever such action is for the public 
welfare. 
Brownson is not interested in ascertaining the merits of 
one form of government as opposed to another. He maintains that 
no one form is inherently superior to another. His primary con-
cern is to retain any form that is in harmony with the habits 
and traditions of a people. 
Brownson applies these pr·inciples particularly to the 
United States. He is obliged to show that the states were not 
severally sovereign nations at the termination of the revolu-
tionary war, for if they were, they would retain the right to 
resume their original status as sovereign nations. He argues for 
an original union on the ground that the colonies acted jointly 
while still under the dominion of Britain; they made a joint 
declaration of independence; it was through their joint action 
that they wrested sovereignty from Britain. With the termination 
of the war the successfully rebelled oolonies oontinued to act 
jointly in order to suooeed in performing all of the funotions 
consequent upon an independent nation. Thus the people who have 
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wrested sove.reiB'.nty and who have maintained their politioal 
independenoe of other nations are a people distributed into dis-
tinct states acting jointly. 
The fundamental organ through which the nation expresses 
its will is the convention. The people assembled in this way 
have authorized a general government whose p~er is restricted 
to matters pertaining to the general welfare. The powers of the 
particular state government are restricted to particular inter-
ests. 
This division of power, based upon distinct territorial 
units within the nation itself, is distinctively American; it 
is found nowhere else in the world. Its merit lies in the fact 
that it provides for the exercise of power while guarding effect 
ively against its excessive centralization. This arrangement 
must be preserved, not only because of its intrinsic merits but 
because it is in.harmony with the unwritten constitution of the 
nation. Both states and states acting jointly are and have been 
essential parts of the nation. 
The constitutional republicanism of the United States 
represents the best practical solution of the problem of indi-
vidual liberty in relation to public authority. The nation has 
pledged itself to preserve the rights which God has given to 
individuals. Thus there has been a practical recognition of_the 
supremacy of God's law. The state is consciously aware of the 
fact that there is a domain upon whioh it is forbidden to 
trespass. 
In pledging itself to observe the rights of individuals the 
state has embodied God's law in its constitution. This law rep-
resents an internal bond or union between the ohuroh and state 
whioh is better for the ohuroh than any other oonoeivable 
arrangement. The atmosphere of Amerioan republioanism is parti-
oularly oonduoive to the spread of Oatholioity. Catholios are 
obliged as oitizens to preserve the Ameriaan Republic. The 
obligation is based upon God's oommand to preserve the natural 
order. Their aotive and intelligent interest in political affair 
is neoessary to sustain the republio. With their cooperation the 
Amerioan Republio will solve not only the problem of individual 
liberty in relation to publio authority, but also the problem 
of perfeoting the harmonious relationship alreading existing 
between the Ohuroh and state. 
This brief statement of Brownson's position indicates 
1 
first of all that he is not a oonsistent Thomist. One of the 
first indications of that faot is to be found in Brownson's 
disoussion of law wherein he takes the position that it is 
primarily an aot of the will, whereas st. Thomas indioates 
2 
olearly that law is an aot of reason. Brownson, moreover, does 
1 While we shall attempt to oompare and to oontrast briefly the 
position of Brownson with that of st. Thomas, who is seleoted 
as a prominent representative of the great Christian tradi-
tion, no attempt is made to explain or to present a detailed 
exposition of Thomistic politioal philosophy. 
2 s.Th., 1-2, q.90, a.l, a; and ad 8~nd a.4, a. 
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not indicate clearly the metaphysical basis for his views as 
3 
does St. Thomas. 
Brownson refuses to discuss the merits of one form of 
government as opposed to another. He maintains that no one form 
is inherently superior to another and that the question cannot 
be discussed apart from a concrete situation. st. Thomas, on 
the other hand, appears to adopt the view that a monarchy is the 
4 
best form of government. Brownson, furthermore, states explicit 
ly that a particular nation, the American Republic, ha~ devised 
the best practical solution of the problem of individual liber-
ty in relation to public authority, whereas the analysis of st. 
Thomas is never confined to a particular civil order. 
Brownson's emphasis upon a clearly defined territory as a 
basis for political authority is also a departure from the tra-
dition. While st. Thomas discusses the importance of a suitable 
locality he does not do so with a view to showing that it is 
5 
necessary for authority. The same may be said of Brownson's 
. -: um 3 s.Th., 1, q.l6, a.4,ala. ~.Also, as Gilson points out, the 
intellect is for st.~homas superior to the will(E.Gilson, 
The Philosoph~ of St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Louis, 1937, 295-
297} whereas Brownson has maintained that the will is super-
ior to the intellect. 
4 He does so unequivocally in De RTf•• Bk. 1, oh. 2. The 
question is also discussed in-s. ., 1-2, q.95, a.4, a., 
wherein the merit of each form is discussed and the conclusion 
seems to be that the ideal is a combination of the best 
features of each. st.Thomas also says that a free and intelli-
gent people may flourish Under a democracy. ~., q.97, a.l, 
a. 
5 De Reg., Bl.2, chs, 1,2,3,4. 
l 
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attempt to determine the fundamental factors which unify a 
people. On this point he emphasizes particularly the oommon 
habits and customs whiah develop with a people. These are for 
the most part unwritten but nevertheless important as unifying 
factors. 
P. 0 
Brownson's doctrine of the ideal relationship between 
ahurch and state is in some respeats a departure from tradition-
al doatrine. Both Brownson and st. Thomas agree that the ahurah 
6 
is superior to the state. Brownson's doatrine of the union of 
ahurch and state existing in the Ameriaan republic is a depart-
ure from the traditional conception of that relationship. 
While Brownson's doctrine is alearly different from that 
of st. Thomas in the instances cited, it is rather difficult to 
determine whether or not other views of Brownson are tradition-
al. Brownson states explicitly that political authority is 
vested in the people considered as a community. The most that 
aan be said safely is that this appears to be the doctrine of 
7 
St. Thomas. 
Brownson's doctrine that a nation de facto is a nation de 
jure is not so much a departure from the tradition as a prima 
facie view would indicate. If he held the view that any govern-
ment able to maintain itself is legitimate, his doctrine would 
be absurd. One phase of it, that the nation derives authority 
6 De Reg., Bk.l, ah. 14. 
7 S.Th., 1-2, q.l05, a.1, a.; Ibid,, q.90, a.3, ad. a.~. 
from God through the natural law seems to be consistent with 
tradition as represented by st. Thomas, who also accepts the 
8 
view that the authority of society is natural. The other phase 
2ll 
of the same doctrine includes the view that whenever a politi-
cal community finds itself subject to no other political power, 
regardless of the circumstances leading to such a situation, 
the community is authorized under the natural law to institute 
and maintain a government of its own. This part of the doctrine 
is certainly not traditional. Distinct nations in the modern 
sense of the term did not exist at the time af st. Thomas. Con-
sequently it seems reasonable to conclude that st. Thomas does 
not discuss explicitly questions concerning the conditions 
under which a political community has the right to complete 
political self-determination. Brownson furthermore makes a 
sharp distinction between a nation with a spirit of its own and 
the gov-ernment authorized by the nation, whereas I cannot find 
this distinction in st. Thomas. It seems impossible to find any 
similarity between Brownson and st. Thomas on this point. 
Other doctrines presented by Brownson are traditional. He 
takes the position that the individual has rights which the 
state may not violate. st. Thomas also states clearly that in 
matters pertaining to his bodily welfare, such as nourishment 
8 De Reg., Bk. 1, ch. 1; S.Th., 2-2, q.l04, a.l, c. 
2 2 
and generation, as well as in matters pertaining to the internal 
9 
movements of his will, the individual is subjeot only to God. 
Brownson, in some respeots, also aooepts the dootrine of 
St. Thomas on law. Both agree that the individual is bound in 
oonsoienoe to obey legitimate enaotmenta, while those that are 
unjust or oontravene in any way the law of God are null and void 
10 
from the beginning. 
For Brownson as well as st. Thomas the purpose of authority 
is to direot, not to ooeroe. The authority of the state must be 
used to promote the publio welfare rather than the private inter 
11 
ests of the ruler. There is no indioation in either that auth-
ority is a neoessary evil. 
There is also a substantial agreement on the dootrine that 
man is naturally sooial. This, of oourse, is olearly the dootrinE 
12 
of st. Thomas. ·Further, both agree that while man is an entity 
13 
he may be oonsidered also as a part of sooiety. Brownson also 
oonours in the view of st. Thomas that the state is speoifioally 
14 
different from the family. 
9 s.Th., 2-2, q.l04, a.5, a. 
10 s.Th., 1-2, q.96, a.4, o. The exposition· of st. Thomas in 
regard to the oriteria for determingng whether or not a given 
enaotment is to be obeyed, is muoh more satisfaotory than 
that of Brownson. 
11 De ~eg., Bk. 1, oh.l. 
12 De Reg., Bk I, oh. 1. 
13 s.Th., 1-2, q.90, a.3, ad. 3~; of. also 2-2, q.97, a.lO, 
ad. 2~. 
14 s.Th., 2-2, q.97, a.ll, o. 
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As indicated already, Brownson adopts the view of st. Thom-
as that man, being insufficient for himself, requires society to 
supply the goods he cannot acquire without cooperation. st. 
Thomas states further that men form groups for the purpose of 
living well together. He continues that "••• a good life is a 
virtuous life. Therefore a virtuous life is the end for which 
15 
men form groups." This end is for both Brownson and st. Thomas 
ordained to the supernatural end of the individual; society is 
16 
merely one of the means which enables man to attain to his end. 
And finally, for both, the state is not directly concerned with 
17 
the supernatural end of man. 
In attempting to evaluate Brownson's work, his position is 
examined first of all from the viewpoint of consistency. As is 
evident, Brownson has shifted positions frequently. Prior to 
the election of 1840 he was not so keenly aware of the harmful 
tendencies of popular rule and consequently did not berate 
democracy to the extent that he did thereafter. There was a 
15 De ~eg., Bk 1, ch. 14. 
16 De~., Bk. 1, ch. l;cf. also the following: "Therefore it 
IS not the ultimate end of an assembled multitude to live 
virtuously, but through virtuous living to attain to the 
possession of God." Ibid., ch. 14. For Brownson sooiety cre-
ates a medium in which religion may exe•t her supernatural 
energy and it also "••• contributes as a powerful means to 
the fulfillment by man of the divine purpose in his exist-
ence." XVIII, 15. 
17 De Reg., Bk. 1, ch. 14. 
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radiaal ahange in his views around 1861 when he developed his 
theory of an original union of states. 
Brownson•s early view of the state was bas&d1largely upon 
his interpretation of the Flatonia theory of ideas. While he 
abandoned it later, after his aonversion in 1844 When he beaame 
familiar with the writings of Catholia theologians, he retained 
a tendenay to Platonize. Immediately after his aonversion 
Brownson abandoned the doatrine of aommunion whiah had led him 
to the Churah, but about ten years later he ~egan again to 
write in terms of this doatrine. 
While he has maintained aonsistently the view that oatho-
liaity is neaessary to sustain any state, but partiaularly 
those whose administration is largely popular, his view of the 
union of ahurah and state is first stated in his Ameriaan 
Republic. Although Brownson said that this work represents the 
final and definitive statement of his views, this point is 
developed in greater detail in his later essays, partiaularly 
throughout volume thirteen of his Works. Although his first 
essays on the origin and ground of government inalude an ex-
pliait statement of the dootrine that a olearly defined terri-
tory is an essential element of the state, it is in his Amari-
~ Republia that he first speaks of territorial demoaraay. It 
is in the same work that he first maintains that the essential 
oharaoteristio of barbarism is the oonoeption of power as a 
personal privilege, whereas in the oivil order it is a public 
trust. 
2l5 
The inconsistencies stated thus far indicate Brownson's 
intellectual honesty and his merit, rather than his deficiency 
as a thinker. He has no love for a theory because it is his own 
intellectual child. He confesses his readiness to accept truth 
wherever he finds it, regardless of consequences to personal 
prestige or temporal well being. His own justification for 
shifting positions is adequate: nnoubtless we have changed our 
opinions on many subjects, for we do not happen to be of the 
18 
number whom experience cannot profit or events enlighten." "But 
it is no crime to grow wiser with years and to profit by ex-
19 
perience or the grace of God.n 
Of particular importance in attempting to evaluate Brownson 
is the fact that he has attempted to present systematically and 
coherently his best thoughts on political philosophy in his 
American Republic. In fact Brownson observes that this work 
represents his best as well as his final and definitive views 
on the subject. Taking him at his word, critics of Brownson's 
20 
political position seldom go beyond this work. 
18 XVII, 583. 
19 Essays and Reviews Chiefly on Theology, Politics and 
Socialism, New York, 1852, IX. 
20 Hate, for example, the followj_n·~-: "T~;:.kj_ng Henry B1·ownson' s 
sununary of The p.meri can Republic as the basis of discussion 
at this point •••• n Maynard, 343. In all probability Maynard 
refers to Literary! Scientific and Political Views of Oreste~ 
A. Brownson, selected from his works by Henry F. Brownson, 
!few York, 1893, 154-202. Also, "The present paper confines 
itself to an analysis of The Amerjc ~.:m Republic since this 
work alone is remembered and because Brownson himself pre-
faced the val ume with the stnteme nt that it vias the final and 
definitive exposition of his views.n Cook and Leavelle, 77. 
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Unfortunately Brownson is deficient as a critic of Brownson 
His exposition in The American R~~blic is not his best. To sup-
port this evaluation it is necessary to recall that.Brownson was 
primarily a reviewer and a controversialist. The fact that he 
was a national figure, respected and sometimes revered, was due 
to his ability as a reviewer. His method was to analyze an 
issue and to strip it of embellishments; in the estimation of 
Lowell, already cited, this me~nt to beat first this half, then 
that, black and blue. 
The rough, independent reviewer professes in The Americran 
Republic to quarrel with no one. Consequently the Brownson who 
is a nstional figure because of his activity in a restricted 
sphere is consp~auous by his absenee in The American Republic. 
There is nothing in Brownson's habits or termperament to qualify 
him to write calmly and systematically as he professes to write 
in The Americlan _Republic. 
Furthermore, the reader is well aware of the fact that 
Brownson's tnly systematic treatise is characterized by termin-
ological inaccuracies. He does not indicate clearly and con-
sistently the sharp distinctions between state, government, 
written and unwritten constitutions, required by his system. It 
is true that anyone familiar with Brownson's essays is capable 
of judging his meaning within a giyen context, but the lack of 
consistent terminology in his only systematic exposition is 
inexcusable. 
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His terminological inac~uracy is also evident in his exposi 
tion of the "providential constitution." He became familiar with 
it through De Maistre. In his first review he accepted the 
theory whole heartedly. Later he became more critical. He used 
the term providen~a to signify the act whereby God sustains the 
existence of His creatures and directs them to their end. His 
primary purpose seems to be, in his later views, to convey the 
idea that the people as a nation depend upon God for their ori-
gin and continued existence to the same extent that individuals 
depend upon Him. While his purpose is good it is somewhat con-
fusing to present such a doctrine in terms of a "providential 
constitution," particularly when he also uses the term to signi-
fy the customs and traditions which unify a people. 
Because his systematic exposition is confusing in the im-
portant instances cited, the writer would treat ~he American 
Republic as nothing more than a summary of Brownson's views, 
convenient for those already familiar with them, but very liable 
to mislead those who approach it with the understanding that it 
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represents Brownson at his best. 21The adoption of this attitude 
on the part of his enthusiasts would be a great step toward 
securing a firm foundation for a revival of interest in Brown-
son. 
From the viewpoint of internal consistency, it must be 
conceded that Brownson's principles, at any particular period 
of his life, are in no sense mutually contradictory. Illustra-
ting that point, it must be recalled that Brownson endeavors to 
present a solution of the problem of individual liberty in re-
lation to public authority. In the first part of his solution, 
Brownson maintains that God is the complete owner of all things 
because He has created them. Consequently all things are owed 
to Him alone. This means that the individual is not an absolute 
21 Maynard, 340, for example, says that it is a pity the book 
has been neglected "••• as usually happens to anything a 
Catholic writes." Yet he maintains Brownson was "••• too 
prone to arrange his facts to support an a priori argument." 
344. He adds that Brownson spent a large part of his book 
proving what no sensible man ever doubted. 345. This latter 
statement is pure and simple rhetoric because comparatively 
little of that work is devoted to a discussion of democracy. 
Further, Maynard maintains that Brownson's various thesis 
are disconnected logically; it is unfortunate that he 
attempted to connect the latter part of the work with the 
first. 349. Mow if 'he American Republic is judged guilty 
on all of these important points common sense as well as 
consistency would seem to demand a clear-cut recognition 
of the fact that it is not the best of Brownson. The ex-
pression of a contrary opinion seems slightly absurd. 
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owner. He owns the things God has given to him, and his rights to 
them are real because of God's command. Thus the rights of the 
individual are guaranteed by the divine command. 
The same doctrine means that God as sole and complete owner 
possesses the right to define what is owed. In terms of law this 
means that God alone has the right to legislate or to impose ob-
ligations. He has imposed the obligation to preserve the natural 
order, which includes society. Authority is natural to society 
and therefore God's command to preserve the natural order is the 
source of the state~.authority. Since human legislators have no 
authority in their own name, they must exercise it as stewards 
of Him from whom all authority is derived. Thus a society abus-
ing power forfeits its right to legislate. 
Since the Church is the divinely appointed custodian of 
God's law, it has the right to determine whether or not the 
rights of the individual or the state are violated. Thus the 
rights of the individual a.nd the authority of the state are 
guaranteed by the representative of God. 
This position is, vdth some exceptions, tenable. So far as 
it is possible to determine, there is nothing philosophically 
2~ 
unsound in the doctrine that the maker has a right to his produo • 
22 Of., e.g., the foll-owing: "As effects follow their cause, so 
it is just and right that the results of labor should belong 
to him who has labored." Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, 8. 
Official translation in Joseph Husslein, The Christian Social 
l1:i.anifesto, New York, 1933. 
220 
On this basis it is possible to bring out olearly and in a rathe 
simple and striking way the view that the individual must render 
to His oreator the tribute of his being. It is only beoause it 
is God's will that a person is obliged to support the state and 
to obey its legitimate enactments. Thus there is a clearly de-
fined moral obligation of loyalty. Rulers, on the other hand, 
are made aware of the fact that they have no personal authority. 
They possess authority only as a trust and are consequently 
obliged to use it to 9romote the publio welfare. 
Inasmuch as Brownson's exposition is presented in familiar 
and acceptable terms, understandable even to those who are not 
trained philosophers, his approach is commendable. Inasmuch as 
he has not entered the realm of metaphysics in presenting his 
conception of law, his discussion is deficient. A Thomist would 
hardly embrace the doctrine that will is the basis of law. 
Brownson's position on the origin of authority from God 
through the natural law is sound. His refutation of contrary 
theories is particularly good. His criticism of the social con-
tract theory is irrefutable. He proves his point in argurnehts 
that are at once conclusive and easy to follow. 
The other phase of his doctrine in regard to rights in 
relation to law includes the view that the state must permit the 
Church full freedom to exert her influence; in the case of a 
conflict the state must yield to the superior authority. Nor is 
this allJ Catholicity is necessary to sustain the state. 
In asserting that position boldly and in defending it ably, 
particularly at a time when it was customar~ to assert timidly 
that allegiance to the pope did not conflict with loyalty to 
America, Brownson has made a contribution that is difficult to 
overestimate. His truculence, perhaps imprudent at the time, 
certainly succeeded in conveying to many the idea that Catholics 
are not required to apologize for their Catholicism. 
Brownson's ability to detect and ·to expose error is not 
confined to instances in which he examines a particular author. 
The Brownson writing on democratic and socializing principles 
has demonstrated his ability to perceive the dominant tendency 
of his age. Believing that the tendency toward totalitarianism 
requires refutation, he has channelized his energy, directing 
it toward the root-evil: the implication that material well-
being is an end in itself which cannot be attained without 
oooperetion. This granted, the equalitarian frenzy of the age, 
Brownson argues, finds its logical resting place only in the 
abolition of individuals as such. 
The fact that Brownson has waged war consistently against 
the tendency to adopt popular opinion as a criterion of morality 
on the ground that it is atheistic and therefore emphasizes the 
material rather than the spiritual is to his credit. He believed 
sincerely that such a tendency existed and that as a Catholic 
reviewer he was obliged to expose the danger involved in its 
acceptance. Aware of his responsibility, perhaps extremely so, 
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he oould not be induced to give up his oause for suoh trivi-
alities as popularity and wealth. For this he must be admired. 
Brownson's analysis and exposition of demooratio theories and 
23 
tendencies represents him at his best. 
Brownson's rejection of theories attempting to aooount for 
authority on a purely human basis leaves the reader in a posi-
tion that requires him either to aooept the view that authority 
oomes from God or to deny that the state has the right to 
govern. Brownson suooeeds in -proving that it ls illogical to 
accept the legitimacy of oivil government while denying its 
divine origin. 
Brownson's doqtrilJ.e on:authority, as we have seen, in-
eludes the view that it must be based upon territory. Brownson 
is undoubtedly oorreot in insisting upon the faot that the 
modern civilized state is inconceivable without a fixed terri-
tory and that attachment to territory is in itself a civilizing 
factor. The same doctrine also reiterates the view, whioh is 
well worth emphasizing, that authority exists and must be 
exercised for the public welfare. Whether territory is essen-
tial to authority and is the factor that disting~ishes oivili-
23 Maynard's opinion is exactly the opposite. He observes that 
Brownson in his incessant girding against demooraoy was 
wasting his energy: "Onoe again he triumphantly disproves 
what no sensible man ever doubted." 345. If Brownson warred 
with an imaginary enemy throughout his life, one wonders 
why Maynard thought him worthy of so muoh attention. 
zation from barbarism is a debatable question. 
There is in Brownson a clear recognition of the fact that 
a people develops distinctive habits and traditions as a nation 
and that these are important unifying factors. Written consti-
tutions and governments must be adapted to the nation. Govern-
ments cannot be introduced from without regardless of the cus-
toms of people to be governed. Americans, for example, would 
not be prepared to accept a monaroh; but it is equally obvious 
that a republican form of government would not work as well 
everywhere else as it has here. 
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Brownson's dootrines from this point are developed with 
partioular reference to American republicanism. The first of 
these is the view that any organized people in possession of a 
territory who find themselves subject to no other political 
power are by that fact authorized to institute and maintain 
oivil government. If the nation maintains itself and its govern-
ment fulfills its funot_ions, it is by that fact legitimate. It 
retains ita right to govern as long as it retains its unity as 
a nation. A government imposed from without through oonquest is 
illegitimate; the nation has a right to resist such a govern-
ment and to attempt to resume its own original status. A part 
of a nation oannot wage war merely to seoure oomplete politioal 
self-determination; war is justified only in the event of out-
rageous tyranny. 
This dootrine may be described best as an honest attempt 
r---------------------------------------------------~~24 
to justify the power of the American Republic. Brownson is cor-
rect in denying that a nation must come into existence right-
fully in order to be legitimate, for as he points out, it would 
be impossible to justify the power of any civilized nation on 
this basis. Although he was extremely patriotic, he did not en-
deavor to prove that England had forfeited her right to govern 
because of an abuse of power so serious that it justified a 
declaration of war; and here Brownson is to be commended both 
for his honesty and consistency in applying his principles. on 
the basis of Brownson's doctrine it is unquestionable that 
England had the right to rule her colonies. It was wrong to 
resist her enactments as long as there was no serious abuse of 
power. Furthermore Brownson could not accept, as a principle 
universally applicable, the right to revolt merely to secure 
complete political power. It is clear, therefore, that Brown-
son's doatrine that any organized people subject to no politi-
cal power other than their own have the right to institute and 
maintain government is the only basis on which he could justify 
the authority of the United States. Brownson's justification 
for the authority of the United States is probably as sound as 
any other. 
There is nothing objectionable in his view that a nation 
has a right to resist a government imposed through conquest as 
long as it retains its unity as a nation. The same may be said 
of his view that it is impossible to accept in principle the 
doatrine that a part of a nation has a right to rebel merely 
to secure complete political power. 
Brownson's exposition of the distinctive characteristic 
of American republicanism in terms of a division of power based 
upon distinct territorial units is clear and conVincing. There 
is a commendable insistence upon the doctrine that Ameriaa is 
a constitutional republic rather than a democracy reflecting 
popular whims. At least it is unquestionable that states were 
never intended to be mere administrative units of a supreme 
national government, and that America was not intended to be a 
"democracy" as Brownson understood the term. 
It is impossible to quarrel with Brownson's view that a 
legislator must do more than express the will of the majority 
of his constituents. It can be morally wrong for those in 
authority to bow to the will of the majority. Brownson, however 
overstates his case when he says that popular opinion is 
usually a compound of ignorance, passion, prejudice and caprice 
ever varying, condemning a Socrates one day to drink hemlock 
and erecting a temple to his memory the next. 
The culmination of Brownson 1 s thought is his doctrine of 
the union of Church and state in America. There is certainly 
no indication in Brownson that the state is separate from and 
superior to the Church. There is an explicit statement that the 
American solution to the problem of the relationship between 
Church and state, while the best for Ameriaa, is impracticable 
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anywhere else in the world, 
It is almost impossible to disagree with the thesis that 
there can be no conflict between the Church and state as long 
as the nation adheres to its pledge to protect the rights of 
individuals and not only permits but protects the right of the 
Church to exert her influence. An arrangement which would allow 
churchmen to devote all of their energy to spiritual matters 
is distinctly advantageous to the Church. While Brownson con-
fesses that the relationship between Church and state in Amer-
ica is not as yet ideal, he maintains, and rightly so, that 
American republicanism furnishes a basis for a more perfect 
solution of the problem. 
The argumentation whereby he supports his conclusion is 
sound. The Church as the custodian of the divine law is obliged 
to oppose any political power which violates that law. Conse-
quently an harmonious relo. tionshi:p is possible vthenever and 
wherever t:te ~t:~.:te observes tl-:'.c natural moral law. America has 
succeeded in preserving fo1· the individual the largest liberty 
he has ever known; it seldom trespasses upon the rights God 
has given to him. Therefore there is seldom a conflict between 
Church and state in America. Thus the elements whereby the 
rights of the individual are preserved, in this case territor-
ial democracy or constitutional republicanism based upon a 
division of power in terms of distinct territorial units, must 
be preserved in order to secure a harmonious relationship 
between the Church and the state. 
Brownson's final thesis is not without interest. He main-
tains that the active and intelligent interest of Catholics in 
political problems is essential to the preservation of the 
republic. With CDtholic support, the American Republic may 
succeed in perfecting the harmonious relationship already 
existing between the Church and state in America and thereby 
present the pest practical solution of the greatest problem of 
the age. It is regrettable that Brownson has not succeeded in 
arousing more interest in this thesis. 
The conclusion of the exposition of Brownson's political 
philosophy is simple. As a philosopher, attempting to present 
an organized and systematic treatise on political philosophy, 
Brownson is deficient. As a revi·ewer and controversialist, he 
writes with power and precision. It is in his discussion of 
particular problems that the reader of Brownson observes a 
logical mind in action. The Brownson writing on the social con-
tract theory, or the tendency toward totalitarianism, or 
Catholicity as essential to the maintenance of the American 
Republic, is an eminently worthwhile Brownson. These essays 
and those in which Brownson presents his views on American 
republicanism and the union of Church and state in America are 
an enduring monument to his genius. Only therein can the 
student grasp an appreciation of the force and value of Orestes 
Brownson. 
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